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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
P.W.S. Andrews held the Foundation Chair in Economics at the 
University of Lancaster from 1967 until his death in 1971. The 
previous thirty years were spent at Oxford, first at New College, 
then at Nuffield College, where he was an official fellow 1946 to 
1967. .
At Oxford Andrews was associated with the Oxford Economists' 
Research Group established in the 1930's to conduct empirical enquiries 
into aspects of business and business decision making. Particular 
emphasis was placed on evidence obtained from interviews with 
businessmen. He was involved in the publication of the Oxford 
Economic Papers, being Secretary of the editorial board from 1946 
until he left in order to found the Journal of Industrial Economics 
in 1952. The position as General Editor of this Journal he held for 
the rest of his life.
His major interest was in Industrial Economics and he carried 
out investigations of a variety of industries, including the textile, 
boot and shoe, and steel industries. He published widely, both 
journal articles and books. His publications include Capital 
Development in Steel, A Study of the United Steel Companies Ltd.
(1951), and The Life of Lord Nuffield (1955), both written in 
conjunction with Elizabeth Brunner. His interest in business and 
industry resulted not only in his empirical publications but also in 
the publication of two major theoretical works, Manufacturing 
Business (1949) and On Competition in Economic Theory. In the former 
he set out an alternative theory to, and in the latter an extended 
critique of, the neoclassical theory of the firm. It is Andrews' 
critique and his alternative theory that is the concern of this thesis.
ii.
ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Philip Andrews’ attempt to replace the 
theories of imperfect competition with his own theory of competitive 
oligopoly. It is argued that a proposed alternative to an existing 
theory will not be accepted unless it can be interpreted to fit into 
the current methodology of the discipline’s research programme. A 
new theory that would involve the rejection of the whole programme and 
not just the replacement of a sub-theory within the programme cannot 
succeed without a change in the goals of the discipline. To challenge 
the hard core of a research programme as Andrews did when he rejected 
the notion of equilibrium could be regarded as an attack on the 
discipline’s claim to being a science.
To develop this argument the thesis looks first at some 
alternative views of the way in which a discipline such as economics 
develops historically. Secondly it looks at neoclassical economics 
in its philosophical and epistemological framework, and then at the 
progressive elimination from economic theory of its non-Cartesian 
elements. The theories of imperfect competition are examined in the 
light of Andrews’ criticism and then there is a discussion of the 
reactions to Andrews' theory and to his critique. The reactions were 
varied and the interpretations of his ideas by different writers 
were contradictory. There appears to have been no agreement about 
what he was trying to do.
The thesis then considers Andrews’ theory in some detail, 
beginning with a discussion of its Marshallian origins and going on 
to consider the way he uses concepts such as the industry, competition,
m .
goodwill, and excess capacity. It also examines his use of the 
demand and cost relationships, and the difference between his approach 
and that of neoclassical theory. It is then argued that the issues of 
rationality and profit maximization which were seen by many critics to 
be central, were in fact not the key issues at all. Although it was 
not perceived to be so at the time, the most important aspect of 
Andrews' theory was the rejection of a structurally defined static 
equilibrium of price and output for individual firms. Andrews 
wanted to replace this equilibrium with a steady state of industry 
prices. The latter he thought was more realistic as it was arrived 
at through a competitive process taking place under real world 
conditions of uncertainty.
It was this rejection of equilibrium that struck at the heart 
of neoclassical theory and was the main reason why his theory of 
competitive oligopoly did not replace the neoclassical theories of 
imperfect competition.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
When Keynes died in 1946 he had brought about a revolution in 
economic theory. Economics as a discipline had been re-defined or 
rather, emphasis within the broad paradigm of economics had been 
changed. No longer was microeconomics the major pre-occupation of 
both theory and application, macroeconomics had come back, acquiring 
again the place it had held in the classical age - the age of 
’’magnificent dynamics”. Research, both theoretical and empirical was 
being carried out along Keynesian lines. Policies based on Keynesian 
theory were being introduced by many countries in the capitalist 
world and full employment had become a specific goal of responsible 
governments. Economic theory was being re-written along Keynesian 
lines and text books, whose purpose was to initiate students into the 
mysteries of economic theory, were also being re-written along 
Keynesian lines.
The latter was an important indication that a successful 
revolution has occurred, that a new theory had become dominant, for it 
is in text books that the currently accepted theories of a 
discipline are set out for all the world to see. Advanced work, going 
beyond the currently held views, is always being carried out, all 
sorts of revolutionary possibilities are explored, but until the new 
ideas appear in standard text books they have not succeeded in 
becoming part of the accepted body of knowledge of a discipline.
When Philip Andrews died in 1971 his attempted revolution had
2.
\failed. Except for a few close colleagues and former students no 
one was carrying out research based on Andrews’ ideas, and no 
government had introduced policies based on his ideas. Text books, 
if they mentioned him at all, did so only in a paragraph or a 
footnote, and were just as likely to misrepresent his views as not.
The theories he sought to replace still have a prominent place in 
modern text books.
Yet there were enough similarities in the aims of the two men,
in their theoretical antecedents and in the nature of their theories
to raise the question of why one succeeded so well and the other did 
2 .not. Both were dissatisfied with the then current theory’s
inability to reflect and deal with economic reality. Keynes
3emphasised the inappropriateness of neoclassical full employment 
equilibrium theory for dealing with questions relating to depression. 
Andrews was concerned with the inappropriateness of the theory of 
imperfect competition for dealing with questions relating to a major 
sector of modern economics, the industrial sector or, as he put it, 
manufacturing business. Both were schooled in Marshallian economics,
Whether it will never be successful is another matter; theories and 
ideas, especially in economics, often make a comeback when the 
attention of the discipline has shifted so that questions and 
methods of answering them come to be seen to be appropriate where 
they were not before. An example of this is the long gap between 
Cournot’s exposition of marginalism and its incorporation into the 
mainstream of economic theory,
Not that success is ever final, the current challenge to Keynesian 
orthodoxy by the monetarists is an indication of this.
3 .What he called classical.
^The perfectly competitive theory of the firm he thought 
inappropriate for manufacturing business also, but he wanted to 
retain the theory of the perfectly competitive industry for 
commodity markets.
3.
Marshall was their academic ancestor, and both wanted to introduce 
alternative theories that included time, uncertainty and a major role 
for expectations. Both were concerned to find a solution to the 
problems of capitalism that did not involve replacing it with 
socialism.
Why was Keynes’ revolution successful and Andrews’ not? A simple 
answer is that Keynes’ alternative was better than the one he wanted 
to replace and Andrews’ was not. But this is really no answer at all, 
for it raises a multitude of further questions: ”In what sense is one 
theory better than another?” "What criteria are used to decide?”
"Are the theories really alternatives in that they are attempting to 
answer the same questions?” "Who does the deciding?" The answers to 
these and other questions require examination of the nature and 
purpose of theories, and the epistemological presuppositions on which 
they are based. When we consider theory or concept change in a 
particular discipline we are considering the history of that 
discipline, the history of a particular body of knowledge, so that 
ideas on the nature of history must be considered. Whether Theory A 
is better than Theory B is not a simple question, and cannot have a 
simple answer.
This paper is an examination of a particular episode in the
history of economic theory, the unsuccessful attempt of Philip
Andrews to turn mainstream microeconomics away from what he thought
5 , . ,was the false turning it had taken after Marshall. That is, he 
wanted to do away with the theory of the firm, especially as 
developed by Robinson and Chamberlin, and replace it as a model for
5It does not attempt to examine why, and in what sense, Keynes was
successful, though comments on this are included where they appear
to me to be relevant to Andrews’ case.
manufacturing industry by his own theory of competitive oligopoly.
It is a particular attempt to bring about concept change that is 
being considered. This attempt is examined in the light of a 
particular view of the development of scientific theories and of the 
reasons for theory change, namely that the philosophical background of 
a discipline has an important effect on the kind of theories it 
develops, on what is regarded as the scope of the discipline and on 
which theories will be allowed to revolutionize it. In this view, 
the absolute presuppositions of a science determine the types of 
theory and methodology that are regarded as acceptable by the 
scientific profession. While there are other supplementary factors 
to be considered, the philosophical framework of a discipline is the 
most important reason for the acceptance or rejection of new theories.
When Andrews presented his alternative theory the profession of 
economics had become increasingly to regard only static equilibrium 
models based on Cartesian epistemology as appropriate for scientific 
economics. Andrews’ model did not fit within this methodology and 
could not be made compatible with it. His challenge, though directed 
at imperfect competition theory, which was one of a group of theories 
making up neoclassical economics, struck at the basis of the whole 
neoclassical paradigm. It was much more revolutionary in its 
implications than Andrews intended. Andrews’ incompatibility with 
the dominant Cartesian methodology was not the only factor in 
explaining his failure though I would argue that it was the most
5.
. 6important.
Various other factors have been suggested as contributing causes
It has been suggested, for example, that Andrews wrote his theory
and criticism too far apart and in the wrong order for maximum 
. 7 . .impact, that he wrote for businessmen in an era when economics had 
become a profession, that he was an Englishman writing at a time 
when academic hegemony was passing to the Americans, that his work 
seemed particularly directed to the British economy and that he 
presented a non-mathematical theory when econometrics was in the 
ascendancy. The last was largely responsible for his work being 
regarded as descriptive rather than analytical. All of these factors 
I think, have some explanatory value. On the other hand the idea 
that the obscurity of his style was responsible for his rejection is 
less convincing, Keynes style is hardly a masterpiece of lucidity 
especially in the General Theory; less convincing too is the argument 
that Andrews was rejected on ideological grounds, that the economics 
establishment, being left wing socialists, did not like his defence 
of capitalism.
I will argue, therefore, that the most important reason for
gThere are important elements in Keynes, too, that are incompatible 
with this methodology. A version of Keynes’ theory became orthodox 
as a result of a process in which the emphasis on these incompatible 
elements was reduced. Keynesian economics succeeded, only by 
distorting the economics of Keynes, removing its really 
revolutionary elements. This proposition is argued in detail in
A. Leijonhufvud (1970), On Keynesian Economics and the Economics of 
of Keynes, Oxford University Press, and in Piero Mini (1974), 
Philosophy and Economics, University Presses of Florida.
7 . .Manufacturing Business (1949a), Lond., Macmillan, is the theory,
On Competition in Economic Theory (1964b), Lond., Macmillan, is the 
critique.
8A mistake Keynes did not make.
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Andrews’ rejection was that his methodology was regarded by the 
reference group of the profession as inappropriate and unscientific, 
because the view of the world on which it was based was incompatible 
with the Cartesian world view on which neoclassical economics was 
based.
In developing this argument I will proceed as follows:
To examine some alternative views on the historical process 
that is science, with particular reference to the nature of concept 
change.
To consider the philosophical basis of economics and the effect 
this had had on the body of economic knowledge that was current when 
Andrews wrote.
To discuss the nature of the reaction to Andrews’ proposed 
alternative and the factors that contributed to its rejection.
To make a detailed comparison between Andrews’ theory and the 
theory of imperfect competition it was to have replaced.
CHAPTER II
SCIENCE, HISTORY AND ECONOMICS
Science can be defined as the systematic and orderly asking of
questions about aspects of the world in order to find out some kind 
. lof truth about its nature. The definition can be applied equally
well to questions about the social world which man creates for
himself as about the physical world which exists independently of man.
The purpose of scientific enquiry is to develop "a logically
2articulated structure of justifiable beliefs about nature". However, 
logic is a characteristic of the internal structure of a theory; it 
has no part to play in the choice between theories. Logic is not 
relevant when we ask whether one theory explains the world better 
than another.
Scientists attempt to make a convincing story about the world
but scientific knowledge is never certain or final.
"[[The scientistDis aware of the good luck that 
helped him discover theories that fit the given 
observations, and which made later observations 
fit his theories. He realizes that discrepancies 
and new difficulties may arise at any moment and 
he will never claim to have found the ultimate 
truth.
^This definition is the one used by R.G. Collingwood (1940), 
Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, p.4.
^Medawar (1969), Induction and Intuition m  Scientific Thought, Lond., 
Methuen, p.59 - Medawar was writing of the physical and natural^ 
sciences. A similar approach is seen by Stretton to be appropriate 
for what he calls the political sciences including history,^ 
economics, sociology. H. Stretton (1969), The Political Sciences, 
Lond., Routledge 6 Kegan Paul.
3Reichenbach (1957), The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, University of 
California Press, p.43.
7.
8.
While most modern writers on the nature of science would find 
little to disagree with in what I have said so far, from this point 
on there is a divergence between those who take the view that
progress in science involves a movement towards some absolute
. qultimate truth and those who believe all truth to be relative.
Which view is held affects one’s approach to the history of science, 
a point I elaborate later.
The questions asked by scientists stem from presuppositions held
by the questioner. These presuppositions are relative to and depend
upon the deeper absolute presuppositions of a particular world view,
those presuppositions which are taken to be so self evidently true
that they often do not enter the scientific consciousness. For
example, a basic presupposition of all science is that it is possible
by systematic enquiry to discover important truths about the real
world. In other places and other times important truths were thought
to be discoverable only by revelation. The idea that truth is to be
found by active enquiry rather than by passive receptivity is an
absolute presupposition of the scientific world view. Not only is
science in general based on presuppositions, but particular
scientific methodologies all have their own presuppositions.
’’...all methodologies make cosmological assumptions.
The naive falsificationist assumes that there are 
no oceans of anomalies. The conventionalist assumes 
that the world is built in a simple way. The research
^Toulmin has an extended discussion on this dichotomy. He uses as 
examples of the polar views the ideas of Frege and Collingwood.
My own views, as will become apparent, lean towards the latter, 
thus this thesis is developed within a broadly relativistic 
framework. S. Toulmin (1972), Human Understanding Volume I, Oxford, 
Clarendon Press.
9.
programmist assumes that progress, once realised, 
does not put an end to further progress and that it 
leads to truth.”5 6
0
In Nagel's account of science he makes the point that we do not 
know whether the premises assumed in the explanation of the sciences 
are true. If the requirement that these premises must be known to be 
true were adopted most of currently accepted scientific explanations 
would have to be discarded as unsatisfactory. Scientific truth then 
becomes a relative truth; it is what scientists believe to be true 
not what has been proved to be true.
The knowledge that science is based on faith, on absolute 
presuppositions, has not damaged the status and authority of science, 
but rather increased it.
"Modern philosophers have excused this unaccountable 
belief in science, by declaring that the claims of 
science are only tentative and ever open to refutation 
by adverse evidence. And this has added to the 
authority of science. It was taken to show that, 
while scientific knowledge was extremely reliable, 
scientists were at the same time supremely open- 
minded, setting thereby an example of incomparable 
modesty and tolerance."7
The presuppositions of science affect the judgements by which one 
theory is said to be better than another. These presuppositions and 
the value judgements related to them are not uniform. There are 
differences between disciplines and between individuals which lead to 
different assessments of the value of particular theories and types
5Paul Feyerabend (1976), "On the Critique of Scientific Reason" in
C. Howson, ed. (1976), Method and Appraisal in the Physical Sciences, 
Cambridge University Press, p.323 (footnote).
6Ernst Nagel (1961), The Structure of Science, N.Y., Harcourt Brace 6
World, p.43.
7M. Polanyi (1967), "The Growth of Science in Society", Minerva Vol.5,
p . 533.
10.
of theories and methods - a very important point for this thesis.
Absolute presuppositions are not verifiable, falsifiable or even
in principle testable. To speak of testing a presupposition implies
that it is a relative one. In relation to absolute presuppositions
the following are nonsense questions: "Is it true?" "What evidence
is there?" "How can it be demonstrated?"
Every question involves a presupposition; whether the answer
follows logically from the question does not depend on the truth of
the presupposition or even on whether the questioner believes it to
be true. Propositions (statements) are answers to questions, a
relative proposition stands relatively to one question as its
presupposition and relatively to another as its answer. When we push
our questions far enough back we get to the absolute presuppositions
. 9which cannot be propositions, they cannot be answers to questions.
"The various prejudices ^presuppositions] current 
at various times have tended to deceive such 
inquirers into thinking that the conclusions they 
have reached will hold beyond the limit of that 
group and that time. They may even imagine that 
an absolute presupposition discovered within 
these limits can be more or less safely ascribed 
to all human beings everywhere and always."8 910 *
The absolute presuppositions that are used are not derived from
experience but are "catalytic agents, which the mind must bring out
of its own resources to manipulate what is called experience and
11 .convert it to science and civilization". That is, they are used to
8See also P. Feyerabend (1976), op.cit., p.316.
9R. Collingwood (1940), op.cit., pp.22-33.
^ibid., p.57.
^ibid., p.197.
11.
organize and make sense of experience. We need institutions to
perpetuate and legitimate these ideas. In science these institutions
are the discipline, the profession, and the reference group. The
institutions and the presuppositions are subject to change over time,
and while the institutions perpetuate a world view, neither they nor 
. 12it are permanent or changeless. Nevertheless, changes in world 
views of scientists or anyone else are not easy to bring about. They
are not superficial changes of fashion and do not result from people
. 13just wanting to believe something new and different. A concept
change that involves a basic change in a world view, in the
presuppositions of a science, is much harder to bring about than a
theory change which involves replacing one theory by another within
the same world view.
"Scientists are not searching for any kind of 
truth; ... they are rather searching for an interesting 
truth, that is to say, for theories that enable them to 
explain and predict the behaviour of phenomena in which 
they are interested.” 1̂
It is not possible for the historian of science to answer the question
of why an individual finds certain phenomena interesting and others
do not, why a particular person develops an interest in certain areas
15and develops a theory to account for the problems he sees. The 123*
12See S. Toulmin (1972), op.cit., especially Section B, "Rational 
Enterprises and their Evolution".
13R. Collingwood (1940), op.cit., p.48.
1I+B. Easlea (1973), Liberation and the Aims of Science, London, 
Chatto and Windus, p.4.
^For an expansion of this idea see P. Mini (1974), op.cit.,
pp.178 ff.
1 2.
historian of a science cannot hope to explain the origins of
individual thought but can hope to throw some light on why ideas
developed by individuals are accepted or rejected by the groups of
individuals making up a professional discipline.
By examining the philosophical presuppositions of a particular
discipline at a particular time, we should be able to explain why
particular theories are accepted despite the anomalies and counter
16instances which are always present, why some alternatives succeed 
and others fail. Philosophical presuppositions are a very important 
factor in determining whether one theory will replace another, whether 
a new theory is regarded as a "better” theory or not, in explaining
why a theory does or does not become part of the collective and public
. • • 17enterprise that is a current science.
Despite the best efforts of writers such as Popper and Lakatos
so far no objective criteria have been discovered by which science
can be judged to have progressed. Only on arbitrary criteria can it
be shown that it is illogical to continue allegiance to theories that
most of the scientific community have rejected or not yet accepted,
. 18for the direction of progress is not unequivocal. Yet to many
16There are always phenomena, interesting to a particular discipline, 
that cannot be explained by the current theories, yet these theories 
are used provisionally despite the anomalies they cannot cope with. 
It is this characteristic of scientific knowledge which led Lakatos 
to state that all theories are born refuted but not rejected. Imre 
Lakatos (1970), "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes" in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the 
Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge University Press,pp.135 ff. *18
*7For science as a collective enterprise see Toulmin (1972), op.cit., 
pp.261 ff.
18See Easlea (1973), op.cit., pp.22-23.
13.
scientists the discipline's history is seen to be a straight line
leading to the currently accepted set of theories, indicating that
19progress has clearly occurred.
Kuhn argues that this is because
"revolutions (i.e. drastic theory changes) close 
with total victory for one of two opposing camps.
Will that group ever say the result of victory 
has been something less than progress? That would 
be like admitting that they had been wrong and 
their opponents right. To them at least, the outcome 
of revolution must be progress, and they are in an 
excellent position to make certain that future 
members of their community will see past history in 
the same way."19 20
Kuhn's main theme is that a scientific change does not 
necessarily result in progress, but that it is always experienced as 
progress by the younger members of a discipline because of the 
particular way of writing the discipline's history. That is, the 
discipline's history is interpreted as progressing by way of its own 
internal logic from error to truth.
To see a discipline's history this way is to take one of two 
polar views of the way scientific knowledge develops. The other
19This is a view similar to the Whig interpretation of British 
history, history written by the winners.
20T.S. Kuhn (1970a), The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed., 
University of Chicago Press, p.166. He goes on to state that 
"The depreciation of historical fact is deeply and probably 
functionally ingrained in the ideology of the scientific 
profession, ... the same profession that places the highest of 
values upon factual details of other sorts", ibid., p.138. Kuhn 
is talking primarily about the natural sciences, but I would argue 
that much of what he says is also applicable to economics. This is 
especially so in the teaching of economics at an undergraduate 
level where it is rare for students to be required to or even have 
the opportunity of studying the history of this discipline. From 
this it follows that most economists have only superficial contact 
with the history of economic thought, and in these superficial 
views the idea that progress has clearly occurred is taken for 
granted.
14.
polar view, more usually applied to the social sciences than to the
physical sciences, sees changes in theories over time as reflecting
only changes in the conditions in the world external to the science,
for example changes in modes of production or in political
institutions or allegiances. Other external factors that are
considered to affect the development of particular disciplines are
those that are part of the general intellectual climate of the period.
An example is the use by classical economic theorists of the model of
21Newtonian physics as an analogue for the economic world.
There is a similar division between those who see the aim of a 
science as being to search for universal laws applicable to all times 
and places and those who see this as a vain endeavour, especially 
for the social sciences. The former are concerned with the discovery 
of some kind of "absolute" truth. A science progresses when errors 
are systematically discovered, wrong theories falsified and replaced 
by better ones. A "better" theory is one which comes closer to 
absolute truth, although the question of how we know we are moving 
towards it if we don’t know what it is is rarely asked. Histories 
of science written from this viewpoint are referred to as rational 
reconstructions, the steps by which the present theories were 
reached being reconstructed so that only logical, which they regard 
as synonymous with rational, choices appear to have been made between *
^*There are of course still other ways to approach the history of a 
body of thought like economics. "The history of the times, the^ 
demands of policy decisions, the previous development of economic 
thought itself, the psychological needs of certain seminal minds 
Cand the intellectual environment beyond economics itself] ...all 
these are of unquestioned importance in any search for an 
understanding of why economics took a particular turning, followed 
a particular path in a given period." R. Brandis (1978), "Newton 
v. Darwin in 19th Century Economics", Paper presented at History 
of Economics Conference, Toronto 1978, p.l.
15.
alternative possibilities.
Those who reject the idea of universal laws, while they may seek 
to discover regularities in the phenomena with which they are 
concerned, take the view these will only be appropriate for 
particular times and places. They recognise that changes in external 
circumstances require different questions to be asked and therefore 
different answers given. Since theories by their very nature can 
only, in this view, deal with a finite range of questions no theory 
can be universally and absolutely correct. Truth is relative and a 
’’better” theory is one which is more appropriate than another for 
particular circumstances, problems and questions.
An "internal logic" view of the development of scientific
disciplines is usually taken by those who think that there is some
absolute truth to be searched for, while those who see truth as
relative emphasise the importance of external events and ideas.
While it would be rare to find a writer taking one or other of the
extreme polar views, most historians of ideas lean towards one of the
interpretations. Schumpeter, for example, while basically taking the
accretion view of the development of economic analysis, does not deny
that external factors have at times played a part in focussing the
attention of economists on particular problems and issues. And on
the other side, not even the most extreme externalist would deny that
there was some logical development of the idea of general equilibrium
. 22after its original formulation by Walras. 2
22A discussion of these issues and of the kinds of influences 
economic theories have been subject to is to be found in 
J.S. Spengler (1968), "Exogenous and Endogenous Influences on the 
Formation of Post 1870 Economic Thought" in R.V. Eagly, Events 
Ideology and Economic Theory, Detroit, Wayne State University 
Press (1968). ”
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Of the protagonists in the controversy over scientific
revolutions and the activities of scientists, which I will be
considering below, Popper may be said to represent the internal 
. . 23 . .absolutist view while Kuhn is best seen as stressing external
. 2Hfactors and relative truth. Lakatos, although an avowed follower of
Popper, in some respects takes the middle ground. He recognises that
an internal approach to the history of science, a rational
reconstruction, cannot be completely satisfactory since there are many
aspects of the historical development of science that cannot be
encompassed by such an approach.
”No ... historiographical research programme can 
or should explain all history of science as rational: 
even the greatest of scientists make false steps and 
fail in their judgement. Because of this rational 
reconstructions remain for ever submerged in an ocean 
of anomalies. These anomalies will eventually have to 
be explained either by some better rational 
reconstruction or by some "external" empirical theory.”23 45
Concept Change
Analysing and comparing the internal structure of the different 
theories that have made up the accepted knowledge of a science at 
different times is a task of the historian of science. Another task 
is to attempt to discover why theories change, to examine the reasons
23Karl Popper (1968), The Logic of Scientific Discovery, London, 
Hutchinson, and (1969), Conjectures and Refutations, 3rd ed., 
Lond., Routledge and Kegan Paul.
24His argument that he is not really a relativist does not seem to me 
to be particularly convincing though it is true that he does not 
take the extreme position that some relativists take, that of 
denying any strictly logical internal developments at all. See 
T.S. Kuhn (1970b), ’’Reflections on my Critics" in Lakatos and 
Musgrave, op.cit., pp.264 ff.
25(his emphasis). I. Lakatos (1976), "The History of Science and its 
Rational Reconstructions" in Howson, op.cit., p.32.
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why one theory has been succeeded by another. It is the latter 
question that I am concerned with in this thesis. It is appropriate 
therefore to ask how useful are the different views of Popper, Kuhn, 
and Lakatos for the question of concept change? I shall argue that 
although some of their terminology is useful because it enables us to 
distinguish between the different activities scientists engage in, 
and between the different elements that make up a theory or research 
programme, their analyses throw little light on the reasons for 
concept change.
The internal rational reconstructions of Popper and Lakatos 
assume that concept change occurs in logical steps and that the 
criteria for the choice between theories are unambiguous and when 
applied always lead to a clear cut conclusion. Yet when we examine 
particular historical examples we find that these criteria are not so 
clear and objective as they seem. They are only applicable with the 
knowledge of hindsight and could not have been applied at the time 
the change occurred because the necessary information was not 
available.
There are difficulties also with Kuhn’s approach although he 
does recognise that scientists do not accept or reject theories for 
solely or primarily reasons of logic. He argues that concept changes 
do not occur just because an old theory has been decisively refuted 
and the new one is seen to be the next logical step in the develop­
ment of an idea. A theory change occurs when the body of men who 
make up the discipline reach a consensus that this change is 
desirable. But he does not consider, and is not really interested in, 
the grounds on which they reach this consensus. When pressed he 
mentions such criteria as accuracy, scope, simplicity and
18.
fruitfulness but regards these reasons as values to be used in
. . 27making theories rather than rules of choice.
The listing of these criteria is not much help in finding out
why a particular theory was accepted or rejected, for their meaning
and application are not unambiguous. If one theory is not better
than another on all criteria, weights have to be assigned to the
different criteria before a judgement can be made. The weighting of
the criteria is clearly a subjective matter and no general rules can
be devised that would apply in all circumstances.
When considering a particular instance of concept change we must
pay attention to the selection procedures actually used and to the
attitudes and goals of the authoritative reference group of the
profession. We must examine also the relationship between the goals
of the profession and the scope of the discipline. We must look,
that is, at who does the selecting, at the reference group whose
. . 28agreement is the consensus, and at the basis of their consensus.
A model of the development of science that does take these into
account and that is therefore useful in examining concept change is
29that developed by Stephen Toulmin. He calls his approach an 
evolutionary rather than a revolutionary one.
There are, in his model, many variations of current theories 
always being worked on, and many alternatives to current theories 2678
26
26T.S. Kuhn (1970b), op.cit., p.261.
27ibid., p.262.
28This position is argued at length by Toulmin (1972), op.cit. In 
particular, see p.143.
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being developed. He argues by analogy with biological evolution 
that very few of the variants are selected to survive, to be passed 
on to succeeding generations. That is, few variants enter the 
paradigm that is taught to new members of the profession. In the 
theory of biological evolution, mutations, that is variations, arise 
continually, but very few survive to change the nature of the species. 
Those that do survive are those best adapted to the environment in 
which the species lives. If this environment itself changes the 
species changes its nature continuously over time. It evolves.
By analogy the conceptual variations of scientific theories 
that survive are those that are best suited to their environment. The 
environment of scientific theories includes the surrounding 
intellectual systems which condition what is accepted as knowledge; 
the currently accepted epistemology; the goals of the particular 
discipline and the problems relating to the external world that the 
discipline tries to solve. At any time a discipline consists of a 
set of currently accepted theories designed to explain aspects of 
the world in accordance with the goals of the profession, its view 
of the scope of the discipline, and the methodology it regards as 
appropriate. Available explanations never achieve the goals 
perfectly, so that members of the profession are always looking for 
new explanations or better variants of old explanations.
It is because explanations never meet perfectly the standards 
set by the goals that concept changes occur. The current concepts 
of a discipline are never regarded as satisfactory or final and 
theories change as some of the available conceptual variations are 
selected to survive, while others die away. The currently accepted 
concepts represent the collective view of a particular scientific 
community and the development of a new concept is essentially a
20.
communal affair. Before a change occurs there must be communal
dissatisfaction with the existing repertory, an individual proposal
of an alternative, and the matching of one against the other. An
individual proposal of a variant is accepted if it is seen as a
satisfactory way of dealing with collectively recognized problems.
The selection of innovations to survive is therefore in terms of
compatibility with the goals of the discipline. But this, though a
necessary, is not a sufficient condition. For
”At whatever point we study the processes of 
conceptual variation, we find intrinsic (or 
intellectual) and extrinsic (or social) factors 
affecting it jointly, like two independently 
acting filters. Social factors limit the occasions 
and incentives for intellectual innovation; the 
scientist’s own judgement about the demands of 
the existing intellectual situation discriminates 
between ripe and unripe fields of work.
... Intellectual considerations focus the theorizing 
which social incentives make possible.”* 31
Types of Scientific Activity and an Anatomy of Theories
Although the models of Kuhn and Lakatos are not directly 
helpful to one who is trying to understand why a particular concept 
change does or does not take place, they nevertheless illuminate the 
nature of scientific activity and provide a useful terminology and a 
classification of the parts of theories.
. _ „ .32But to understand Kuhn and Lakatos we must start with Popper's 
views on the development and nature of science. Popper was 
concerned to distinguish science as a rational, objective enterprise,
33ibid. , p.206.
31ibid., pp.220-221.
The relationships between the ideas of Popper, Kuhn and Lakatos are 
discussed in detail by Toulmin (1972), op.cit., pp.479-84, and 
Easlea (1973), op.cit., pp.3-24.
32
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consisting of falsifiable propositions from other bodies of knowledge,
for example from metaphysics and religion, in which concepts cannot
be falsified even in principle. Scientists, in their search for
knowledge, engage in a process of conjecture and refutation, in the
course of.which progress is made towards "truth". Truth is seen as
absolute and the aim of science is to approach it as closely as
possible. Subjective elements may and do enter into the generation
of hypotheses. These result from the scientist's vision, but the
subsequent refutations are brought about by objectively testing the
33hypotheses against the facts of the real world. The aim and
purpose of scientific enquiry is to subject hypotheses to tests; and
if they fail to meet the tests new hypotheses are developed. At any
one time the current body of knowledge of a scientific discipline
consists of those theories which have not yet been disproved. For
Popper, scientific activity is revolutionary activity. All
scientific activity is directed towards testing and falsifying
hypotheses. Progress occurs when one theory is refuted and replaced
by another better one. This activity is continuous and science
. 34could be said to be in a state of permanent revolution.
The trouble with the view that theories are continually being 
tested against the facts is, that if it is meant to be descriptive, 
then it can easily be shown, as Kuhn argued, that this is not what *
^This was the view of economic science held by Schumpeter, for him
ideology, that is subjective, non-scientific ideas, enters into 
the generation of economic hypotheses, but in the development of 
those ideas logic and objectivity are the only considerations, 
j .A. Schumpeter (1954), A History of Economic Analysis, bond., 
Allen and Unwin, for example on pp.15-17 and 41 ff.
^Discussed further by Lakatos (1970), op.cit., p.92 ff.
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even those who are regarded as the best scientists do; if it is meant 
to be prescriptive then it provides no clear rules to follow, for no 
clear and unequivocal distinction between facts and theories can be 
made.
"If observational statements are to any 
degree theory-dependent then theories cannot 
be compared against neutral experience and 
therefore cannot be so readily falsified by 
disagreement with experiment as Popper 
desires."35
Popper solves the problem by an arbitrary methodological precept,
that if a higher level theory and a lower level operational
hypothesis clash, it is the high level theory that must be rejected.
In addition he suggests that, because it is impossible to challenge
all assumptions at the same time, all criticism must be piecemeal,
dealing only with one problem at a time.
"Rationality, it would seem, despite Popper's 
good intentions, has been reduced to commitment 
to an arbitrary methodological principle - one 
problem at a time but never all together!"36
This is not to argue that it is wrong to use methodological
rules of thumb; they may be the only way to proceed. But to argue
as Popper seems to that a particular rule of thumb is somehow more
"scientific" than another is not valid, for a rule of thumb is by
definition a judgement based on practical experience rather than
scientific knowledge, and cannot therefore be "scientific".
Kuhn was to show that in practice scientists did not engage in
permanent revolution. The activity scientists normally engaged in
was more humdrum and prosaic but no less useful. He did not deny
35Easlea (1973), op.cit., p.9.
36ibid., p.10.
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that scientific revolutions occurred, but argued that they were far
37less frequent than Popper suggested. Anomalies and counter 
instances were always present within the paradigms of science so it 
was not the existence of these alone that resulted in one theory 
being replaced by another.
Normal science is a problem solving activity. When most of the
problems that can be solved within the current paradigm have been
solved and it is mainly the anomalies that remain, then that branch of
science is in a crisis-state. The crisis, however, is not a
sufficient condition for a revolution to occur. An alternative
proposal is also required, one which appears potentially able to
solve the remaining problems, as well as providing an alternative
explanation for some of those already solved. Thus, in Kuhn's view,
two ingredients are necessary for a scientific revolution; a state
of crisis and an alternative paradigm. But the presence of both
these does not guarantee a revolution. The new alternative has to
be accepted by the profession and in particular by the scientific
establishment, that is by those who authoritatively speak for the
science. While the establishment requires substantial reasons for
accepting a new theory, it is of course not possible to state
objectively for all circumstances what the criteria are and how they 
. 38are to be weighted.
The establishment is not fixed, the people comprising it change *
^Originally Kuhn implied that they were extremely infrequent, but
later conceded that this was overstating his case, and that
revolutions could occur not only in major world view but in parts 
of what Lakatos refers to as scientific research programmes.
38T.S. Kuhn (1970b), op.cit., p.262.
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over time and it is the newer and younger members of the discipline's
establishment that tend to favour the alternative, since their
. . 3commitment to the old is less strong than that of the older members.
Once a paradigm is accepted, that is, once a consensus is reached 
that it is better than the old one, "normal" science comes into 
operation. Acceptance is, in a sense, a matter of faith because how 
well the new theory can answer the questions and solve problems 
regarded as the province of a particular science cannot be known in 
advance.
It is only in the course of normal scientific activity, when the
paradigm is being articulated, that the extent of its explanatory
HOpowers becomes apparent. The ability of a proposed theory to solve 
problems cannot be known with certainty in advance, though it may 
appear promising in this respect. This is a very important point 
when we are looking for reasons why one theory does or does not 
replace another. For it means that relative problem solving ability 
cannot be an objective criterion for theory choice. Looking 
backwards, in the course of attempting a rational reconstruction of 
the history of a discipline, problem solving ability can be used as 
a criterion for deciding whether a new theory was better than the one 
it replaced. But it cannot have been of decisive or even major 
importance at the time the choice was made.
Thus, in the present case, it cannot be argued that Andrews'
^9We could note here Johnson's comment on the Keynesian Revolution - 
that one of the reasons it succeeded was that the older economists 
found it too hard to understand, but the younger members of the 
profession found it relatively easy. H. Johnson (1971), "The 
Keynesian Revolution and the Monetarist Counter-Revolution", 
American Economic Review, May, p.5. 40
40This point is discussed at length by Kuhn (1970a), op.cit., 
pp.153 ff.
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theory was rejected because its problem solving ability was inferior 
to the neoclassical paradigm, for this could not have been known at 
the time. Indeed, it is even possible to argue that it is still 
not known since very little work has been done in articulating 
Andrews’ theory. It is therefore necessary to look for other reasons 
why Andrews’ attempted revolution did not succeed.
Normal science is predicated on the assumption that the 
scientific community knows what the world is like, and is, according 
to Kuhn, a serious and devoted attempt to force nature into the 
conceptual boxes supplied by the paradigm. The fit of the paradigm 
with reality is never exact and it is the mismatch which supplies 
scientists with problems or puzzles for solution. The object of 
normal science is to solve a puzzle for whose very existence the 
validity of the paradigm must be assumed. Normal science has been a 
highly successful enterprise. The restricted vision imposed by a 
paradigm contributes to success by allowing concentration on 
particular problems and preventing attention from becoming diffused. 
It is in normal science that Popper’s methodological precept of one 
problem at a time is followed, revolutions result from the 
questioning of all the assumptions at once.
The word "paradigm”, as many of Kuhn’s critics have pointed out,
. . . 42 .is not a precise term. Kuhn himself used it in many ways and this
multiple usage has caused much ink to be used in considering whether 
the idea of a paradigm is appropriate to, for example, economics and *42
^ I t  could have been regarded by individuals as inferior in this 
respect but their belief could not have been founded on objective 
evidence.
42See M. Masterman, "The Nature of a Paradigm" in Lakatos and 
Musgrave (1970), op.cit.
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other social sciences. Nevertheless, the term "paradigm" in the 
sense of the current world view of a particular discipline and 
"revolution" in the sense of replacement of one paradigm with another, 
a major change of emphasis, are useful broad terminology where the 
question of concept change is considered. The terminology is 
useful in developing a classification of theories in terms of their
43For example, A.W. Coats (1969a), "Is there a Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions’ in Economics?", Kyklos 22.
M. Bronfenbrenner (1971), "The Structure of Revolutions in Economic 
Thought", History of Political Economy 3. John Hicks (1976), 
"Revolutions in Economics" in S. Latsis, ed., Method and Appraisal 
in Economics, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
Kuhn was not of course the first to use the term "paradigm" to mean 
a fundamental pattern of explanations which is used to direct 
thought in perdetermined directions. Its use has antecedents in 
philosophy, both Ludwig Wittgenstein and W.H. Watson used it, as 
Toulmin points out - (1970), op.cit., pp.106-107. But in these 
earlier uses paradigm change is not seen as "revolutionary".
Toulmin's own argument is that concept change is better seen as 
evolutionary, not revolutionary. The distinction is only sharp 
however if we think of revolutions as changes that occur suddenly, 
resulting in a complete switch from one paradigm to another. If we 
think of a revolution in the sense that the word is used for 
example in "The Industrial Revolution" or the "Agricultural 
Revolution" Kuhn's usage becomes less controversial. These 
"revolutions" were certainly not sudden, not even dateable with any 
precision, and, while fundamental changes occurred, the old 
institutions lingered on side by side with the new for a very long 
while. So too with scientific revolution, even if the conversion 
of an individual scientist to a new paradigm occurs in a blinding 
flash; acceptance by the establishment is much slower and in many 
cases the old is still being worked on and used where it seems 
appropriate, even when the new has come to dominate. In economics, 
for example, there are mercantilist and other survivals in economic 
thinking as Bronfenbrenner points out - (1971), op.cit., 
pp.137-138. The use of the term revolution for this type of change 
is therefore not without precedent. That individuals do on 
occasion become suddenly converted is illustrated by Shackle’s 
description of how he became a Keynesian. Referring to a seminar 
on Keynes that he attended in 1935 he says "one member of it, at 
least, underwent almost a spiritual conversion. We heard first a 
paper by Mrs. Joan Robinson, and no other discourse has ever 
released upon my mind so staggering and thrilling a flood of light".
G.L.S. Shackle (1966), The Nature of Economic Thought, Cambridge 
University Press, p.53.
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differences and similarities as the accepted concepts change over
time. It enables us to make a distinction between major changes of
direction and changes which result from the carrying out of normal
scientific activities, that is changes which make current explanations
fit the acceptable observations better. It is useful for an
examination of the nature and structure of theories and of the kind
of changes that can occur even though the terminology has no
explanatory power; that is it is not useful when we are trying to
explain why concept changes have occurred.
The same is true of Lakatos* term ’'Scientific Research
Programme” which has much in common with one meaning of Kuhn’s
paradigm. Lakatos distinguishes between the different parts of a
research programme; for example, between the "hard core" which
consists of unquestioned presuppositions, and the "positive
heuristic" which consists of the methodological rules by which
research within the programme is carried out. This singling out of
the component parts makes it possible to distinguish between two
different types of concept change or "scientific revolution". One
involves the replacing of one paradigm with another, the other the
. . . . 45development of alternative sub-theories within a paradigm.
But although his terminology and classification are useful,
Lakatos is no more able than Kuhn to set out unambiguously the
46 ,conditions in which a paradigm change should take place. But to do 
just this was Lakatos' main aim. Lakatos was a supporter of Popper
U5This distinction is important for the present thesis, for I argue 
that although Andrews was attempting the latter type of change, the 
acceptance of his thesis would have meant the former type of change.
46To be fair to Kuhn, unlike Lakatos, he does not set out to do this.
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and a critic, of Kuhn all hough in many respects his views were similar 
to Kuhn’s. He certainly accepted some of Kuhn’s points while 
rejecting his main thesis. Both Kuhn and Lakatos take the actual 
historical experience of scientists more seriously than Popper does
and try to find some way of mobilising it to throw light on the
. . . 47rationality of scientific enterprises. Lakatos agreed that the
naive falsificationist interpretation of Popper’s views could not be
sustained; that is, theories are not rejected the moment a single
counter instance or a disconfirming experiment are found. There are
always counter instances that the current hypothesis cannot explain,
’’oceans of anomalies”, so that while theories are born refuted, they
are not born rejected. Although he rejects the naive falsificationist
view, he argues that the development of a science can be seen as
proceeding rationally. That is, rules could be set up enabling us to
say whether it was rational to continue working in a particular
paradigm or whether it should have been abandoned.
Lakatos is concerned to argue against Kuhn’s thesis which he
sees as implying that development of and changes in science are
48 . . .irrational - a matter of ”mob psychology”. To him science is, or
ought to be, a rational enterprise undertaken by intellectually
honest men and he believes that objective criteria do exist to enable
. . 49choice between theories to be made rationally.
In Lakatos* view, the collective knowledge of a scientific 47*
47Toulmin (1970), op.cit., pp.481-482.
^Lakatos (1970), op.cit., p.178.
49See Easlea (1973), op.cit., pp.18-19.
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discipline consist:; not. of a single theory or a series of
disconnected theories, but a group of interconnected theories which
he calls a "Scientific Research Programme". Progress comes about in
science when, after rational evaluation, one research programme is
replaced by another more fruitful one. The activities of scientists
within a research programme are very much like those of scientists
engaged in Kuhn’s normal science. They are engaged in trying to
develop fruitful hypotheses, answer questions, and solve problems.
In other words they are, while their commitment to a research
programme lasts, engaged in exploring its scope and applicability.
Every research programme has its hard core, the assumptions that
are accepted a priori and that are the common basis of the series of
50theories that make up the programme. The methodological rules for 
the programme can be divided into two groups, the "positive heuristic"
which tells us which procedures are appropriate and the "negative
. . 51 . .heuristic" which rules out certain procedures. It is the negative
heuristic that requires us to keep the hard core unquestioned, indeed 
to see it as unquestionable.
This is clearly reminiscent of Collingwood’s absolute 
presuppositions, for which the notion of testability is inappropriate. 
The negative heuristic of a science tells us which propositions we 
are to regard as absolute for the time being, that is while we 501
50I will argue that in neoclassical economics, including Keynesian 
macroeconomics, this hard core consists of the notion of a 
determinate static equilibrium derived through the use of Cartesian 
methodology and a mechanical analogy.
51Thus Friedman’s proscription on the testing of assumptions is part 
of the negative heuristic of the neoclassical research programme 
as he sees it. M. Friedman (1953), "The Methodology of Positive 
Economics" in Essays in Positive Economics, Chicago University 
Press.
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continue to work within the programme. These propositions provide 
conceptual boxes into which we attempt to fit nature. The research 
programme builds around the hard core a protective belt of auxiliary 
hypotheses - alternative theories within the programme - designed to 
explain different aspects of the subject. These auxiliary hypotheses 
will be constantly modified, adapted or even replaced as the programme 
proceeds. This is the activity scientists carry out when they engage 
in Kuhn's normal science. To defend the paradigm he says, scientists
will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their
. 52theories. The individual theories within a programme will have
53their own hard core of assumptions, but these are not likely to be 
as strongly defended as the hard core assumptions of the programme 
itself. Single theories are more easily replaced than the series as 
a whole, concept change within a programme is easier to achieve than 
concept change that involves a change of programme. For a research 
programme to be progressive, there must be continual adjustment and 
replacement of the theories it comprises. More fruitful hypotheses, 
both theoretical and empirical, must be set up and better 
explanations given for the questions the programme is trying to 
answer. When a programme ceases to do these things it is said to be 
degenerating. It is not rational for a scientist to continue to 523
52Kuhn (1970a), op.clt., p.78.
53For example the assumptions of the model of perfect competition 
form its hard core, the alternative model of monopolistic 
competition uses some of the same assumptions but others are 
different and therefore its hard core is not exactly the same. 
But both share the overriding hard core assumptions of the 
neoclassical research programme mentioned above.
work in a degenerating research programme. But as with Kuhn's
paradigms, a programme wil„ only be replaced if it is both degenerating
and if a more progressive alternative is available.
While this all appear* straightforward and clearcut, there are
still problems involved. For it is not unknown in the history of
science for a programme to stagnate, and in Lakatos’ terms, to appear
to be degenerating, yet after some time to pick up again and become
once more progressive. It would not then have been rational to
abandon it in its degenerating phase. For a programme to appear to
be degenerating at a particular time is not an adequate reason for
its replacement and we need something more. Lakatos meets this
problem by saying that the old research programme should be
regarded as defeated and should be abandoned if after sustained
effort it fails to become progressive again. But he does not say for
how long the effort is to be sustained before a comeback can be
ruled out. As Easlea points out
"It is difficult to see how a triumphant return 
of an apparently defeated research programme ... 
can ever be objectively ruled out ... It cannot 
make a return unless there are some scientists 
seeking to develop its positive heuristic. And 
Lakatos conspicuously fails to tell us at what 
point it becomes irrational to continue such 
efforts ."5l+
Lakatos' criteria are arbitrary and do not help give a general answer 
to the question of why a choice is made between competing paradigms. 54
54Easlea (1973), op.cit., p.23. It is interesting to note that the 
going back to apparently discarded theories to try with them again 
when current programmes seem unsatisfactory seems to be a 
characteristic of economics - Andrews wanted to go back to Marshall, 
Keynes at least partly to Malthus and now some orthodox economists 
are beginning to go back to Ricardo to try and solve the problem of 
the marginal product of capital, (see below, p.262)
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Not only does Lakatos fail to give much help, even 
retrospectively, in understanding the circumstances surrounding and 
reasons for concept change, he also does not tell us why a 
scientist commits himself to a particular programme in the first 
place - it seems as if the search for the logic of choice has so far 
been to no avail.
For a framework within which to try and understand concept 
change therefore, we need to look elsewhere; Kuhn and Lakatos are not 
much help in this, however useful their terminology is.
The Interaction Between Internal and External Explanations of Concept *
Change
"There are, in my opinion, no clinching reasons 
why science should be regarded exclusively in 
internalist terms, whereas it is at least realistic 
to take the social context of any activity in which 
people take part into account in any effort to 
understand its processes and the way it changes ...
CThis view is based on the assumption] that, like 
education, religion and politics, science as a 
belief system and science as a set of social 
relationships are not totally unrelated, and that 
each influences the other in patterns that may be 
discerned and explained,1,55
Leijonhufvud argues convincingly that "external” factors have a 
role in the history of economics that they lack in natural sciences. 
They serve to render suspect, he says, historical accounts structured 
according to severely "internalist" Growth of Knowledge theories. 
External events cause professional attention to shift from one family 
of models to another, but such shifts do not signify victory of one 
research programme over another. There will be problems and policy 
issues for which the theories in decline provide a better engine of
55L. Sklair (1973), Organized Knowledge, St. Albans, Paladin, p.130.
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of analysis than do the theories in the ascendency. Different
economic models illuminate' different things and we find several
56analytical traditions surviving side by side. Nevertheless other 
writers in the field of economics have warned against falling into 
the trap of thinking, when we reject internal history as being not 
much help in explaining theory change, that only external factors 
matter.
Winch for instance comments that while we must beware of the
rationalist fallacy of believing that ideas are powerful enough to
determine the course of events, we should not take the opposite
extreme of regarding economics simply as an extension of the
political debate. The history of economics, he says, does not
reflect in a straightforward fashion the dominant interest groupings
or political problems of society at any particular time. ’’The agenda
and time table set by the internal pressures may or may not
,57correspond with that of the external world."
Mini, too, warns against laying excessive stress on what is
outside the economic mind at the expense of the inner logic of
economic thinking. It is relatively easy to relate economic theory
to environmental or cultural factors. This relativeness, though it
may explain the spirit of economics, its underlying philosophy, never
. 59succeeds m  explaining completely its movement or development. An 56
56A. Leijonhufvud (1976), "Schools, ’Revolutions’ and Research 
Programmes in Economic Theory" in S. Latsis (1976), op.cit., 
pp.73-76.
^D. Winch (1959), Economics and Policy: A Historical Study, Lond., 
Hodder 6 Stoughton, p.21.
58Mini (1974), op.cit., p.3.
ibid., p.9.
explanation of the origin and development of ideas wholly in terms of
environmental conditions ignores the fact that the social environment
• i , 60is shaped by men.
The Discipline, the Profession and the Reference Group
There are two main aspects to the notion of concept change. 
Firstly how do new concepts arise and secondly, how and why do they 
become accepted as part of the body of knowledge of a discipline.
It is the second question I am considering in my attempt to explain 
why Andrews’ alternative to imperfect competition theories was not 
accepted.
I propose to use Toulmin’s evolutionary analysis of the
. . . 6development of science as a framework for my discussion of Andrews.
Toulmin examines concept change in terms of the goals, aims and 
values of the reference group who do the selecting on behalf of the 
discipline. .
What then is the relationship between the discipline, the 
profession and the reference group that speaks for both?
A rational enterprise such as one of the sciences has two sides 
to it; a discipline - that is a communal tradition of procedures and 
techniques for dealing with theoretical and practical problems; and 
a profession - that is an organized set of institutions, roles and 
men.
’’Scientific professions ’embody’ their disciplines, 
not just by providing institutions and channels of 
communication for all the necessary activities of 
those disciplines; at a deeper level, also, their
6°ibid., p .171. This important concept is the main theme of P.Berger 
and t ! Luckmann (1971), The Social Construction of Reality,
Penguin Books.
61S. Toulmin (1970), op.cit.
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organisation shows how the boundaries between 
different disciplines are currently conceived."62 
..."A well developed scientific discipline 
requires a common standpoint associated with shared 
explanatory ambitions and ideals."63 *
Each discipline has a specific and realistic set of ideals which
. . . 64impose demands on all those who commit themselves to the profession.
Around these ideals the activities of the profession are organized.
When innovations designed to improve the current repertory of concepts
are proposed, these are examined in the forums provided by the
discipline. The justificatory arguments used to show that the
innovation measures up to the collective demands are judged in terms
. . 65of criteria of adequacy determined by the collective ideals.
So that it is the forum of the discipline to which the proponent 
of an innovation must submit it for acceptance or rejection. When 
examining aspects of the history of thought in an era where a 
discipline has been established we must look at the nature of the 
discipline and its forum, its ideals and standards to see why an
innovation is accepted or not.
"The crucial element in a collective discipline 
is the recognition of a sufficiently agreed goal 
or ideal, in terms of which common outstanding 
problems can be identified. Where this goal is 
an explanatory one, the discipline is a scientific 
one."66
^ i b i d . , p.281.
^ i b i d . , p.217.
^Those who do not accept those demands as valid are seen as being
outside the discipline or at best on its fringe. This was the way
Andrews seems to have been seen.
65Toulmin (1970), op.cit., p.379.
66 ibid., p.364.
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Disciplinary ideals determine an agreed direction of conceptual
and procedural change and hence determine the criteria by which
suggested variations are regarded as acceptable. The authority of
the discipline is involved not only in influencing choice between
alternative theories, but in the socialization of the scientist.
That is, it is involved in the process by which values and norms are
6 7picked up in the course of training. The authority of the 
discipline is involved also in training scientists to judge in some 
way which innovations are plausible, and which facts are admissible 
as relevant to the particular discipline.
Medawar, discussing the development of hypotheses, comments 
that there appears to be "some internal censorship that restricts
hypotheses to those that are not asburd", and that Mthe internal
. . 68 . ,circuitry of the process is quite unknown". Polanyi suggests that 678
67See Sklair (1973), op.cit., p.140, and also Kuhn (1970a), op.cit., 
pp.165-167, for a discussion on the training and socialization of 
the scientist. Toulmin’s view on the role of the profession is 
very similar to that of Polanyi. "[[The scientists]] administer 
jointly the advancement and dissemination of science. They do so 
through the control of university premises, academic appointments, 
research grants, scientific journals and the awarding of academic 
degrees which qualify their recipients as teachers technical or 
medical practitioners and opens to them the possibility of academic 
appointment. Moreover, by controlling the advancement and 
dissemination of science, this same group of persons, the 
scientists, actually establish the current meaning of the term 
'science', determine what should be accepted as science and 
establish also the current meaning of the term 'scientist', and 
decide what they themselves and those designated by themselves as 
their successors should recognize as such." M. Polanyi (1958),^ 
Personal Knowledge, Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, University 
of Chicago Press, pp.216-217. What is so of science as a whole 
also applies mutatis mutandis to the individual sciences.
68Medawar (1969), op.cit. , p.53. He goes on to state that "the 
critical process in scientific reasoning is not therefore wholly 
logical in character though it can be made to appear so as we look 
back on a completed episode of thought".
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it is during their training that scientists learn to judge whether a
hypothesis is plausible, i.e. not absurd.
MA vital judgement practised in science is the 
assessment of plausibility. Only plausible ideas 
are taken up, discussed and tested by scientists.
Such a decision may later be proved right, but at 
the time that it is made, the assessment of 
plausibility is based on a broad exercise of 
intuition guided by many subtle indications and 
thus it is altogether undemonstrable. ”6 9
Scientists learn to judge, in terms of a discipline’s attitudes, 
aims and methodology, between what is plausible and implausible, 
reasonable and unreasonable, the breakthrough and the blind alley.
Part of the task of the education of scientists is to develop the
. . . . . 70ability to notice some things and ignore others. The way facts are
to be regarded is something that the discipline decides. Facts are
sifted through the collectively devised and handed down norms.
"Facts arc collectively defined, any system of 
knowledge because of its character as an institution 
must include any collectively accepted statements.
Moreover even collectively vouchsafed reports of 
experience may be denied straightforward factual 
status if they contradict accepted theories or are 
themselves legitimate material for explanation by 
an accepted theory. Our culture is well stocked with 
categories to degrade the epistemological status of 
shared perceptions.71 ... A natural requirement for
69Polanyi (1967), op.cit., p.536.
7°Sklair (1973), op.cit., p.140. Schutz and Luckmann argue that this 
process is an integral part of the way we structure our ordinary 
everyday world, so that the discipline’s training gives guidance 
to the individual on which things should be ignored and which 
things noticed for the purposes of carrying out the collective 
enterprise. See especially their discussion of Relevance, 
pp.182-229. Alfred Schutz and Thomas Luckmann (1974), The 
Structures of the Life-World, Lond., Heinemann.
7*For example, those things that come into the category of optical 
illusions.
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a neat and tidy belief system, a cohesive and 
manageable story about the world, overrides any 
natural propensity to accept such impressions 
and results in culture norms coming into 
operation to define what counts as experience of 
the world.”72
The refusal of many economic theorists to accept the empirical
findings of the Oxford group regarding the methods businessmen use to
arrive at prices is a good - or bad - example of this. It was claimed
that the facts were not what they appeared to be because the methods
used to collect them were unsatisfactory. Businessmen, it was said,
told the interviewers what they wanted to hear. Alternatively it was
said that businessmen really equated marginal cost and marginal
revenue to arrive at price without realizing that they did this or
even that they knowingly equated marginal cost and revenue but did
not want to admit it because this would mean they were making
. 73monopoly profits. The facts were clearly illusory.
The collectively defined nature of facts is evident not only in 
that some observations do not count as facts for a particular 
discipline. It is also evident in the existence of ’’stylized facts”, 
which are taken for granted despite the fact that they are clearly at 
odds with observation. An example of a stylized fact is the 
stability of consumers’ preferences, which is frequently used in *73
7 9B. Barnes (1974), Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Knowledge, 
bond., Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp.19-20.
73Another example is Stiglor’s discussion of the illusory nature of 
price rigidity in G. Stigler (1964), ”A Theory of Oligopoly", 
Journal of Political Economy 72.
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studies of consumers’ behaviour. Facts of this kind are part of 
the hard core of a theory or research programme and, as such, must 
remain uncriticized if the programme is to continue to be worked on. 
It could be argued that the findings of the Oxford group, and by 
extension Andrews’ normal-cost theory, were quite clearly 
criticizing the stylized fact that businessmen equate marginal cost 
and marginal revenue in order to maximize their profits. This 
criticism if accepted would have meant that the research programme 
associated with the theory of the firm could not continue.
Every discipline has its own body of characteristic concepts, 
methods and fundamental aims. All these change over time, the last 
being the slowest to change. There is a relationship between 
fundamental aims and what is regarded as appropriate methodology.
The aims reflect a particular view of the world, of the nature of 
knowledge and of the way in which it is acquired. Some methods are 
ruled out as being inappropriate to a particular world view. Each 
discipline, although it changes over time, normally displays a 
recognizable continuity, particularly in the selective factors that 
govern changes in the concepts of the discipline. New concepts, to 
be acceptable, must be regarded as appropriate to the current aims 
and associated methodology. A proposed concept change which is 
rejected as incompatible at one time, may later become acceptable 74*
74See Ward (1972), What’s Wrong with Economics, p.21.
The stability of preferences "because of its familiarity to 
economists from their training and because of its centrality to 
the basic normative propositions of welfare economics" is not 
likely to be criticized within the profession. "Any serious and 
systematic critique of this stylized fact would be striking at the 
heart of neoclassical economics." ibid., pp.21-22.
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when views on methodology or fundamental views change. 75
77
Toulmin’s Model of Disciplinary Evolution
A rationally developing discipline arises where there is a
shared commitment to a sufficiently agreed set of ideals which leads
to the development of Man isolable and self-defining repertory of 
76procedures”. These procedures will be subject to further 
modification because the disciplinary ideals are never perfectly 
fulfilled. The disciplined manner in which the currently accepted 
set of concepts and procedures changes over time occurs not because 
the aims of the collective enterprises "provide a criterion of 
’truth’ or impose a single uniquely correct system of concepts”.
It occurs because the ideals determine an agreed direction of 
conceptual and procedural change. These determine, in turn, the 
criteria for selecting "acceptable" variants.
If we understand what the goals of a discipline are, and how 
the choice of goals impose specific conceptual problems, then we 
should be able to understand what counted as theoretical improvement.
Innovations are continuously generated by the failure of 
currently accepted theories to satisfy completely the goals of the 
discipline. Of the many innovations that are available at any time 
only a few are accepted and become part of the current doctrine or 
paradigm. This process of concept change is continuous, but at any *7
78
^These ideas are expanded by Toulmin (1970), op.cit., pp.133 ff.
^ i bid. , p. 359.
7 7 ,  ibid.
78ibid. , p .318.
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one time the discipline has an accepted set of ideas defined by the 
reference group that speaks for the profession. These accepted ideas 
appear in the text books designed to introduce students to the 
discipline and also in the professional journals. Not all articles 
in the latter however are part of accepted doctrine or even will 
become part of it.
While scientific theories by definition are, or should be, 
characterized by internal logic and consistency, the choice between 
theories, has nothing to do with logic, though it occurs for ’’good” 
reasons.
In their rational reconstructions of science Popper and Lakatos 
require that the choice between competing theories be a logical 
choice. That is it must have been made because it was seen to be 
the next logical step. If the choice was not made for this reason 
then it must have been irrational.
Toulmin, on the other hand, argues that "logical" and "rational" 
are not synonyms. The test of logic is one which is applied to the 
internal coherence of a theory. Competing theories may be equally 
logical in the sense that the progression from their assumptions to 
their conclusions adheres to the conventional rules of logic. If 
one of them is not logical then this is the criterion in use for 
rejecting it. Where, however, each meets the test of logic the 
choice must be on other grounds. At this point rationality applies. 
It is rational to choose that theory which is consistent with the 
current goals of the discipline and which appears to be more likely 
to achieve these goals.
A theory may be judged with hindsight to be better than another 
for a variety of reasons. These reasons are only the causes of the 
change if they were used by those making the choice.
42.
If those who made a choice between competing theories did so in
terms of "the next logical step" then logic was a criterion on which
the choice was made. But if ’’the next logical step” can only be seen
with hindsight then logic did not enter into the choice. And the
. 79absence of logic does not make the choice irrational.
Only those reasons actually considered by those making the choice 
can be said to be causes of the change. The choice between competing 
theories is made by the current reference group, or rather one of 
the current overlapping reference groups. The reference groups, the 
concepts, the methods and the goals of the discipline all change over 
time.
A scientist who wishes to have a proposed theory accepted as 
part of the discipline must provide supporting arguments for its 
advantages cannot be known in advance and must be accepted partly on 
faith and partly on the ability of the supporting arguments to 
convince the reference group.
Whether the arguments convince depends on how well they fit in
with the goals of the discipline at the time, with the methodology
seen to be appropriate for achieving those goals and ultimately with
the world view of the discipline represented by the reference group,
or as Becker puts it
’’Whether arguments command assent or not 
depends less upon the logic that conveys them 
than upon the climate of opinion in which they 
are sustained.”80
^Note, by the way, that not only is ’’rational" not used here to mean 
"logical” it is also not used the way neoclassical economics uses 
it to mean maximizing behaviour under conditions of certainty. It 
is used here in the every day sense of acting for what seems to be 
good reasons under circumstances in which all the information known 
subsequently is not yet known.
®°Carl Becker (1932), The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-century 
Philosophers, Yale University Press, p.5.
These new ideas may have unintentional, undesirable side effects,
which if seen by the reference group will count against them. That
is, they will tend to offset the advantages suggested by the
protagonists and contribute to their being unacceptable.
New theories which are accepted are often associated with new
problems, or old ones that have recently become ripe for solution.
It is not enough for a problem to be interesting, it must also be
thought to be able to be solved by the discipline, i.e. by the
methods it thinks appropriate. Science is, in Medawar’s term, ’’The
Art of the Soluble”. A good idea needs a sufficient theoretical
81 . .frame before it can be used and quite often a new instrument or 
technique will ripen an unripe problem. However while problems that 
appear readily soluble attract more attention sometimes the very 
simplicity of problems means that new conceptual light will not be 
shed by this solution, so they are routine and uninteresting. 
"Ripeness” can be a result of the development of new tools, or it can 
result because some other problem has been solved. This is the case 
if the solution to the latter problem needed to be found before the 
former could be considered.
The Reference Group - Who Speaks for the Profession?
Toulmin argues that a question such as "What does biochemistry 81
81See Reichenbach (1957), op.cit., p.197. There are plenty of _ 
examples of a problem that was not ripe for solution in economics - 
of ideas cropping up in various guises long before they become part 
of accepted theory, an obvious example is Malthus concern with a 
general glut. This idea was not incorporated into the paradigm of 
economics until we get to Keynes over 100 years later though of 
course was a major part of Marxist paradigm of economics. Other 
examples are to be found in G. Stigler (1965), "The Nature and Role 
of Originality in Scientific Progress", Essays in the History of 
Economics, University of Chicago Press.
tell us?" obscures the fact that
’’Firstly, biochemistry - or any other discipline - 
can tell us nothing except through the mouths of 
human spokesmen; and secondly that not every 
biochemist speaks with equal authority.”82
The idea that all authoritative or established judgements express an
informal consensus on which the whole profession is agreed is, he says,
a convenient fiction.
’’All accredited members of a profession may in 
theory be equal; but some turn out to be ’more 
equal’ than others. On the one hand, there are 
the men whose word carries weight in the 
profession - the men whose judgements are accepted 
as authoritative by other workers in the field, 
and who come to speak ’for and in the name of’ the 
science concerned. On the other hand, there are 
men who have no such influence, either because 
their opinions and attitudes are regarded as of no 
consequence, or because they are dismissed as 
heretical - and these men are in no position to 
act as spokesmen.”83
Most members of a profession are not part of the reference group, 
they are the followers who tacitly or explicitly support the views of 
the reference group.
Scientific professions like other social organizations, have 
■their reference groups, men whose individual choices become m  effect 
the choices of the whole profession. A new concept becomes an 
effective possibility only when taken seriously by influential 
members, only fully established when it wins their positive 
endorsement. When a proposed innovation is rejected by the reference 
group there are two possible reactions, either abandon the innovation 
or change the reference group. The establishment of new journals
82Toulmin (1970), op.cit., p.263.
83ibid., p.264.
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often results from a desire to provide an outlet for those who are
84not satisfied with the current reference group.
When we view the discipline as Toulmin suggests, then success or 
failure can be measured, not in terms of whether a particular theory 
has had some influence, continues to have adherents or be taught in 
some places. Rather it is measured in terms of whether it has been 
endorsed by the reference group and whether it appears in the 
standard text books where the beginner learns the nature of the 
discipline.
Reference groups are not unchanging. There are overlapping
groups as the profession changes over time, as newer scientists
replace the older ones. As time goes on an older scientist often
loses authority with younger members and continues to be taken
seriously only by his contemporaries. ’’Who is accepted as
speaking ’in the name of' any science depends in part on the
85seniority of the scientists whose opinion you obtain.” Although 
within the career structure and administrative organization of a 
scientific profession there is always a tendency for authority to 
pass from one group or individual to another, at any time innovations 
must be addressed to a current reference group, preferably one that 
is in the ascendancy. To fail to do so, to address them to the 
public in an era where a discipline is well developed can be the kiss 
of death, for to speak for the science is a hard fought for and well 
defended prerogative of the reference group. 84
84The establishment of The Journal of Industrial Economics by 
Andrews is a case in point.
85Toulmin (1970), op.cit., p.284.
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Concept Change - Reasons and Causes
One theory or set of concepts will be replaced by another, if in 
the eyes of the scientific community in general and the reference 
group in particular, it is better than the alternative. Looking 
backward in a rationally reconstructed internal history we can draw 
up reasons why it is better, or rather why, with hindsight, it 
appears better, why we approve, so to speak, our predecessors’ 
choice. But the reasons why, looking back, we regard one theory as 
being better than another are not causes of the change in concept 
unless those who made the choice thought of them as reasons. That is, 
unless they saw the same things, looking forward, that we see looking 
back.
This distinction between reasons and causes is an important one
86in Toulmin’s model of concept change. Reasons are related to the 
intellectual outcome of the change. That is to the criteria by which 
the new theory is judged to be better or worse in terms of the content 
and/or applicability of the theories. As was argued before the 
content and applicability cannot be clearly seen when a new theory is 
proposed. Causes relate to why a proposed theory was chosen or 
rejected at a particular time. They are concerned with a human 
activity, not with the internal structure of the theory. The emphasis 
here is on the process of change and not on the outcome of change.
A rational reconstruction of the development of a set of theories 
looks at the internal structure, and does not say anything directly 
about why changes occurred. With hindsight it can be argued, for 
example, that one theory has proved to be better than another 
because its explanatory powers turned out to be better. These better
86 ibid., pp.309-311.
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explanatory powers are only causes of the change, if those by whose 
influence the theory came to be accepted could see at the time what 
it would be able to do - and this is very unlikely. What we can say 
is that the scientists who decided thought that it would probably be 
a better theory and subsequently were shown to be right or wrong but 
the improvements were not causes of the change. Optimism - any 
change must be for the better or pessimism - better the devil you 
know ... would come into the assessment of the potential of a new 
theory. Neither optimism nor pessimism however are rational in the 
face of uncertainty - but they are not irrational either, they are 
non-rational.
"Whether the change has improved the explanatory 
powers of the science is no longer the primary 
issue Qwhen we are looking at causes]. Reasons 
cannot operate directly as ’causal factors’ in 
the historical explanations; they are causally 
operative at all, only to the extent that the 
scientists responsible for bringing about the 
change were aware of, and paid attention to those 
particular reasons. What is causally relevant 
therefore,is not the reasons themselves, but the 
scientists’ awareness of those reasons." ^
Even if we are rationally reconstructing history "it is vain to 
search for any single index or measure which will indicate in all
cases whether a conceptual change is to count as an ’improvement' or
ft fl •not". For improvement is multi dimensional and includes
predictiveness, coherence, scope, precision and intelligibility. It
is rare that a new theory is better than the old on all counts, so
that the judgement made will depend on the standards and the weights
that the choosing group accept at the time. This is especially so *8
^7ibid., p .311.
88ibid., p.229.
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when the criteria point in opposite directions, a new theory appeared 
to be better in some respects, worse in others.
Since rational reconstructions do not deal with causes then 
changes in concepts need to be studied historically otherwise changes 
are not intelligible and we get carried away with the false view that 
the change occurred for reasons of logic.
Toulmin contends that it is always a mistake to identify 
rationality with logicity - logic is in the relationship within a 
body of theories at a particular time, it has nothing to do with the 
process by which the theory was discovered, propounded and became 
accepted. It is a mistake to think that because theory change has 
nothing to do with logic then it must be irrational. This was what 
Lakatos claimed that Kuhn’s rejection of rational reconstruction 
implied. The ’’rationality” of a science lies in the procedures 
governing its development, the reasons why concept changes are 
accepted or rejected. This rationality of scientific discovery
’’necessarily eludes analysis and judgement in ’logical’ terms
i „ 89 alone”.
Because the advantages of a new theory cannot be known in
advance, though they may be guessed at, the scientist not only needs
to discover new ideas but also needs to provide supporting arguments
that make the theory ’’acceptable" to the reference group before the
concept change occurs.
"It will count in favour of a conceptual 
variant if its adoption extends the scope of 
established explanatory procedure to cover 
hitherto anomalous phenomena Eor at least if 
the choice makers can be convinced that it 
is likely to do this] ... It will count against
89ibid. , p.85.
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a proposed variant if its advantages are 
minimal or are counter-balanced by other 
disadvantages from which current concepts 
are free.”90
The Nature of Economics
To use Toulmin’s model as a framework for the examination of 
Andrews' challenge it is necessary to look at the goals of the 
profession of economics, at the methodology it thought appropriate 
and at the extent to which the current theory appeared to fall short 
of the goals. It is also important to examine Andrews' position in 
relation to the current reference group. For it was only if this 
group agreed with him about the shortcomings of the current theory 
and were prepared to listen to and try to understand his proposed 
alternative that there was any chance of its being accepted.
In the social sciences new problems emerge not just because of
development of theory and/or the slow change in aims and goals of the
discipline but because of changes in the world. And changes in the
world can make old problems appear soluble. For example, Winch
suggests that one of the changes in the world that had happened since
World War I was the development of the idea that governments should
actively engage in economic policy. This was one of the reasons
that made Keynes' solution to the old problem of business cycles
acceptable, and so made the Keynesian revolution acceptable. Another
reason for its becoming a ripe problem was the development of the new
. 92tools of national income accounting and econometrics. *91
9°ibid. , p.225.
91Winch (1969), op.cit., p.16.
92Johnson (1971), op.cit.
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It could be argued that the changes in the world since Marshall 
had made the theory of perfect competition inappropriate for
manufacturing industry; a new phenomenon had come into being which
. 93 . . .required explanation. The theory of imperfect competition was
designed to provide such an explanation. At the same time its 
articulation was able to utilize the new tools of the econometricians. 
Andrews' alternative explanation for the new phenomenon suffered in 
comparison because the econometricians could not use it.
His alternative was unsatisfactory also because it had a major 
unintended side effect that counted against it. To abandon the 
search for a determinate equilibrium applicable to manufacturing 
firms and industries as Andrews suggested would have had implications 
for the whole neoclassical research programme. For this programme 
was based on a view that only by the use of a methodology involving 
the specification of equilibria could economics claim to be 
scientific. And a theory that was regarded by the reference group as 
"unscientific” was unacceptable.
Economics in the mid-twentieth century had become a well 
developed discipline.
"During the first three decades of this century 
the development of economics as an organized 
academic discipline proceeded apace in Britain 
as elsewhere: there was a striking growth in the 
number of student degrees granted, university and 
college teaching and professional publications." 934
93Though in this connection we should keep in mind Sowell's warning 
against assuming that the 19th century world was any "simpler" than 
our own so that "simpler" explanations were more appropriate then. 
Thomas Sowell (1974), Classical Economics Reconsidered, Princeton 
University Press, p.8.
94Coats (1964), "Role of Authority in the Development of British 
Economics", Journal of Law and Economics Vol.7, p.103.
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Marshall was to a large extent responsible for economics becoming a 
professional discipline. When he himself was writing his predilection 
for addressing the businessman was understandable, because the 
profession had not yet become the only appropriate audience. Andrews’ 
similar predilection, writing when he did, was not wise, even though 
he had Marshall as a precedent.
To appeal to another authority, the general public or the 
businessman, is seen as undermining of the reference group authority 
and, by extension, the authority of the discipline itself as the 
repository of knowledge about particular aspects of the world. To 
do this is perhaps to be even worse than to be a popularizer. Too 
much popularization of a subject can be bad for the scientist’s 
reputation; he won’t be taken seriously. If he addresses himself 
to problems which to outsiders might appear the most interesting and 
important but which to the reference group are either not within the
discipline’s scope or whose theoretical implications are slight, then
95 . . ,he is not a true scientist. True scientists are not out to please
the crowd, make the mysteries of the discipline intelligible to the
layman, or write for the businessman. Only someone with the
personality and literary gifts of a Galbraith can get away with it,
and even he is criticized as being soft on theory.
Andrews was neither a member of the established reference group 
nor a follower who supported the views of that group. He was rather 
somewhat of an outsider whose views were regarded as heretical. It 
is not so much that his views were heretical that made him an 
outsider, but they were to a large extent regarded as heretical
95Toulmin (1970), op.cit., pp.213 ff.
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because he was an outsider, had not initially established himself as
sound. His theories were based on the wrong kind of approach:
empirical studies, not a priori analysis. Economists who were
regarded as members of the reference group such as Hayek, J.M.Clark
and Machlup, could and did express views that bore a remarkable
similarity to those of Andrews, yet were not regarded as heretics,
96because they had established their soundness in other ways.
There is often a difference between people’s stated goals and 
the goals that can be inferred from their activities and from the 
judgements they make. In other words we need to consider the
question ’’does the profession, in its typical practice, adhere to
97 . . .its own creed?” For example, if economists claim that their m a m
aim is to explain the real world, yet base their work on and give 
their highest praise to highly abstract general models which have 
nothing to do with the real world and which they recognise as having 
nothing to do with the real world, then "reality" is not what they 
are interested in. Or, if there is a fundamental stated emphasis on 
testing, yet the "best" models are those which are untestable then 
there is, on the face of it, some inconsistency to be explained. 
Jones expands this argument and comes to the following
conclusions: that the ,
”... econometric quantification of specific theories
96Hayek's views on the meaning of competition sound as if they could 
have been written by Andrews. F. Hayek (1949), "The Meaning of 
Competition" in Individualism and Economic Order, Lond., Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. Similarity between the views of Andrews and Clark, 
Machlup and also Joan Robinson are discussed in Chapters IV and VII
97e . jones (1977), "Positive Economics or What?", Economic Record 53, 
Sept. , p.350.
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from the Neoclassical framework constitutes no 
necessary test of the explanatory power of these 
theories. The more appropriate test of the 
applicability of the framework is a direct examination 
of its central axioms. It is erroneous to claim 
that microeconomists of Neoclassical persuasion are 
systematically employing Popper’s methodological 
criterion of falsifiability. On the contrary the 
continuing imposition of Neoclassical theories in 
empirical situations in which the assumptions are 
empirically inappropriate is inconsistent with 
positivist tenets."^8
If we ask why there is a difference between practice and precept, 
then I would like to argue that there is an inconsistency between what 
is regarded by the reference group as the ’’scientific method” and what 
is regarded by the same group as "science”. Those economists who like 
to see the discipline as a science think that the profession should 
practice "scientific method" yet economics as a "science" is not able 
to do this. The conflict is resolved in practice by giving priority 
to the idea of science.
Scientific method is now, and was when Andrews was writing, 
generally equated with the use of Popper's method of falsification.
Yet the model of a science on which economists have attempted to base 
economics, especially since the "Marginal Revolution" is that of 
Newtonian physics. In this view the economy is seen as a mechanism 
and it is tendencies towards equilibrium that must be examined. The 
theory of knowledge on which this view is based is that of Descartes. 
For Descartes, because the evidence of the senses is suspect, 
assumptions must be based on introspection and not on the world 
outside the mind. "Economic man" for example, is clearly a Cartesian 
construct. The task of science is to draw logical conclusions from
98ibid., p.362.
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the assumptions, which are clearly not testable in Popper’s sense.
The idea that the appropriate way to look at the world is in 
terms of tendencies towards equilibrium is an absolute presupposition 
of Cartesian economics. We can contrast this with the opposite world 
view, which regards continuous change not directed towards some 
external goal as the appropriate presupposition to make, rather than 
tendencies to equilibrium. This is the world view of, for example, 
the evolutionary theory of Darwin and Marx’s theory of society derived 
in part from Hegelian philosophy. I will argue in detail later 
that Marshall wanted in some way to combine the two incompatible 
world views but failed in the attempt. Cartesian equilibrium 
analysis came in neoclassical economics to stand for all that was 
scientific in economics. Andrews’ work, which sought to develop the 
non-equilibrium elements in Marshallian analysis, was regarded 
therefore by its very nature as unscientific.
To present for consideration a theory with is unscientific will 
not achieve the goals of the discipline, no matter how much better it 
explains reality, it will instead strike at the status of the 
discipline, and by extension the status of the profession. In a 
scientific age a body of knowledge must be seen to be ’’scientific if
^The Cartesian nature of economics, particularly neoclassical 
economics is the major theme of Mini (1974), op.cit.
•^^The contrast between the two and the effect on economics of the 
analogies of the two different analogies drawn from the natural 
sciences, i.e. Newtonian physics and Darwinian biology is discussed 
by Royall Brandis ’’Newton v. Darwin in 19th Century Economics” - 
paper presented at History of Economics Conference, Toronto, May 
1978. See also David Hamilton (1975), Newtonian Classicism and 
Darwinian Institutionalism, Greenwood Press, University of New 
Mexico Publications.
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its status is to be high. Those whose claim to this label is not 
firmly established like the ’’soft” social sciences must be ever 
vigilant in preventing anything that could be regarded as 
unscientific becoming an accepted part of the discipline. Andrews by 
presenting such an ’’unscientific” theory posed a potential threat to 
economics’ status as a science.
CHAPTER III
CARTESIAN ECONOMICS
The question of whether economics is* or should be, a science is 
perennial. Some writers consider that the failure of economics to 
achieve particular goals results from its being not scientific 
enough. Others attribute the failure they see to a mistaken attempt 
to emulate the physical sciences. The orthodox view, at least in the 
period we are considering, seems to have been that economics should 
be a science, that is that economic knowledge should be discovered 
by "scientific method".* Not only is this seen as the firmest basis 
for knowledge, but advice based on scientifically derived knowledge 
is regarded as more authoritative in the present climate of opinion 
than other advice.
Critics of Economics as a Science
Much of the argument against economics as a science is argument 
against the use of physical science as a model for economics, 
particularly the use of Newtonian mechanics as a model. This view 
assumes implicitly that economics cannot be said to be scientific 
unless it follows this model, an assumption adhered to also by many 
who favour economics as a science. It is argued that the model of 
physics is inappropriate for economics. Ward, for example, argues 
that economics is a science and that this scientific nature is the 
cause of what is wrong with it. Economics is, he says, (echoing
^Though as noted above there is some conflict between the nature of 
science and the nature of scientific method.
5 6 .
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W.S. Gilbert) "the very model of a modern major discipline".
"Neoclassical economics has produced criteria 
of scientific performance based more on 
sophistication of the intellectual input 
rather than the quality of the output."3 4
He considers that its procedures are at best only applicable in 
the consideration of marginal changes in the status quo and not to the 
world of structural change which is the subject of economics, and he 
goes on to suggest that perhaps we should take law as the model for 
economics rather than science.
Schoeffler, too, argues that the "failure" of economics, in his
eyes the failure to predict with accuracy, comes from attempts to use
methods that, however appropriate for the closed systems of the
physical sciences, are inappropriate for the open systems that a
subject like economics is concerned with.
"Economic science has the strange characteristic 
that whenever it is ’economic1 it is not ’science’, 
whenever it is science it is not economic and 
frequently it is neither ... The theory of the firm 
and similar types of model are ’science’ but not 
economic. The theory studies the consequences 
of certain given assumptions ... CitH contains no 
information that is not already entailed in the 
postulates, it merely presents the information in 
a different way. The theory is scientific in the 
same sense that mathematics is scientific.’’5
Schoeffler is here clearly implying that science is synonymous 
with a Cartesian approach; that economics has failed because it uses 
this approach and that it would be better if economics ceased trying
^Benjamin Ward (1972), op.cit., p.89 (footnote 2).
^ibid., p.240
4S. Schoeffler (1955), The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study, 
Harvard University Press.
5ibid., pp.154-155.
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to be scientific. Schoeffler wants to use the findings of 
psychologists as a basis for economic theories and seems to think that 
these are empirically based, more realistic and better founded than 
the present assumptions economics makes about the nature of man. He 
does not, however, say which psychological underpinnings we should 
use; there seems to be a great variety of contradictory ones available.
Worswick argues that economics should not be regarded as 
scientific because it cannot use what he regards as "scientific
g
method". He sees scientific method as involving experimental method 
and hypothesis testing and argues that experiment is not practical 
in economics, and that hypothesis testing is much more difficult than 
in the physical sciences. He considers that the difficulty arises 
because of the nature of economic facts. There are many quantities 
which appear to be like physical facts such as numbers employed or 
tons of steel, but which are only proxies for economic values or 
utilities. The distinction is vital, he suggests, and the failure 
to recognise it can have detrimental consequences both for policy and, 
for example, in the discussion of the relation between wages and 
productivity. But physical facts are not always firmer or more 
distinctly observable than these. (E.g. electrons and atoms have to 
be observed through man-made, theory-laden tools). Students, for 
example, have to be taught to interpret what they "see" through a 
microscope in terms of the current theoretical entities. Physicists, 
as well as economics, have to interpret their data and although it is 
true that their observations do not stand for values or utilities,
6G.D.N. Worswick (1972), "Is Progress in Economic Science Possible?", 
Economic Journal 82, p.76.
^ibid.
5 9 .
their facts are still theory-laden.
Hutchison argues on similar lines - where data are heterogeneous 
as in economics, generality can only be obtained at the price of 
content. Attempts to derive general laws through the approach used
g
by physical sciences are inappropriate for economics. It is the 
same point about the difference in subject matter that leads Hicks to 
suggest that
"Economics is more like art or philosophy than 
science in the use that it can make of its own 
history ... The facts that we study are not 
permanent, or repeatable, like the facts of the 
natural sciences, they change incessantly, and 
change without repetition. We are trying to 
detect general patterns amid the mass of 
absorbing detail; shapes that repeat themselves 
among the details that do not repeat."8 9 10
But to find patterns is clearly a scientific task, and all
science is not Cartesian. Thus, while it is possible to argue that
economics is unsatisfactory because it is based on the wrong science,
to abandon that particular science as a model does not necessarily
10 . .mean that economics must become unscientific. Taking CollmgwoodTs
definition of "orderly and scientific thinking" as any method of
analysis that involves systematically disentangling and arranging
11questions, or,alternatively, detecting presuppositions enables us
8T.W. Hutchison (1976), "On the History and Philosophy of Science 
and Economics" in Latsis (1976), op.cit., p.189. This is a position 
that has been consistently argued by Hutchison for many years. See 
for example his exchange with Machlup in the pages of the Southern 
Economic Journal in 1955/6 and also his (1977) Knowledge and 
Ignorance in Economics, Oxford, Blackwell.
9Hicks (1976), op.cit., p.207.
10This is a point that Andrews made very strongly, see below p.265.
11Collingwood (19*+0), op.cit., pp.39-40.
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to view Cartesian methodology as one scientific method not the 
scientific method. Which method it is best for a discipline to use 
will depend on many things, such as on the goals of the discipline, 
and on the questions it is thought appropriate to ask in terms of 
these goals, and on how the method will succeed in answering these 
questions given the nature of the subject matter.
Alternative Research Programmes in Economics
Gordon’s view that the paradigm of economics since Adam Smith
has been equilibrium via the market mechanism involves defining
12economics in terms of the Cartesian based research programme. But
there have been at least two major scientific research programmes in
economics, called variously bourgeois and Marxist, mainstream and
13radical, orthodox and heterodox, Newtonian and Darwinian. The first 
is the ahistorical Cartesian static equilibrium programme, the second 
the dynamic evolutionary approach which includes not only Marxist 
economics but the German Historical School and the Institutionalists. 
That is to say there are and have been two alternative research 
programmes existing side by side, neither replacing the other 
completely, the dominant programme in capitalist countries since the 
last quarter of the 19th century being the Cartesian neoclassical 
programme.
12Donald F. Gordon (1965), "The Role of the History of Economic 
Thought in the Understanding of Modern Economic Theory", American 
Economic Review 55, pp.123-124. 13
13See C. Napoleoni (1975), Smith, Ricardo and Marx, Oxford, Blackwell, 
Ch.l, and J. Baumberger (1977), "No Kuhnian Revolutions in 
Economics", Journal of Economic Issues 11. Also Hamilton (1975), 
op.cit.
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The Cartesian approach may be summarized as follows. There is 
a fixed and stable order of nature, over which the mind of man 
acquires intellectual mastery by reasoning in accordance with equally 
fixed principles of understanding; that is, conclusions are arrived at 
by the use of logic from assumptions based on introspection. 
Introspection rather than examination of the world outside the mind is 
the source of the presuppositions because sense impressions are 
misleading. Mind and matter are separate, matter being inert. The 
actual source of rational self motivated activity is the mind, the 
Cartesian ego, within which all the highest mental functions are 
localized. Geometric knowledge is the only absolutely certain 
knowledge and provides a standard against which all other claims to 
knowledge must be judged. Science is a logical system and not a 
historical process and the function of science is to discover the 
fixed and stable order of nature. This approach, when applied to 
economics, requires the elimination of time and uncertainty for these 
are incompatible with rational choice on which stable economic laws 
depend.
The alternative methodology of science is what is loosely called 
the ’’Darwinian” approach, although its philosophical roots go back 
before Darwin. It focuses not on static equilibria but on change, on 
process, and on development. It is evolutionary, not in the sense of 
a belief that all change is directed towards some inevitable final 
goal, though some theories of social change include this, but in the 
sense that change occurs through a process of adaptation to changing *15
1**Based on Toulmin's description (1972), op.cit., pp. 13-14.
15See below p.221.
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circumstances. Change does not necessarily involve progress.
A good example of the nature of institutional change as seen
through this approach is the following summary of Veblen’s views on
the matter. He thought that economics should be a science, but an
evolutionary not a Cartesian one.
"Social evolution is a process of natural 
selection of institutions which are defined as 
’prevalent habits of thought with respect to 
particular relations and particular functions 
oi the individual and of the community’.
Institutions, because they are products of the 
past are adapted to past circumstances, and are 
therefore never fully in accord with the 
requirements of the present. These institutions, 
therefore, in their link with the past, function 
as conservative factors in society. Since 
institutions must, if they are to be preserved, 
adjust to constantly developing circumstances, 
there must be a maximum of freedom and facility 
of readjustment if the evolutionary process 
is to continue without obstruction. It follows 
that capacity for growth in the social structure 
depends on the ’degree of exposure of the 
individual members to the constraining forces of 
the environment'. If any part of the community 
lives a peculiarly sheltered life, 'it will adapt 
its views and its schemes of life more tardily to 
the altered general situation, it will ... tend 
to retard the process of social transformation'.’’16
Economics in this view would need to be exposed to the environ­
ment if it were to be a satisfactory model of the real changing 
world. The Cartesian model, which by its very nature is sheltered 
from the real world, cannot be satisfactory.
To see economics as consisting of more than one research 
programme is not to brand economics as unscientific, for exactly the 
same characteristics appear when we examine the physical sciences.
"Many independent explanatory procedures, concepts 
and methods of representation are normally current
16Morton White (1957), Social Thought in America, Boston, Beacon 
Press, p.92.
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as means of fulfilling the proper disciplinary 
missions of any particular science. Between a 
few of these concepts and procedures there will 
be formal or ’logical’ links ... Alongside these 
systematically related concepts and procedures 
there will normally be others which are logically 
independent of, and even at variance with, one 
another.”*7
If we accept the view that there are two main strands of 
economic theory, then one way of looking at the history of the 
neoclassical research programme is to see it, not as a steady movement 
from error to truth, resulting from the systematic rejection of 
falsified hypotheses, but as a process of removing non-Cartesian 
elements from economics. The continued removal, in other words, of 
the threat of contamination by the other research programme. This 
process took place in the context of, and in response to attempts by 
various economists to adapt their discipline by adding more realistic 
elements based on a view of the world incompatible with the Cartesian 
view. All these efforts were repulsed, though not all in the same 
way. Marshall apparently succeeded for a time, but only by papering 
over the gaps that he was unable to fill; the Institutionalists who 
were seen as unscientific, descriptive and soft, were largely ignored, 
while Keynes’ apparently successful attempt was the result of 
eliminating from Keynesian economics the dynamic, changing and 
uncertain elements in the economics of Keynes. Andrews, who was also 
attempting to do the same kind of thing, suffered a fate like that of 
the Institutionalists not like that of Keynes.
Cartesian Economics and Its Implications
In the course of a discussion on the applicability of Kuhn’s 
idea of scientific revolution to economics Gordon argues that
17Toulmin (1972), op.cit., p.129.
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economics has never had a major revolution because its basic
maximizing model has never been replaced.
"Smith’s postulate of the maximizing individual 
in a relatively free market and the successful 
application of this postulate to a wide variety 
of specific questions is our basic paradigm."1®
The economists' fundamental way of viewing the world has remained
unchanged since the 18th century and this, he thinks, is "a tribute to
19the supremacy of purely positive intellectual forces". If by
"economics" he means mainstream classical and neoclassical, or what I
have called Cartesian economics, then he is clearly right, this is the
fundamental model. But whether it is "positive", if by this he means
"value-free", is another matter.
"The fact that contemporary economists find the 
world of today similar to that of Adam Smith’s 
day is more a commentary on this lack of contact 
with reality than a tribute to their objectivity."20
The economics that Gordon refers to results from a commitment to
Descartes’ theory of knowledge and the belief that only this kind of 
. . . 21economics is "scientific".
"The fundamental characteristic of the Cartesian 
theory of knowledge is the clear separation it made 
between the intellectual and the sensible worlds, 
the world ’in the mind’ and that ’outside’ it ...
Certain well-known characteristics of economics - 
its tautological and non-evolutionary nature, its 
detachment from, and even scorn for, the world of 
experience, its inability to adapt itself to changes
1 ftGordon (1965), op.cit., p.123.
^ibid. , p . 124.
^G.E. Peabody (1971), "Scientific Paradigms and Economics", Review 
of Radical Political Economics 3, p.7. The proposition that social 
science cannot be value-free is admirably and clearly presented 
by Easlea (1973), op.cit., Ch.6, Section 4.
21-a belief held also by some who oppose this kind of economics as we 
saw above, p.57.
in economic realities, and its mixture of pessimism 
and optimism, of determinism and freedom, of 
materialism and idealism - all stem from its having 
unequivocally accepted the ego as its guide and 
compass through the previously uncharted land of 
economic reality.”22
Despite, or perhaps because of, the emergence of alternative
models of the social world based on a different methodology, that
stemmed from a view that the world is best explained by concentrating
on change and conflict of interest rather than equilibrium and harmony,
economic theory became more and more stringently Cartesian in the late
nineteenth and twentieth century.
"Ricardo’s ’machinery question’ disappeared,
Mill’s semi-historical interests and humane 
outlook atrophied, text books became 
diagrammatical, and the analysis altogether 
more stringently Cartesian and, paradoxically 
more palpably inadequate both in understanding 
the world and solving its problems ... EThe 
Cartesian ego] ... answered questions 
pertaining to the realm of existence with tools 
designed to answer questions pertaining to the 
relations among the purely psychic entities of 
geometry. It recast the world of men into the 
world of geometrical symbols."23
The commitment to the Cartesian theory of knowledge explains 
two attributes of neoclassical economics. The first is the belief 
that the best, or even more strongly the only, route to knowledge is 
through the use of mathematical models. Thus one reason, though not 
of course the only one, why Ricardo’s model is regarded as inferior 
to that of Walras is that although he uses Cartesian methodology the 
relationships within the model are expressed in words and are
22Mini (1974), op.cit., p.ll.
23ibid., pp.12-13.
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therefore not as precise, as scientific, as those of Walrasian
24general equilibrium.
The other attribute is the primacy given to what are essentially
i
aesthetic goals. Of the model of general equilibrium Joan Robinson 
writes
"Logical structures of this kind have a 
certain charm. They allow those without 
mathematics to catch a hint of what intellectual 
beauty means. ... In the face of such elegance 
only a Philistine could complain that the 
contemplation of an ultimate stationary state, 
when accumulation has come to an end, is not 
going to help us much with the problems of 
today.
Beauty rather than realism is the goal of economic theorizing.
The highest aspiration of the Cartesian ego "is to create a ’well 
rounded' system or 'model' whose quantities will be symmetry, 
internal consistency, simplicity, economy of axioms, and 'elegance'."
Those who, like Andrews, think that beauty should be tempered with 
a modicum of reality and so develop alternative theories, are 
declared to be unscientific. The research programme of building 
and quantifying self adjusting models is a product of Cartesian 
epistemology, and this same epistemology results in the judgement 
that only self-adjusting models that are concerned with equilibrium 
are scientific. The judgement is not only applied to intellectual 
innovations such as Andrews* proposal, but also to the founding 
fathers. In a discussion on the "scientific" assessment of Smith,
26
“^The view that to express ideas mathematically removes most of the 
content of those ideas is discussed later on, see below p.165.
25Joan Kobinson (1964), Lconomic Philosophy, Harmondsworth, Penguin,'
p. 61.
26Mini (1974), op.cit., p.63.
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Moss comments:
"So long as 'progress' in economic analysis 
is defined in terms of the description of final 
states of equilibrium, models of the market 
that shift attention from the subtle equivalence 
of marginal revenue and marginal cost are apt to 
be declared retrogressions in the development of 
the science.
To argue that only one methodology is regarded as scientific is
not to argue that all economists committed to Cartesian methodology
have asked exactly the same questions. There are, as Black has
pointed out, fashions in economics as there are in anything else,
economists addressing themselves at different times to different parts
of the range of questions that are regarded as appropriate to the 
28discipline. Bronfenbrenner too, in a paper based on an examination
of A.E.A. index of economic journals shows that there are successive
. 29waves of interest in different aspects of economics. But I would 
argue that since the early days of economics these questions have 
been increasingly confined to those that can be answered within the 
Cartesian methodology.
It has been argued that one theory is to be regarded as better 
than another if as well as explaining old 'facts' it can also predict 
new ones. Worswick, for example, suggests that progress in economic 
science consists of "a dialogue or interaction between facts and 
theory, the latter being strengthened or modified as new data come to 
light and according as they agree or disagree with hypotheses *2
27Laurence S. Moss (1976), "The Economics of Adam Smith: Professor 
Hollander's Reappraisal", History of Political Economy 8, p.571.
2^R.D. Collinson Black (1963), Economic Fashions, Belfast, Queens 
University.
Bronfenbrenner (1966), "Trends Cycles and Fads in Economic 
Writing", American Economic Review 56.
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30 .deduced from the theory". But for economics at least, it appears 
that what count as "facts" are only those which can be explained by 
use of the accepted scientific methodology. Other facts are 
irrelevant or even illusory.3^
This of course applies in full strength only to those proposing 
alternative theories. Applied economists or descriptive economists,
those lesser breeds, can do what they please as long as they don’t
. 32have pretensions to joining the elite.
The Scope of Cartesian Economics
By the time Andrews was developing his theory the model of
general equilibrium had come to be regarded as the quintessence of
economic theory, economic theory par excellence. This was despite
the fact that the theories of the firm developed from Marshallian
analysis used partial equilibrium analysis. Leijonhufvud argues that
the neoclassical theory that has been predominant in the post war
• 33 . .period is more accuractly referred to as neo-Walrasian. This is
evident, I think, when we look at the text books of the 1950’s and
34- .1960’s, and observe the emphasis on positive economics and the
dependence on the 1932 Robbins definition of the scope of economics. 3012
30‘ G.D.N. Worswick (1972), op.cit., p.76.
31As I argued above, p.38.
32See Ward (1972), op.cit., pp.9-12.
33Leijonhufvud (1976), op.cit., p.86.
^For example, P. Samuelson (1967), Economics: An Introductory
Analysis, N.Y., McGraw Hill, and R. Lipsey (1963), An Introduction 
to Positive Economics, Lond., Weidenfeld 6 Nicholson. This is true 
I think despite the fact that the general equilibrium model as such 
normally only has one chapter devoted to it in such text books.
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Robbins defines the scope of economics as
"Economics is the science which studies human ■
behaviour as a relationship between ends and 
scarce means which have alternative uses."^5
That Robbins himself used different definitions and indeed often 
departed himself from the definition is irrelevant here. For what 
matters when we are talking about the paradigm of economics is the 
influence of the definition in limiting the scope of the questions 
asked within that paradigm. As Corry points out what the profession
read into Robbins may not coincide with what he intended to say or
36actually did say, but what it read into his definition is what was 
used as a basis for research.
"According to Robbins economic theory was a 
deductive structure erected on the basis of 
a few intuitively obvious postulates which are 
impervious to empirical tests."0'
A similar view is expressed by Friedman who argues that the
assumptions of theory not only do not need to be realistic but that
38realism is inappropriate. Robbins' definition
"...virtually confines the subject to the 
economic problem, as conceived by the 
neo-classical tradition, particularly as 
interpreted by Vienna, rather than Cambridge".37 89
Andrews, of course, wanted to go back to a form of the Cambridge
version, but one which minimized the Cartesian elements. He wanted
35L. Robbins (1935), An Essay on the Nature and Significance of 
Economic Science, Lond., Macmillan, 2nd ed., p.16.
36Bernard Corry (1975), "Should Economists Abandon HOPE?", History 
of Political Economy 7, footnote p.255.
37Winch (1969), op.cit., p.194.
38M. Friedman (1953), op.cit.
39Winch (1969), op.cit., p.191.
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to return to clearly defined industries and a variety of different
theories to explain different parts of the system to answer different
questions. He agreed with Shackle that we can have
M...an orderly array of theories differently 
grounded in basic assumptions, some assuming 
perfect knowledge, some acknowledging uncertainty, 
some concerned with progressive irreversible 
evolution, some with mechanical deterministic 
repetition”.40 '
Shackle is not here trying to reconcile two incompatible methodologies
as I have suggested Marshall tried to do, but suggesting that they can
exist side by side. Andrews was very much in sympathy with this view
as is evident from his frequent references to Shackle’s article
41’’The Hedgehog and the Fox” m  discussion and m  lectures.
The dominance and authority of the Robbins’ definition meant that 
only one type of question, one type of problem came within the scope 
of economics. Robbins was very much concerned to protect the 
authority of this version of economics "There is no longer any ground
for serious differences of opinion on these matters once the issues
42 ' . .are clearly stated". Those who agreed with Robbins were clearly 
anti-empirical, anti-eclectic, and would find no value in Andrews’ 
work which was, as he clearly stated, based on his long experience 4
4°G.L.S. Shackle (1966), op.cit., p.32.
This practice of his in recommending students to read this article 
was mentioned to me by a number of his former students.
^Robbins (1935), op.cit., p.xiv. This has echoes of Mill’s famous 
statement about the Theory of Value. "Happily there is nothing in 
the laws of value which remains for the present or any future 
writer to clear up; the theory of the subject is complete." The 
purpose of making these statements was similar. In Mill's case, 
he was seeking to establish the authority of Ricardian Value Theory 
- as interpreted by Mill!
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and contact with businessman. They would not be in sympathy with his 
views on the need for different theories appropriate to different 
circumstances. The underlying institutionalism of Andrews’ work 
aroused an adverse reaction among those who wanted theory to be pure 
analysis and abstraction.
The neoclassical theories could only answer one type of question, 
but those with a vested interest in Cartesian economics said that this 
was the only type of question that economists should concern themselves 
with; other questions should be left to other disciplines. Economics, 
in what has become its orthodox form is concerned with the surface of 
things.
"The firm as currently presented could be 
abolished and replaced by a computer in the 
text books. It has nothing to decide, there 
is only information of a specific kind to be 
gathered and the rest is automatically 
settled.,,tt3
Machlup’s comment on the kind of questions that the theory of the 
firm can answer are pertinent - this theory is designed to explain 
and predict changes in observed prices (direction but not magnitude) 
that result from changes m  external conditions.
Machlup, a professed supporter of the neoclassical research 
programme seems to be implying that these are the only questions 
economists should answer. He appears to have retreated from this
^Oskar Morgenstern (1972), "Thirteen Critical Points in
Contemporary Economic Theory: An Interpretation", Journal of 
Economic Literature 10, p.1184.
^F. Machlup (1946), "Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research", 
American Economic Review 36, p.521.
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. . M b  .position by 1967, when lie argues that other questions are not
ruled out, but need other types of theories to deal with them. But
Machlup is a strange sort of supporter for the neoclassical programme,
for as we will see later, when he describes in detail the kind of
variables to be used and the kind of answers that can be expected
from the use of the neoclassical methods he comes very close to 
. . .  . . M6Andrews* non-equilibrium position. When Andrews was writing, the 
kind of questions he wanted to answer, although including those 
Machlup suggested, required the inclusion of time, uncertainty and 
decision making. These were ruled out in neoclassical analysis as 
being unanswerable by "scientific" economics, as indeed they were if 
"scientific" economics means Cartesian economics.
When a discipline obtains a single answer, uses a single way 
of looking at complex questions there are implications for its 
vitality and its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. Reality
comes to be made up intellectual categories, and these categories as
M7 . . .Gordon's comment indicates can remain serviceable for a long time.
Serviceable because reality has been defined to fit the categories
M8 .the mind has invented. The questions are lost sight of, turned 
inside out and the answers lose their meaning because they are 
elaborated without reference to the question. The answer destroys 45
45F. Machlup (1967), "Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioural, 
Managerial", American Economic Review 57.
4t>See below, p.121.
M7See above, footnote 12.
4^cf. Hegel, "If one looks at the world rationally, the world looks 
rationally back".
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the awareness of rival possibilities suggested by the questions.
This, I suggest, is a way of looking at what has happened in economics 
- the single Cartesian way of answering the complex questions about 
the world has progressively ruled out rival possibilities, and affected 
what is regarded as "reality".
The Elimination of Choice
One of the research programmes to which some physical and
behavioural scientists adhere is "to prove man a machine, to interpret
. 50all phenomena in terms of the known laws of physics and chemistry".
Cartesian economics however, takes as its starting point the
assumption that man is_ a machine. Homo economicus is a mechanical
man who has no choice but to act as the situation dictates so that to
call economics the science of choice is a misnomer. Latsis argues
that, in order to arrive at the determinate answers Cartesian
methodology requires, neoclassical models are and must necessarily be
51"single-exit" models. These models put the economic actor, be he 
firm or consumer, into a situation analogous to his being in a 
burning building that has only one exit. The choice then is to go 
out that single exit or burn to death. Since the latter choice would 
conflict with the assumption made that behaviour is rational, there 
is really no choice at all for the rational person, assuming of course 
that he knows there is only one exit and knows, too, where it is.
^Dennis Wrong (1961), "The Oversocialized Concept of Man in Modern 
Sociology", American Sociological Review 16, p.186.
5°Easlea (1973), op.cit., p.259.
^S. Latsis (1972), "Situational Determinism in Economics", British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23.
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The art Lon that will be taken can be predicted completely accurately 
because the action is situationally determined. The situation as 
defined includes a problem - the building; a behavioural assumption - 
rationality; a knowledge assumption and a single exit. Neoclassical 
models are like this, they set up conditions under which there is 
only one exit, only one way to get maximum profits or sales revenue, 
or whatever is the goal; a problem - how to act so as to achieve that 
goal; knowledge of all the relevant variables, i.e. knowledge that 
there is only one exit and where it is; and rational behaviour.
There is only one solution to the problem, only one price and output 
that can be chosen, the answer is determinate, and choice has been 
eliminated.
But a contradiction arises because economic theory is associated 
historically not only with Cartesian methodology but with the
political philosophy of liberalism. This is evident not only in the
52 . .concept of laissez-faire but also in the emphasis on the individual
economic actor especially after the "Marginal Revolution" of the
1870’s, that is after classical economics became neoclassical
53 . .economics. This contradiction arises out of what Mini sees as a
52 . . .  .The argument about whether the policy prescription of any economist
was laissez faire under all circumstances is not relevant here, it 
was sufficient that it was seen as desirable for individuals to 
act in their own interests even if this was within a framework of 
law and order established by government.
53 • •That an important aspect of this revolution was a change of
viewpoint from that which regarded social class as an important 
explanatory variable (Smith, Ricardo) to that which stressed the 
individual as both consumer and factor supplier has been argued 
frequently. See for example: Michael De Vroey (1975), "The 
Transition from Classical to Neo-classical Economics: A Scientific 
Revolution", Journal of Economic Issues 9. Robert V. Eagly (1974), 
The Structure of Classical Economic Theory, Oxford University
Press.
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conflict between ethics and method. The conflict was resolved by
subordinating ethics to method as evidenced by the stress laid by
Robbins on economics being about means not ends.
This contradiction comes from regarding men as politically free
that is, capable of doing what they please, and yet also regarding
them as acting in a predetermined rigidly circumscribed way.
"The premise of all economic thinking is that 
economic actors (workers, entrepreneurs) are free 
beings. Yet faced with a certain event (a change 
in taxes, a cut in wages) they act with remarkable 
uniformity, one may even say with robot-like 
thoroughness. EThis is so] because the ethical 
desideratum of freedom clashes with the 
epistemological longing for certainty ... In the 
conflict between ethical and methodological 
convictions, the latter won. In economic theory 
freedom is spoken of but in reality the economic 
agents act as slaves."51*
It is sometimes argued that uniformity results not because everyone
acts in the same determined way, but because divergences cancel each
other out. But, as Keynes pointed out, this latter is not
necessarily the case. He cautions against assuming that in an
atmosphere of ignorance errors tend to offset each other.
"It can easily be shown that the assumption of 
arithmetically equal probabilities based on a 
state of ignorance leads to obscurities."* 55
Mathematical reasoning needs agents who respond instantaneously and
predictably to given stimuli so that the assumption of freedom of
action by economic actors has no practical significance, ultimately
economic agents act as they must, i.e. as the rules of logic demand"
5Vini (1974), op.cit., p.42.
55J.M. Keynes (1936), The General Theory of Employment Interest and 
Money, Lond. , Macmillan, p.152.
Mini (1974), op.cit., p.44.
56
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When they do not they have no part in the central body of economic 
theory.
"Schumpeter’s entrepreneur [who is the reflection 
of Schopenhauer’s idea of will - the direct 
opposite of the Cartesian ego] lives an uneasy life 
at the periphery of economics: in economic history 
and development economics.’’57
Decision makers cannot be fitted into a theory that denies decision. 
Andrews’ decision maker was similarly banished to the realm of 
descriptive economics.
In general equilibrium an attempt was made to see the whole 
economic scheme as the manifestation of the free operation of self­
interest within a frame of law and order. But to reach the 
determinate answers required by the Cartesian method every 
participant had to have or be able to obtain all the knowledge 
relevant for the self interested action. Whatever the scarcity of 
resources there is no scarcity of knowledge. Choice was eliminated 
by the assumption that enough knowledge was available to ensure that 
there was only one rational action that could be taken. Where 
knowledge is not sufficient a variety of actions can be regarded as 
rational; which one will be chosen cannot be predicted with 
certainty.
The assumption of sufficient knowledge implies the elimination 
of uncertainty which in turn requires the elimination of time. For 
it is the fact of time, the existence of a future, that makes 
certain or even sufficient knowledge impossible. Part of the 
knowledge that is required for a decision is the knowledge of the 
future outcomes of that decision. These cannot be known with 
certainty; they can only be anticipated with some degree of
57ibid., p.213.
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r- , . . . . 58or subjective probability.
Choice, decision making, cannot be rational where rational is
defined as it is in Cartesian economics as referring to situations 
. 59where knowledge is certain and sufficient. It is not surprising
that the current theoretical crisis in the neoclassical programme is
60related to capital and interest, for it is in capital theory that 
the problems raised by the elimination of time appear most 
intractable. Economic phenomena are assumed timeless, yet interest 
owes its very existence to time.
Shackle argues that it is because of the need for determinate 
answers, the need to predict behaviour with certainty that Cartesian 
economic theories are static, that they abstract from time. Even 
theories which are called dynamic, which refer to equilibrium paths, 
abstract from real historical time. In economics time is a 
subjective fiction which enables us to split the analysis into two 
or more parts, and it has nothing to do with real time. It is an 
independent variable, and, if mentioned at all, it is isolated from 
all other variables.
"The movement from the short to the long run 
does not cause a change in what, if time were 
historical, would have to change, it is merely
^Here I want to distinguish between the kind of probability we use 
when we say something has a "good chance” of coming about and the 
measured probability we get when the number of possibilities are 
known, i.e. statistical probability.
5°See G.L.S. Shackle (1972), Epistemics and Economics: A Critique of 
Economic Doctrines, Cambridge University Press, especially Book IV, 
"Statics: The Rejection of Time”.
"see Napoleoni (1975), op. cit. , Ch . 1.
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a link between the beginning and end products 
of theory."®1
The unhistorical nature of time is shown by what happens between 
equilibrium states, if we take these away from theory we find we have 
nothing, for nothing is what is sandwiched between them. The abstract 
nature should be obvious from the fact that whenever an attempt is 
made to give dates to the ’t’s of economic theory, the results are 
ludicrous.
"More than one ’historical’ econometric study 
has concluded that consumption was negative in 
the days of Cotton Mather."®2
General equilibrium, the glory of Cartesian economics, cannot be
arrived at, it can only exist in a time vacuum. When scarcity of
knowledge was assumed away, the role of expectations was ruled out.
The text book use of indifference curve analysis, for example, ignores
uncertainty and expectations as if there were no uncertainty in life,
6 3in planning, in setting prices, in profits. The overwhelming 
emphasis on the physical aspect of economic processes may seem one­
sided when we consider that it is plans, decisions, expectations that 
determine the movement of these processes, but it is a direct result 
of the needs of the Cartesian methodology. Hutchison comments that 
while it was a worthwhile activity to elaborate quite fully and 
precisely the oversimplified case of maximization under certainty,
"...to continue decade after decade or even half­
century after half-century with needless elaborations 
of this particular oversimplification hardly seem any 
longer a promising or progressive programme".®1* 61*4
61Mini (1974), op.cit., p.119.
^ibid. , p. 121.
k^Morgenstern (1972), op.cit., p.1182.
64T.W. Hutchison (1977), op.cit., p.81.
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But the trouble is that any introduction of uncertainty is 
incompatible with the Cartesian methodology for this requires total 
neglect of the realm of change if it is to proceed at all. To 
introduce uncertainty would mean abandoning the Cartesian 
methodology in its entirety, something that is almost impossible for 
the adherents of the programme to accept for to them this would mean 
abandoning economics' claim to being scientific. To abandon it would 
mean abandoning the economists right to be considered among the 
intellectual elite - the scientists. There have been frequent 
attempts to introduce into this Cartesian structure elements of 
uncertainty - to introduce expectations and decision making, but all 
failed in one way or another. They were either, like Keynes theory, 
absorbed and rendered innocuous by the elimination of the 
uncertainty elements, or ignored or rejected like Andrews' theory, 
surviving if at all on the fringes of economics, or at the lower 
levels of the hierarchy.
Shackle sees Keynes' main contribution as introducing
6 5expectations into English economic theory. He sees the general 
theory as being concerned with the consequence of coping with or 
concealing from our conscious selves our ignorance of the future. He 
goes on to argue that after 1930's economic theory which had 
previously dealt with scarcity was now the account of how to cope with 
scarcity and uncertainty. Mini, while agreeing that the emphasis of 
uncertainty and expectations was Keynes'major insight, argues very 
strongly that Keynes' theories only became orthodox when they had been 65
65G.L.S. Shackle (1967), The Years of High Theory: Invention and 
Tradition in Economic Thought 1926-1939, Cambridge University Press. 
He argues that it was in Sweden that expectation was first taken 
seriously as the prime mover in economics and that although Marshall 
as always was on the side of the angels he did not blow this 
particular trumpet very loudly.
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interprcted in such a way as to render this insight innocuous by
66purging the theory of expectations and uncertainties.
This is the point of view of Leijonhufvud also when he makes the
67distinction between the economics of Keynes and Keynesian economics.
The former emphasises expectations and decision making under conditions 
of uncertainty, the latter has turned the economics of Keynes into a 
mechanical model where these elements are placed on one side.
Keynes was fighting nearly two centuries of evolution of economic 
thought. The remarkable thing is not that his work was distorted but 
that it survived at all. And it is no wonder that Andrews, who, 
whatever his insight and experience, was no Keynes, who did not, as 
we shall see, have as many factors in his favour as Keynes did, should 
have been rejected out of hand. For his attempts to have part of the 
neoclassical programme discarded had implications that could have 
toppled the whole.
The Predictions of Cartesian Economics
Economics is an invisible college and also a hierarchy, a pecking
68order of status and influence. Of the various branches of the
. 69 , ,discipline that define the scope of economics and serve as the
66Mini (1974), op.cit.
^Leijonhufvud (1970), op.cit.
68Ward (1972), op.cit., pp.9-10.
69 •a) Microtheory, macrotheory, econometrics
b) International trade, money and banking, public finance
c) Industrial organisation, labour, economic history
d) Economic development, history of economic thought, comparative
economic systems, 
ibid. , p.10.
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organising force around which knowledge in the field is categorised, 
those with the highest status, and which confer the highest status on 
their practitioners are microtheory, macrotheory and econometrics.
And it is just in these fields that Cartesian method dominates, the 
highest status of all being given to the most Cartesian of all - 
general equilibrium analysis. Partial analysis, if abstract enough, 
is also highly regarded. But not every economist is satisfied with 
this situation or feels that the qualities of abstraction, elegance 
and generality are of sufficient value to allow us to ignore the 
neoclassic research programme’s inability to make useful predictions 
or to explain the changing world of real economies.
The argument against the use of Cartesian models is that their
predictions have not been conspicuously correct. Prediction has not
been the greatest success in modern economics for the predictions
often take the form of "such and such will happen if something we
. . 70have excluded from our analysis doesn’t prevent it happening”.
Such predictions are at best useless and if used as a basis for 
policy making result in bad policies. Hutchison argues that what is 
unjustifiable about much of modern economic theory is not so much 
that it hasn’t much practical significance, that it cannot for example 
be used to aid policy making, but that more practical significance and 
fruitfulness are claimed than is actually there, so that it is used 
as a basis for policy making when it should not be, resulting in bad 
policies. This was essentially Andrews’ argument against imperfect 70*
70 .Martin Hollis and Edward Nell (1975), Rational Economic Man,
Cambridge University Press, p.47 ff.
^Hutchison (1977), op.cit. , p.90.
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competition models, that their conclusions, because they were based 
on wrong assumptions, resulted in bad policies when used as a basis 
for policy making.^
Spengler likens the use of closed models in economic theory for
an economy that does not stay put to a man "who, possessed only of a
hammer, seeks out only nails or treats everything as if it were a 
. 73 .nail". The main sources of analytical failure, he suggests, are 
the treating of the economy as a closed system and the disparity 
between conditions essential to optimal situations and those that
actually prevail. The same kind of argument is developed at length
. . . . 74by Schoeffler m  his discussion of the failures of economics. The
failures he discusses are failures to make useful predictions and he
argues, like Spengler, that these failures result from the use of
closed models which are quite unlike the open systems of reality.
"Economists could not predict the future 
course of events in the early days of the 
discipline and they cannot do so now."75
The concepts used are totally unsuited to the task of making useful
predictions and deriving policy prescriptions from them. But Nell,
though he agrees on the need to question the methodology asks why
prediction should be a criterion at all.
"There is intuitive appeal to the idea that 
a model of social institutions must be a good 723*
72 . • •See Andrews (1949a), op.cit., and also his contribution to the
controversy over resale price maintenance. P.W.S. Andrews and 
Frank Friday (1960), Fair Trade: Resale Price Maintenance 
Re-examined, Lond., Macmillan.
73J. Spengler (1974), "Was 1922-1972 a Golden Age in the History of 
Economics?", Journal of Economic Issues 8, p.534.
7U , vSchoeffler (1955), op.cit.
75ibid., p.3.
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representative of things at a given moment of 
time regardless of how they work out over time 
Eit is asking too much of economics that it 
predict]] for it is too closely linked with other 
aspects of society, it cannot be isolated, for 
effective tests. But to add a large string of 
ceteris paribus conditions reduces predictions to 
vacuity; instead we must examine definitions and 
assumptions for their realism. If they are 
realistic then the working of the model should 
mirror the working of the economic system in a 
simple and abstract form."7**
And of course the argument that theories should be judged by testing
their predictions and not by examining their assumptions for realism
falls down, when as Hutchison says these are rarely tested at all.
"Certain facile superficialities have become 
widely accepted as a defence of this preoccupation 
with oversimplified abstractions. First, from the 
platitude that some degree of abstraction is 
essential and inevitable in virtually any kind of 
scientific study, it seems to be presumed that no 
degree or kind of abstraction needs any defence or 
explanation ... Secondly there is the facile and 
frequent claim that it doesn’t matter about the 
assumptions - however unrealistic they are - because 
the test comes with the predictions. But then one 
finds that the predictions, in their turn, are not 
very precisely or critically tested (if at all) and 
that there is a great deal of complacency regarding 
the adequacy for the guidance of decisions and 
policies.”7'
Tools and Values
Of course it is possible to argue as E.A.G.Robinson did that
theories like this are best regarded as tools which a practitioner is
free to use or not use because then the wrong conclusions are the
78fault of the practitioner not the tools. This is a rather hard *7
7fi •Edward J. Nell (1972), "The Revival of Political Economy", Social
Research 39, p.52.
77Hutchison (1977), op.cit., p.89.
E.A.G. Robinson (1951), "The Pricing of Manufactured Products and 
the Case against Imperfect Competition - A Rejoinder", Economic 
Journal 61, p.M-30.
78
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argument to sustain given the fact that the status accorded to 
abstract theories of this type is such that to use other tools would 
be to place one beyond the pale.
This argument implies that tools are neutral and value free and 
that they can be used for a variety of purposes. In this view it is
the role of the economic theorist to develop value free tools; the
. . . . . . 79theorist has no responsibility for their misuse.
Schumpeter is one who argues that the greatest economists have 
been those who have developed ideology free tools of analysis. That 
while the initial vision in formulating hypotheses by its nature 
involves ideology, "economic analysis" proper can be treated as 
objective, a set of formal techniques and instruments that can be 
judged by some absolute standard.^
"This Schumpeterian view ... is clearly connected 
with the more crude and forthright ’box of tools’ 
view of economic analysis as being purely 
instrumental, concerned with techniques capable 
of application to a wide variety of purposes 
and situations. As such it has no interest in 
normative judgements; and it is unconcerned with 
the specific purpose to which it is put - whether 
to clarify the problems of a profit-making 
monopoly or those of the planners of a socialist 
economy. This conception of the pure economist’s 
role has, naturally, been furthered by the vogue 
of mathematical methods and forms of statements 
in economics, to the point even of purifying the 
subject of notions, elements or relations incapable 
of being quantified and expressed in an equational 
system."®*
Rather like the argument that the physicists bore no part of the 
responsibility for the atomic bomb - they only provided'the facts. 
But the facts fell on Hiroshima. See Easlea (1973), op.cit.,
Ch.10, "On the Ethical Neutrality of Science".
p flJ.A. Schumpeter (1954), op.cit., pp.561-2.
ft 1 •M. Dobb (1973), Theories of Value and Distribution Since Adam Smith,
Cambridge University Press, p.4.
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IWi!) poos on to argue that either the "analysis" of which
Schumpeter speaks is a purely formal structure without any relation to
economic problems or sets of questions to which it is being designed
as an answer and therefore without content or else it is a system
whose purpose is to serve as a vehicle for statements about economic
phenomena. If the latter it cannot be separated from the answers to
the questions it poses and hence from the economic problems with which
it is supposed to deal.
"In this case it is impossible to claim for 
it 'independence' of the economic content and 
meaning of the propositions which are 
ideologically conditioned, and hence impossible 
to regard as supra-ideological. Theoretical 
analysis and generalisation invariably build on 
classification, in the sense of using what has 
first been classified as its material units 
or counters; and what is classification but a . 
drawing of boundaries between discrete objects, 
which are in turn derived from the structural 
pattern one senses (or deems to have discovered) 
in the real world?"®2
Easlea suggests that argument that social sciences can and 
should be value free comes from those who wish to conceal their own
judgement that policies should be directed towards preserving the
. . 83existing system.
Schumpeter did not attempt to conceal his own bias; he did not 
include himself as being a great theorist; but he certainly regarded 
only value-free analysis as scientific and thought this both 
possible and desirable. The charge that Andrews' theories were
82.,., clbid. , p.5.
®3Easlea (1973), op.cit., Ch.6, Section 4.
®4In J.A. Schumpeter (1943), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy,
Lond., Allen and Unwin, he makes his position quite clear, he does
not wish capitalism to collapse but he is afraid that it will.
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unscientific in Schumpeter’s sense came partly because he made the
ideological basis of his work quite clear. He stated that his aim
was to provide a theory based on "the facts of business life” that
would by its conclusions counter the argument that the only solution
to the inadequacies of the market system was to replace them with
planning. ”... this book tends to argue, that private enterprise does
85work broadly to the benefit of the society in which it exists”.
Andrews was regarded as being unscientific both because he made his 
values explicit and because he tried to break with Cartesian 
methodology. 85
85P.W.S. Andrews (1949a), op.cit., p.28
CHAPTER IV
CONCEPT CHANGE - THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION
Goals, Methodology and Concept Change
"The crucial element in a collective discipline 
is the recognition of a sufficiently agreed goal 
or ideal in terms of which common outstanding 
problems can be identified.”1
At any particular time each discipline is characterized by its
. 2own body of concepts, methods and fundamental aims.
I have argued that at the time Andrews was writing, the primary 
goal of economics was to develop theories which exhibited aesthetic 
qualities such as simplicity and generality. At least, this was 
regarded as the highest level function of economists; economists 
performing other functions were performing lower status tasks, 
directed towards lower status goals.
Scientific professions are like other social organizations, they 
have their "reference groups” comprising the men whose individual 
choices become in effect the choices of the whole profession. A new 
concept, theory or strategy, for example, becomes an effective 
possibility in a scientific discipline when it is taken seriously by 
influential members of the relevant profession and it only becomes 
fully established when it receives their positive endorsement. 
Conversely an innovation which the current reference group declares 
totally unsound, is for the time being, as good as dead. Another
1Toulmin (1972), op.cit., p.364. 
^ibid., p •266.
87.
88.
alternative is that the proponents of a new concept replace the
established leadership and themselves become the reference group.
A proposed new theory, designed to replace a currently accepted
theory - whether it is a sub-theory of a paradigm or the whole
paradigm - will only become taken seriously if it is compatible with
the goals and methodology that the reference group regards as
’’correct". Andrews, who wanted economics to be useful and to relate
to the world of the business man, rejected the mechanistic analyses
of imperfect competition theories in favour of his own more realistic
if less determinate theory. That is, he saw the goal of economic
theory as being the discovery of underlying generalities behind the
complexities of reality; these were wanted not only for their own
sake but to help in policy making by governments and by business.
It was primarily because his goals were different that Andrews
failed to appeal to the reference group. To accept his theories
would have implied the acceptance of different goals, not just better
answers to questions that related to current goals. Not only were
the goals different, but his proposal also contained concepts that
could not be handled by Cartesian methodology.
In a sense Andrews was trying to find a way out of the strait-
jacket of Cartesian methodology and in this we can trace his
intellectual ancestry to Marshall and Mill.
Mill’s "Principles" were an attempt to force economists to deal
with ethical problems. Mill tried to emphasize historical and
customary factors in economic life just as Marshall did.
"Too logical to be just a follower of Ricardo 
but not radical enough to found his own 
methodology, or join the rising historical 
school, Mill did not succeed in wedding history 
to theory or, what is the same thing on another 
plane, in joining the materialism of Ricardo's
89.
conclusions with the ethics of human nature."3 *
Mill was the authority figure, the major figure of the reference
group of economics in the era before it became professionalized, when
the boundaries of the discipline were not so strongly drawn, when the
narrowing of the goals to those of the Cartesian ego had not been
completed. ,
"Mill’s work on economics is indeed a halfway 
house, not so much between Ricardian and 
marginalist economics, but rather between 
orthodox economics and the economics of the 
historical school."5
In attacking Mill, Jevons, the mathematician, was attacking an
appropriate target. To Jevons science was logic and it was the ethical
non-Cartesian element of Mill that he was attacking. The success of
the marginal revolution was part of the process of narrowing the goals
of economics, and the removal of the uncertainties and values of the
real world - the movement towards formalism.
"The discovery of the concept of the margin 
opened up new intellectual horizons. Although 
the margin did not enable economics to explain 
reality any better, at least it made the 
discipline more ethically and aesthetically 
pleasing. ... Economics came to describe not 
the actual but one possible arrangement of 
things. And this possible world was eminently 
satisfactory to the sense of beauty, although 
less so to the moral sense. When that mixture 
of chicanery, deceit, blackmail and downright 
crime which is existential competition entered 
the machinery of marginalism, it emerged as the 
loftiness of optimum allocational efficiency 
and distributive justice."6
3Mini (1974), op.cit., p.102.
^It may be that, when a reference group whose goals are Cartesian, 
indicates a wish for realism, this is a ritual carryover from an 
earlier period when economics had not been "purified".
5Mini (1974), op.cit. , p.103.
^ibid., p.149.
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Perhaps a better way of making this point is that in the marginal 
analysis existential competition was filtered out, leaving only 
competition that was legal and morally defensible. Andrews too was 
only concerned with the latter competition. The difference between 
his competition and that of the marginal theories was that his was 
not defined structurally.
Despite the marginal revolution, with Marshall we had not yet 
reached the complete dominance of Cartesian methodology. Economics 
had not yet become completely professional with an agreed hierarchy 
of goals. Marshall in his turn was the major figure in the reference 
group of English-speaking economists. Marshall, like Mill, tried to 
solve the problem of the conflict between the two major elements of 
economic theory. He solved this partly by keeping them separate in 
his writings. Industry and Trade, for example, has hardly any 
Cartesian elements, it is historical, based on real world customs and 
practices. The Cartesian elements of Marshall’s thought are mainly 
contained in the mathematical appendices to the Principles.
But the separation was not complete, and Marshall sometimes
tried to combine the two, for example when he tried to incorporate
the time-associated concept of returns to scale, especially increasing
returns to scale, into the comparative static analysis of the long
run. The unsatisfactory nature of this combination was what Sraffa
identified as ’’the one dark spot which disturbs the harmony of the
8whole” theory of value.
The imperfect competition theories of Robinson and Chamberlin
See below, Chapter VII.
^Piero Sraffa (1926), "The Laws of Returns under Competitive 
Conditions”, Economic Journal 36, p.536.
7
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were attempts to deal with this problem by the use of Cartesian, i.e. 
mathematico-logical methods. Andrews thought that these models were 
inappropriate to the world of manufacturing business.
I would not argue that there are no non-Cartesian elements to be 
found in the writings of economists since Marshall, many of the
authority figures themselves especially in their writings on applied
. . . 9economics contain non-Cartesian elements.
But by the time Andrews was putting forward his theories, the
’’best" theories, as defined by the reference group, were those which
were most definitely Cartesian. Those theories that rejected
Cartesianism, like the writings of Andrews, were not scientific and
therefore no substitute for theories which, no matter how far they
fell short of the current goals, were ’’scientific".
The Keynesian revolution had been in one sense a counter
revolution - a shift back to the pre-1870 macroeconomic emphasis.
But it was incorporated into the mainstream by minimising and
de-emphasizing those aspects that made it revolutionary. Andrews,
though writing in the field of microeconomics, had affinities with
. 10Keynes, especially in his stress on the role of expectations.
The equilibrium of the industry, in Andrews, was nothing like the 9
9Mini points out that when economists address themselves to practical 
issues they frequently abandon the mechanistic approach. Economists 
in practical writings like the reports of the Council of Economic 
Advisers, in Congressional testimonies, and in industrial and trade 
monographs, abandon nine-tenths of the unbelievable complexities of 
their craft, those mechanistic "nuts and bolts that comprise the 
universe of discourse of economic theory". (1974), op.cit. , p.61.
1Qtn Manufacturing Business (Chapter VII) Andrews discusses the 
relationship between his theory and Keynesian macroeconomics.
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the Cartesian equilibrium. It was a stability reached through a 
competitive process quite different from the competition of price 
theory which depends on s1ructure. In the neoclassical framework 
absence of structurally defined competition implies monopoly, there 
is no other possibility as long as we stay within the framework.
The kind of competition Andrews sees as pervasive cannot be 
accommodated within the neoclassical paradigm since it is the result 
of uncertainty: it results from having expectations about the way 
rivals, potential and actual, will act. Expectations and certain 
knowledge are incompatible. If you have certain knowledge you 
don’t need expectations. The elimination of time not only rules out 
expectations, but also rules out the kind of competitive behaviour 
that is based on expectations. It is not so much that the builders 
of these models do not recognise that this type of competition is to 
be found in the real world, but that the analyses are irrelevant to 
reality. This is because the abstraction from time and uncertainty 
eliminate the essence of real competition.
Yet, as Andrews complained, these models were used as a basis
for policies designed to deal with the problems of the real world,
. , . . 11and as a basis for attacks on private enterprise.
"In apparently respectable economic research 
a good deal of what amounts to deception is 
practised ... Neoclassical microeconomics is an 
individualist theory of rational action, and 
has no necessary explanatory power regarding 
the actual misbehaviour of Western economics.
... Given this status, the propositions of 
Neoclassical microeconomics are rationalist 
constructions based on actions that require no 
empirical defence. The deception occurs because 
the pure theories of this framework are
1 1Andrews (1949a), op.cit., pp.24-29.
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consistently misapplied in the interpretation
of concrete reality."12
There were only two types o f  firm in neoclassical models, when 
Andrews was writing, perfectly competitive firms and monopolies: even 
the firms in imperfect con petition theories were small monopolies.
Those industries that were not perfectly competitive were allocating 
resources wrongly and action should be taken against them. It was 
this conclusion that Andrews objected to: he regarded this kind of 
application of the theories to manufacturing industries as improper, 
since neither the model of perfect competition nor imperfect 
competition was appropriate.
However, to appeal to the real world was not sufficient to 
overthrow the neoclassical paradigm because economic theory had 
become a deductive structure erected on the basis of a few 
intuitively obvious postulates which were impervious to empirical 
tests.
Reaction to Contrary Evidence
To show that the "world is not like that" is, despite Popper, 
not cause enough to abandon research programmes, at least in 
economics. Empirical falsification, by showing that the assumptions 
or conclusions are not appropriate to reality in practice has not 
been sufficient to refute theories. For example, showing empirically 
that business men do not base their activities on a process of 
discovering marginal revenue and marginal cost and producing the 
output at which they are equal was not enough to refute the neoclassical 
theories of the firm based on this assumption.
*^E van Jon es ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  o p . c i t . ,  p . 3 5 9 .
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Theories are repaired more often than refuted and ad hoc
hypotheses are frequently used in the repair process, replacing some
of the former auxiliary hypotheses with new ones. Protecting the hard
14 .core by ’’implicit theorizing” is very common. It is part of the 
process of the articulation of the paradigm, the discovery of its 
applicability, the drawing out of its implications. It is part of
normal science, a normal part of the carrying out of research
/
programmes. One response to criticism of the neoclassical paradigm
by those engaging in normal science has been to make slight changes
in methods and approach.
"The adjustments were usually kept as small 
and quiet as possible and as undisturbing to 
ingrained habits of thought as was at all 
possible. 5
This response is preferred to the alternative of concluding that there 
is something faulty in the basic approach. While the end result of a 
challenge may be changes within a research programme rather than a 
change in basic approach, often the initial reaction is to attack 
the proponents of the theory rather than attempt to assess the 
quality of the theory, and its ability to answer the appropriate 
questions, that is to achieve the goals of the discipline. The 
theorist is often baffled by the criticism of his method and the 
result of this bafflement is that "the attacks are not answered:
^P. Medawar (1969), op.cit. , p.30.
Michael Farrell claims that this is what E.A.G. Robinson did m  his 
defence of imperfect competition theory against Andrews’ attack.
M. Farrell (1952), "Deductive Systems and Empirical Generalization 
in the Theory of the Firm", Oxford Economic Papers 4, p.47.
15Schoeffler (1955), op.cit., p.165.
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they can only be exorcised by resorting to vituperation”.16
Bafflement, or lack of understanding was one of the reactions to 
17Andrews and there was certainly at least an element of hostility in
18some of the reactions.
As soon as a radical theory arises, a process whereby the
intellect goes to work to show the new as only a "special case" of
the old, begins. It can be argued that the bringing of Keynes'
economics back into the neoclassical mould is a case in point. Keynes
"...never tired of stressing the utter fickle­
ness of the bases on which decisions to invest 
are taken Chut the economic mind] divorced 
investment decisions from their flimsy 
psychological underpinnings and rooted them in 
physical concepts. The accelerator is one of 
the most stringent mechanistic relationships 
to enter macroeconomics".16 7*9
The interpretation of Keynes in terms of neoclassical analysis is seen
in studies showing that earlier writers had already Keynesian ideas;
this exercise consisted of a comparison of Keynesian and classical
tools of analysis, and showing that Keynes was not "really"
revolutionary. This process, the attempt to show that the new is
only a "special" case of the old was operating in Andrews' case also.
He was variously interpreted as simply describing a process that was
. . .  20 .really the same as long run profit maximization or expanding on an
16Mini (197i+), pp.cit. , p.141.
17See below, Chapter V.
*®For example the politely hostile article by E.A.G. Robinson (1950), 
"The Pricing of Manufactured Products", Economic Journal 60.
19Mini (197*+), pp.cit., pp.272-273.
2°See E.A.G. Robinson (1950), pp.cit., p.779.
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example already considered in The Theory of Monopolistic21 . .Competition. Having established these points to their own
satisfaction, if not to that of the defenders of Andrews, the
defenders of imperfect competition could then dismiss Andrews’
challenge as not reallv saying anything new, and continue working
within the neoclassical research programme.
This process makes something that was for the contemporaries a
revolution appear to those looking back to be no revolution at all.
Whether revolutions occur or not in economics or science in general
is really somewhat of a non-question for it depends on whether you
are looking at it as a contemporary or looking back. It depends too
on whether you concentrate on the differences or on the continuities.
Both can be found: it is a matter of interpretation which one is
shown to be dominant. Looking backwards after the edges have been
smoothed, when either the old has been redefined in terms of the new,
or the new interpreted as a special case of the old, the
revolutionary aspects often disappear. It is revolution to those who
participate and continuity to those who look back after history has
been rewritten. In Keynesian theory which now forms an essential part
of standard undergraduate curricula
"... the sharp distinctions between the ’old’ and 
’new’ have been eroded, or rather they have been 
rendered less capable of provoking strong passions 
Ly being presented in a schematic form. What was 
once revolutionary is now the new orthodoxy; and as,
21E. Chamberlin (1952), ’’Full Cost and Monopolistic Competition”, 
Economic Journal 62, p.319.
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with most successful revolutions, it is sometimes 
difficult to remember what the world was like before."22
When looking at a successful revolution it is necessary to guard
against an optical illusion when, after the event, the edges have been
rounded and the lines of continuity redrawn.
The Necessary Conditions for a Successful Revolution
Harry Johnson, writing on the Keynesian revolution set out what
he thought were the necessary conditions which had to be fulfilled
. 23before a successful revolution in economics could occur. He based 
these ideas, as he was quick to point out, on a backwards look at the 
Keynesian revolution. It is interesting, I think, to look at those , 
conditions he sees as being necessary and which of these, if any, 
Andrews’ proposed revolution satisfied. It does not satisfy all of 
them, but I will argue that this non-compliance alone is not enough 
to account for his failure, for there are at least two important 
questions that Johnson leaves out.
A successful revolution, in Johnson’s interpretation, requires:
a) The existence of an established orthodoxy clearly inconsistent 
with important aspects of reality which nevertheless tries to 
explain these aspects, thus "exposing its incompetence in a 
ludicrous fashion". That is, the anomalies must be clearly 
obvious.
b) The new theory must be able to attack the central propositions
7? .Winch (1969), op.cit. , p.172. This point of course applies to all
revolutions, not just intellectual ones. It is a point, for example,
that the Chinese are very conscious of, a great deal of effort is
expended there to make the young, who did not experience it, realise
what the world was like before the revolution, and to give them some
idea of the differences the revolution has brought.
23Harry G. Johnson (1971), op.cit.
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of conservative orthodoxy with a new, but academically acceptable, 
analysis.
c) It must appear new, yet absorb as much as possible of the not
easily disputable propositions of existing theory and in this
. . 24process it helps to give old concepts new and confusing names
and to emphasize as crucial some analytical steps that have 
previously been taken as platitudinous.
d) It must appear to be difficult to understand, so that the old 
authorities (i.e. the reference group) would not find it 
worthwhile to master. But at the same time it must not be too 
difficult for younger colleagues and students to master if they 
are prepared to make the effort.
e) It must offer a new methodology that is more appealing than that 
currently available.
f) There must be an empirical relationship for the emerging tribe 
of econometricians to measure.
How does Andrews’ attempted revolution meet these conditions?
a) Andrews and many others certainly drew attention to anomalies, 
questions that could not be satisfactorily answered by the 
imperfect competition theories.
b) He did attack the central proposition of the imperfect 
competition theories of the time, the idea of profit 
maximization. At the same time however, he attacked not only 
the central postulate of some of the theories in the research 
programme but the hard core of the whole neoclassical programme. 
Because of this his innovation was not academically acceptable,
9U •For example, the marginal productivity of capital became the
marginal efficiency of capital. ibid., p.4.
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what: he was doing was not regarded as science.
c) He did the opposite of giving old concepts new names. He gave
25 .old names to new concepts, thus making the defenders think he 
was saying nothing new.
d) His theory, because it was deliberately written in layman’s 
language, did not appear difficult to understand. In reality it 
was difficult for anyone whose ideas were channelled by 
Cartesian methodology to understand and appreciate fully.
e) The methodology, if wo can interpret this as an emphasis on the 
processes rather than equilibrium states and reintroduction of 
time and uncertainty, was new but not appealing.
f) He certainly did not provide anything for the econometricians to 
measure.
Johnson’s conditions seem appropriate to successful revolution 
that takes place within a research programme. By his criteria it 
would appear that Andrews would have been unlikely to succeed even if 
he had, as he thought, only been challenging the imperfect 
competition theories within the neoclassical research programme. His 
failure was made certain by the fact that he struck at the foundations 
of this programme by denying that it was necessary to be able to 
arrive at determinate equilibrium values for price and output.
The Imperfectly Competitive Theory of the Firm
Marshall was concerned to bring together real world firms and 
the firms of the Cartesian model. But severe analytical difficulties 
arose when he was trying to reconcile increasing returns to scale with 
competition, i.e. with a perfectly elastic demand curve for a
25For example, "long run average costs".
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perfectly competitive firm. This problem was the subject of Sraffa’s
r . . 26 . JLaws of Returns under Competitive Conditions. His suggested
solution was to abandon the perfectly competitive firm and to enter
the world of monopolies. It was this suggestion that Joan Robinson
. 27followed up in developing her model of the imperfect firm. Edward
Chamberlin developed a very similar model, not as a response to
Sraffa, but in an attempt to develop a model more suitable for firms
producing differentiated products than the model of the perfectly
28competitive firm which assumed homogeneous products. The models
. 29 .were very similar, at least where they dealt with small firms. Both 
could be said to be attempting to "utilize more realistic
assumptions to develop a theory that was at once both rigorous and
. . 30 . .adequately descriptive of the world". The inadequacies of these
models showed the impossibility of this desired combination. Despite 
these inadequacies a sort of combined version of these models has 
become part of the neoclassical research programme and appears in all 
the standard text books. The imperfect competition revolution was 
successful not because it replaced the theory of perfect competition 
but because it found a place beside it in the neoclassical research *27
o rSraffa (1926), op.cit.
27 • •Joan Robinson (1933), The Economics of Imperfect Competition,
Lond., Macmillan.
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933), Cambridge Mass., 
Harvard University Press.
^Chamberlin called this the "large group" case. He also considered 
what he called the "small group" case, this was not considered by 
Robinson, because, as she later indicated, she did not know how to 
deal with it. The similarities are striking, especially the 
conclusion, despite Chamberlin’s continued attempts to show how 
different they were.
30Jones (1977), op.cit., p.359.
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programme.
It was inadequate in terms of some of the stated goals of 
economics such as having the ability to predict and being adequately 
descriptive of reality. That these goals are not as important as the 
goals of logic, elegance and simplicity is clear, since the theory is 
retained despite its inadequacies in terms of the former goals.
Silberston, for example, implies that the important character­
istic of a good theory is that it should be able to make accurate 
. . 31predictions. But I would argue that the imperfectly competitive 
theories are not good on this criterion. They share the 
disadvantages of other partial equilibrium analyses in that they 
require heroic "ceteris paribus" conditions to make predictions at 
all, the predictions are therefore highly qualified. They share too 
the difficulties of other static theories in that they cannot say 
anything about whether or how equilibrium positions will be reached, 
only what those positions will be if they are possible. And, in 
relation to the determination of equilibrium, they have a further 
inadequacy peculiar to themselves. The downward sloping demand curve 
for the firm rules out a one-to-one relationship between price and 
output supplied; rules out, that is, a determinate supply curve. 
Because of this they cannot predict, even in the Cartesian world of 
logic, the direction, let alone the magnitude, of price and output 
change in response to changes in exogenous variables. They can 
predict what might happen but not what must happen.
31A. Silberston (1967), "Review of ’On Competition in Economic 
Theory'", Economic Journal 77, p.867.
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The other criterion - ability to reflect the real world is also
32 .absent. E.A.G. Robinson says that a better theory is one that
explains the facts better; once again I would argue that the imperfect
competition theories do net meet this criterion. They share with the
rest of the neoclassical programme the characteristic of being an
"Idealist creation which is quasi-permanent and which is imposed on
33the ’facts’ rather than the other way round”. The attachment to 
marginalist theories resuLts not from their having been tested and 
not falsified but because they conform to the ideal of Cartesian 
science, the reaching of definite conclusions from abstract, 
unrealistic, assumptions through the exercise of logic. Whether the 
conclusions bear any resemblance to the real world, whether the 
conclusions are tested or even testable is irrelevant. What matters 
is the method.
’’All respectable microeconomists by 
definition adhere to the neoclassical core.
The reinforcements both positive and 
negative of our education ensure the long 
term viability of this condition.”31*
Shackle suggests that with the emergence of the theories of the 
firm in 1930’s
"...not only the answers but the questions 
are new. The whole notion of what value 
theory sought to do and the way its aim 
should be accomplished had been changed.
... Primacy had passed from the autonomously 
self-subsisting technical commodity to the 
firm considered as a profit-maximizing policy 
maker.”35
32
33
E.A.G. Robinson (1930), op.cit., p.773. 
Jones (1977), op.cit., p.361.
34ibid.
35Shackle (1967), op.cit., p.65.
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The policy that firms make is pricing policy; it is regularly 
said that firms in imperfect competition are price makers, not price 
takers. Yet if we look carefully we can see that there are really no 
policies available to these firms any more than to perfectly 
competitive firms. Once they decide to maximize profits, and this is 
a basic assumption not a policy variable, then the firm’s price and 
output are determined within the situation of the model, there is 
only one output the firm can produce, the profit maximizing output, 
and there is only one price at which this can be sold, the price 
determined by the demand curve for the firm’s product. And other 
policies such as investment policies are ruled out because the models 
are static.
The problem of defining an industry or group where products of
firms are differentiated was overcome by assuming that firms which
were monopolists because their products were distinct, were identical
in cost and demand conditions. In this way they could be grouped
into one industry. This solution involves the use of two different
definitions of a ’product’, in the one model. On the one hand,
product is defined in terms of consumer perception (differentiated
product) and the other in technical and cost terms (homogeneous
product). In perfect competition the consumer perception definition
and the technical definition coincide. Andrews’ model does not
contain such a dichotomy: his definition is consistent in that the
product both in the consumer’s perception and the producer’s costs
is identical, though different producers make different products.
The imperfect competition models bore little relation to reality.
Joan Robinson realised that
’’Clear and definite questions cannot be 
asked about a vague, richly detailed, fluid 
and living world. This world must therefore
104.
be exchanged for a model, a set of precise 
assumptions collectively simple enough to 
allow the play of logic and mathematics.’’36
Marshall had been trying to do just this, to get clear and definite
questions and answers about the fluid living real world. Robinson’s
solution at that time was to abandon the real world.
Andrews on the other hand retained a simplified version of the
. 37real world and abandoned the precise answer - equilibrium.
As a result of the imperfect competition revolution, the
perfectly competitive
’’...account of industries and their mutual 
relations, and of the factors of production 
and their pay, a general account applying to 
the whole economy and answering all questions 
about prices, outputs and incomes, had now 
been left behind, not without many a backward 
glance. In its place had been put the theory 
of the firm.”36
Hicks (1939) is quoted as seeing the result as the wreckage of the 
greater part of economic theory. But while industrial analysis may 
have been the victim, as Andrews claimed, the rest of the neoclassical 
apparatus, including perfect competition as applied both to 
products and factors, and the general equilibrium analysis survived 
unscathed in the neoclassical research programme. The Robinson- 
Chamberlin apparatus takes its place as one of the sub-theories in 
the neoclassical research programme, part of the basic paradigm of
^6ibid. , p.47.
Joan Robinson later on tacitly acknowledged the limitation of her 
own model in (1953) ’’Imperfect Competition Revisited", Economic 
Journal 63, and even more so in (1971), Economic Heresies, Lond., 
Macmillan. In the latter book she uses concepts of industries, 
long run profit maximization and competitive monopolies that are 
very close to Andrews and a long way from those in her 
Economics of Imperfect Competition.
38Shackle (1967), op.cit., p.69.
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"equilibrium throuth the market mechanism". It is curious that
Shackle should state that with the introduction of the theory of the
firm "realism had been served, but elegance, simplicity and generality
39had been lost to a degree at first scarcely realised" since earlier 
in his discussion he showed that "realism" had no place in these 
models.
Johnson agreed with Shackle that the imperfect competition 
revolution was challenging the validity of the assumption of perfect 
competition on which value theory had been built following the 
marginalist revolution. He sees it in particular as challenging not 
just the assumption, but the welfare effects of competition. But he 
argues that
"This revolution has more or less fizzled 
out, though its fossilized remnants continue 
to plague both students and instructors in 
elementary courses."1*0
At the time Andrews was writing, however, it was still very 
important, though it had been under attack almost from the beginning. 
And if it has fizzled out as Johnson suggests, it was not because of 
Andrews' challenge, not because it was replaced by Andrews1 
alternative.
Dennis Robertson wrote about the imperfect competition
. 41 . . . .revolution and the counter revolution which he saw beginning in 
1939 with the Hall and Hitch study which set out the full cost *
39ibid.
^Johnson (1971), op.cit. , p.2.
l4lD.H. Robertson (1956), Economic Commentaries, Lond., Staples Press, 
and (1952), Utility and All That and Other Essays, Lond., Allen 
and Unwin.
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principle as the basis of pricing decisions. He saw the challenge as
an empirical one, based on the fact that businessmen say they use
methods other than equalizing marginal revenue and marginal cost to
arrive at price. Andrews' work he saw as a later formulation of this
counter revolution. This formulation of Andrews
"...generated a number of bewildered and 
hostile comments and three further attempts, 
one by Andrews and two by his disciples to
expound the prino ip Leu of t he counter 
revolution. m1+2
Robertson suggests that while the early exposition of the counter
revolution lacked clarity, the early reactions of the revolutionaries
also left something to be desired. Machlup, for instance, considered
43that the results could be fully harmonized with marginal analysis, 
and claimed that the practices were known before the Oxford group 
drew attention to them but did not explain why they were not used as 
a basis of theory. Chamberlin says that the practices were 
consistent with his model and that he did include them, but as 
Robertson says he treated them just as a minor aberration.
E.A.G. Robinson first reacted by claiming that firms maximized short 
run profits, was taken to task by Farrell and went to the opposite 
extreme, saying that they maximized long run profits suitably 
discounted, of course. This would certainly make profit maximization 
consistent with Andrews, but prevents the clear and definite answers 
to questions of equilibrium that the Cartesian methodology requires 
and that short run profit maximization supplies.
The static framework with simplistic assumptions regarding both
**2ibid. , (1956), p.35.
qHe was referring to the Hall and Hitch study, not Andrews.
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expectations and market structure proved to be inadequate for an
understanding of the behaviour of oligopolistic firms in a dynamic
uncertain world, and for solving the problem of how stability, in the
broad sense not in the formal equilibrium sense, could arise in
oligopoly without collusion. Andrews’ work was both a criticism of
the static equilibrium attempt at an explanation and the provision of
an alternative based on a different methodology.
’’Many of the successful revolutionaries, 
quite properly, turned conservative to 
protect the newly established paradigm 
and their defence owed little to empirical 
evidence about firm’s pricing behaviour.”****
Andrews’ assumptions were more realistic but could not lead to the
definite answers that respectable analysis required. ’’Andrews’
critique, though in its own terms irrefutable, is unacceptable; it
45 # .has therefore apparently been ignored.” Economic theory continues 
to be justified by assuming its validity. Rationality is equated with 
maximizing profits, that is with producing the output where marginal 
costs equals marginal revenue. Any business observed acting 
differently must be irrational and any alternative theory must assume 
irrationality which makes theorizing impossible.
Loasby concludes that profit maximization is a paradigm which 
Andrews did not succeed in toppling. But later theories, those of 
Marris and Baumol, do dispense with this apparently indispensible 
assumption. Their alternative is acceptable despite this because the 
goal of the firm still involves maximization and it is this which *45
^Brian S. Loasby (1971), "Hypothesis and Paradigm in the Theory of 
the Firm”, Economic Journal 81, p.879.
45ibid., p •880•
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yields a clear and definite equilibrium solution. It is the notion of
static equilibrium that is the essence of the paradigm, the hard core
of the neoclassical programme, rather than profit maximization.
Profit maximization is an auxiliary assumption belonging to some but
not all the theories of the research programme. It can be dispensed
with as long as it is replaced with an alternative assumption that
will also result in a determinate equilibrium. This point in fact
comes out in Loasby’s discussion, for he recognises that it was the
dismissal of the notion of equilibrium that followed the rejection of
short run profit maximization that was really unacceptable, profit
maximization only being the means to the end.
"It is the concept of equilibrium which is 
at the heart of the crisis and the ■
abandonment of equilibrium is a much more 
fundamental change than that implied by the 
creation of the theory of the firm which was 
developed, in accordance with Sraffa’s advice, 
precisely in order to preserve the static 
equilibrium method of analysis.,,l+̂
Another writer who developed a similar, though not as fully
47 .worked out, analysis to that of Andrews was Heflebower. In this a 
definite equilibrium of price and quantity is replaced by a zone of 
stability in which firms have some freedom of decision, some room to 
manoeuvre. But he abandoned this direction of enquiry in response to 
the criticism that his analysis was not rigorous and therefore not 
acceptable.
Both the imperfect competition theories and that of Andrews were 
attempts to deal with the problem of reconciling increasing returns 
with perfect competition. Imperfect competition attempted to add a 47
46ibid.
47R. Heflebower (1961), "Stability in Oligopoly", Manchester School 29.
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little realism and sti1J retain the static equilibrium approach, a 
fusion that did not work. Andrews’ approach was to plump for a great 
deal more realism and abandon static equilibrium and with it Cartesian 
methodology. A third way to deal with the problem was to abandon 
realism altogether, and, dispensing with Marshallian partial 
equilibrium, move, as Robbins and Hicks did, to the general 
equilibrium approach, thus saving both perfect competition, which is 
essential for general equilibrium, and the Cartesian methodology.
The decision to use general equilibrium analysis does not depend, 
any more than Sraffa’s or Robinson’s decisions do, on appeal to the 
facts. There is no attempt at empirical verification. Despite the 
oft-repeated assertion that a better theory is one that fits the 
facts better, the choice of competing theories within the research 
programmes, to say nothing of choices between programmes, has 
nothing to do with ’’fitting the facts’’ and everything to do with 
fitting the method of approach regarded as scientific and therefore 
conferring status on the discipline.
Just as perfect competition and increasing returns in Marshall 
were logical inconsistencies, so, as it turned out, were a product 
differentiation approach and a long run equilibrium where average 
cost equals average revenue. The two taken together result in the 
tangency solution which characterizes imperfect competition theories. 
But contradictions in the assumptions led to logical flaws in the 
working out of the model of imperfect competition. Harrod, for 
example, argued that the assumption of freedom of entry and a steeply 
sloping demand curve are incompatible. If, as Johnson suggested,
^R. Harrod (1952), ’’The Theory of Imperfect Competition Revisited" 
in Economic Essays , Lond., Macmillan.
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these theories fizzled out, remaining only to plague beginners, it
was not because they were unrealistic, not as a result of criticism
that came from empirical studies, but because their logic was faulty.
The reverse applies to Andrews’ theory which was rejected although it
was both realistic and logically worked out. The high status of
general equilibrium analysis, the pure theory of rational action, is
seen in its use by major U.S. theorists as a basis for further
49research including Samuelson in the post-war period.
"This renewed endorsement of Robbins’ 
delineation of respectable analysis 
coincided with the endorsement of 
sophisticated econometric techniques, "* 50
an advantage which has nothing to do with applicability to the real
world.
The coup de grace for imperfect competition theories came not 
from Andrews’ and others’ criticisms in terms of the unrealism of the 
assumptions, of the lack of any relationship with business practice, 
and the exclusion of pricing policy, for all these are 
characteristics of general equilibrium which continues to be used. It 
came, rather, because of the logical contradictions contained in the 
assumptions.
The Problem of Oligopoly - The Continuing Controversy
Although the imperfect competition models were not appropriate 
for real world large industrial firms, they were used as a basis for 
policies that affected these firms. But their use this way did not 
solve the problem of oligopoly.
^See Jones (1977), op.cit., pp.359-60. Winch argues that in this 
period intellectual hegemony was moving to the U.S. and the leaders 
of the profession, the current reference group were increasingly to 
be found there. D. Winch (1969), op.cit., pp.13-15.
50Jones (1977), op.cit., p.360.
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I 1In 1967'’ MachLup lo<xed back at what he called the marginalist
controversy of the late 1930’s and 1940's in England and U.S., to
52which he was a major contributor. He sees this as a particular
example of a type of controversy that has been going on in economics
almost as long as it has been in existence.
"Attacks on the assumptions of maximizing 
behaviour and on the lack of realism in price 
theory have occurred with great regularity 
ever since 'economic man' and similar postulates 
were introduced. The running battles between 
the classical and the historical schools were 
largely on these points. The 'Methodenstreit’ 
of 1883-84 dealt essentially with the same 
issues. And in the United States institutionalism 
may be seen as a movement animated by the same 
spirit of protest against abstract theory."53
He saw the particular 'marginalist' controversy as being,
firstly an attack on the theory of the profit maximizing firm,
regardless of market structure, by the researchers in Oxford and
secondly an attack on the marginal productivity principle as an
explanation of demand for labour on the part of the individual firm
54 . .by writers in U.S. This second controversy is far from over, m
its marginal productivity aspects it is very live in the Cambridge *52
^Machlup (1967), op.cit.
52 .In particular in his (1946), op.cit.
^Machlup (1967), op.cit., p.101.
The second aspect was aired in articles in American Economic Review 
in 1946, the principal contributor being Lester. R.A. Lester (1946), 
"Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for Wage Employment Problems", 
American Economic Review 36. As this is not very relevant to 
Andrews' work I do not propose to go into this aspect here. It 
could be noted however that Andrews did not think the application of 
the theory of competitive price to the employment of factors was 
very useful, particularly in the form it appeared in the Keynesian 
theory of investment. P.W.S. Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner (1952), 
Capital Development in Steel, Oxford, Blackwell, pp.6-7.
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controversy on the marginalist analysis of capital and the rate of
55profit.
Machlup does not specifically mention Andrews in his earlier
56article but concerns himself with the Hall and Hitch study. He
does not mention him either in the later article, but presumably he
would have considered him as one of the "Oxford researchers" (as
others did) presenting essentially the same criticism of marginal
theory. And yet, as we shall see, it is curious that on many
important issues relating to the controversy Machlup, who called
himself a marginalist and Andrews, decidedly anti-marginalist,
present almost identical analyses.
Perhaps Andrews would have seen the controversy as symptomatic
of a wider dissatisfaction with microeconomic theory, and its
inability to deal satisfactorily with large firms in an
interdependent situation. He himself, in Manufacturing Business and
On Competition in Economic Theory, was clearly attacking the
imperfectly competitive theories of the firm specifically. But
elsewhere his writings are pervaded with dissatisfaction with much of
current micro theory. The theory of competitive price he regarded
as still satisfactory for the limited questions it could answer, but
he thought that microeconomics, in which he included industrial
. 57analysis, should be able to do far more than this. Andrews, of 
course, was not alone in his criticism, in his ideas on the 567
55See, for example, G. Harcourt (1972), Some Cambridge Controversies 
in the Theory of Capital, Cambridge University Press.
56 . .Written, of course, before Manufacturing Business.
57For example, Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit.
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inadequacies of economic theory. It is, as Machlup points out, a
58continuing controversy. Two relatively recent articles which, where
they are concerned with microeconomics and the theory of the firm,
seem to be very much in the spirit of Andrews, though not, I think,
likely to have been influenced by him, are those by Shubik and 
59 .Morgenstern. But before going on to look at these I would like to
60expand a methodological point mentioned earlier.
General or Particular Models
For some writers the aim of any science is to give a unified 
explanation, a general theory, of the world as it concerns them. 
Many economists have thought that this was the function of economic 
science. The greatest intellectual achievement in this view of 
economic science was the theory of general equilibrium and its 
underlying condition of perfect competition. This was developed 
by the Austrian school and later Robbins and others at the London 
School of Economics. It was not realistic and could not or rather 
should not have been the basis for policy prescription. It was to 
this that Andrews referred when he spoke of the modern form of 
economic theory as
"...an internally consistent logical system of 
analysis thought to be applicable generally in 
the investigation of economic problems".* 61
58 .To mention just a few already referred to - Latsis, Schoeffler,
Mini and Hutchison - to say nothing of the recent flood from the 
Radical Political economists.
59Morgenstern (1972), op.cit., and Martin Shubik (1970), "A 
Curmudgeon’s Guide to Microeconomics", Journal of Economic 
Literature 8.
^See above, p.70.
61Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit.
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Because it was thought by many to be the peak of economic science, by
extension, problems not amenable to solution by this type of analysis
were not regarded as being within the province of economics. In
textbooks, where students learn what economics is, it is implicitly
assumed that this type of analysis and its associated theories of
perfect competition, pose no methodological problems or questions,
there remain only problems of application.
"What the current group of popular text books 
have in common is that few, if any, unresolved 
theoretical as distinct from applied problems 
in economics are mentioned."62
There have always been those who thought that the search for a
general theory in economics was vain and that although
"...general equilibrium economics is 
undoubtedly a splendid intellectual achieve­
ment ... it is not by any means on the level 
of Newtonian mechanics. In a world of large 
complicated corporations selling thousands 
of goods and services, the way we stick to 
our simple models, which at best cover one 
simple limiting case, is ludicrous"
The rejection of general models is associated with the belief that
there are many types of questions that can and should be answered by
economics, for some you need one theory, for others another. It is
also held that theories appropriate in one period may not be in
another because of changes in the economic world itself. These
changes occur far more frequently and continuously than in the world
of physics, which, for most practical purposes, is changeless.
Marshall was one of those who took this view. *63
fi 9Morgenstern (1972), op.cit., p.1163.
63Shubik (1970), op.cit., p.415.
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"The matter with which the chemist deals is the 
same always: but economics, like biology, deals 
with a matter, of which the inner nature and 
construction, as well as the outer form are 
constantly changing ... If we look at the history 
of such strictly economic relations as those of 
business credit and banking, of trade-unionism or 
co-operation, we see that modes of working that 
have been generally successful at some times and 
places have uniformly failed at others. ... The 
function of analysis and deduction in economics is 
not to forge a few long chains of reasoning, but 
to forge rightly many short chains and single 
connecting links."6I+
It was also the basic methodological premise of the German Historical 
School and the Institutionalists.
Even many of those who subscribe to the idea that a general 
theory is the most desirable are prepared to recognise the necessity 
and usefulness of sub-theories that will answer different sets of 
questions, provided they are within the same equilibrium framework.
We could say that currently the major sub-theories with the 
broad framework are, for microeconomics, the theories of perfect 
competition, monopoly and perhaps monopolistic competition. We 
could also include those theories of the large firm which use 
alternative behavioural assumptions to profit maximization, for 
example sales revenue maximization. For macroeconomics we have the 
still dominant Keynesian unemployment equilibrium model, purged of 
its non-Cartesian elements, and the challenger, the more obviously 
neoclassical monetarist theory.
Machlup is one of those who recognise that sub-theories are 
needed, although he sees equilibrium as a tool rather than as the 
essence of the methodology.
6*+Alfred Marshall (1920), Principles of Economics, Lond., Macmillan,
8th ed., pp.637-638.
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"Economic theory, static as well as dynamic, 
is essentially a theory of adjustment to change.
The concept of equilibrium is a tool in this 
theory of change, the marginal calculus is its 
dominant principle."65 6
For he states quite explicitly that the marginalist theory of the
6 6firm is only appropriate for certain types of questions while other
theories are needed for other questions.
"In the theory of competitive price the ’real 
existence’ of firms is irrelevant. This purely 
fictitious single minded firm, helpful as it is 
in competitive price theory will not do so much 
for us in the theory of monopoly and oligopoly.
To explain and predict price reactions under 
monopoly and oligopoly we need more than the 
construct of a profit maximizing reactor ... For 
these theories the real existence of firms (that 
is, an empirical counterpart to the theoretical 
construct) is required, because the explanation 
of changes in prices, inputs and outputs is at the 
same time an explanation of decisions of some 
particular firms, in the sense of an organization 
of men acting in particular, sometimes unpredictable 
ways."67
The theories, developed for the situation of a few firms, that he 
refers to approvingly are those that replace profit maximization with 
some other maximand, that is, those that are within the Cartesian 
methodology.
One of the things he tries to show is that the behavioural
68theories of the firm which Latsis sees as being part of a different 
and non-determinate research programme, are not necessarily 
indeterminate and that their usefulness would be in direct relation
^Machlup (1946), op.cit. , p.521.
66Mainly questions of direction of change in equilibrium values of 
endogenous variables in response to changes in exogenous variables.
67Machlup (1967), op.cit., pp.107, 111.
°8Latsis (1972), op.cit., pp.229-32.
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to their determinateness.
MIt is a mistake to think that models 
containing types of greater anonymity yield 
fully determinate results while models with 
less anonymous types yield less determinate 
results. Any well constructed model furnishes 
precisely the results the constructor wants it 
to furnish. Thus the most useful model has only 
’a single exit’ ... and this holds for a highly 
’behavioural’ model no less than for one with 
only fully anonymous, single minded maximisers 
of profit. Indeed, if the postulate of profit 
maximization in certain circumstances ... fails 
to make the model produce completely determinate 
results, we regard it as unsuitable for instances 
of this sort, and try to replace it with one that 
yields just the results we want it to deliver."*’9
This is a clear example of the need for a determinate solution
dominating over the desire for realism. That he sees economic science
as a matter of using Cartesian methodology is evident also in his
. . . . 70defence of Friedman's position on unreality of assumptions for
where introspection is the source of knowledge as in Cartesian 
epistemology the realism of assumptions is irrelevant.
Despite some areas of agreement with Machlup (e.g. that the
theory of competitive price usefully served some limited purposes and
that it could manage with unrealistic assumptions), despite too,
occasional Machlup-sounding assertions about the realism of 
. 71 . .assumptions, Andrews’ position was m  important respects very
69 . .F. Machlup (1974), "Situational Determinism in Economics", British
Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25, p.283. But perhaps he 
is just trying to have it both ways, an impression one often gets 
from Machlup’s writing, e.g. "Marginal analysis really intends to 
explain the effects certain changes in conditions may [my emphasis] 
have on the actions of the firm". (1946), op.cit♦, p.521.
70 .F. Machlup (1955), "The Problem of Verification in Economics",
Southern Economic Journal 22. *71 v
71 .For example, P.W.S. Andrews (1952c), "Industrial Economics as a
Specialist Subject", Journal of Industrial Economics 1, p.73.
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different. A believer, like Marshall, in the necessity for many
economic theories, he clearly did not think that Cartesian equilibrium
analysis was the only way to deal with economic problems; his own
theory is outside the Cartesian methodology. His answer to the
Marshallian dilemma was to abandon determinate equilibrium and
replace it with a stability that is the result of a historical
process. A major factor involved in achieving stability is the
perception of the business man of his environment. This is one
respect in which his theory is different from the imperfect
competition theories.
"Mrs. Robinson’s theory was based not, as 
she claimed, on the ’study of individual 
decisions' but on the conditions of 
individual equilibrium, just as perfect 
competition had been; and both perfect and 
imperfect competition are empty of 
predictions about the ways in which firms 
actually fix prices."72
The Continuing Criticism of the Neoclassical Research Programme
Both Shubik and Morgenstern, whose work I am using to illustrate 
the continuing criticism of neoclassical economics, have a decidedly 
Andrewsian flavour to their ideas.
Compare for example
"Microeconomics is concerned with the study 
of economic decision making at the level of 
the individual or family and the firm.",73
with
"At the micro-level economics deals with the 
decisions and activities of individual 
businesses and industrial groupings of
7^Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.879.
73Shubik (1970), op.cit. , p.408.
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businessmen and generalizations about the 
way they will react to changes in their 
environment." 7l+
Morgenstern mentions "the absurd usage in economics of the term 
. . 75 .competition" - something which Andrews clearly would have agreed
with for it was his point that by defining competition in structural
terms, the number of firms and homogeneity of products; all real world
competition was ruled out. This type of competition he believed to
be pervasive even among large firms. It is ruled out by definition,
for the assumption that differentiated products mean a downward
sloping demand curve like that of monopoly, is made without any
attempt at justification, "EJoan Robinson’s] demand curves fall down
76because she tells them to do so".
"Present economic theory allegedly deals with 
maxima. The fundamental objection is that 
these extrema exist and are attainable only if 
the individual or firm controls all variables 
on which the maximum depends. If some variables 
on which the outcome depends are under the 
conscious control of other entities who may be 
opposed or wish to cooperate with a given 
economic agent then a maxima problem is not 
involved. Economic theory simply is not in 
general confronted with pure maximum problems, 
certainly not when the theory deals with 
interactions of individual agents not under 
centralized control. Yet this is how economic 
theory is set up at present and how it is still 
viewed."75 *7
n i ± P.W.S. Andrews (1963), Industrial Uses of Economic Theory, Bly 
Stein Memorial Lecture, Los Angeles, University of California, p.10.
75 . •Morgenstern (1972), op.cit., p.1164. Hayek has also discussed this
point, see (1949), op.cit., pp.92-106.
^Andrews (1964b), op.cit. , p.22.
77 .Morgenstern (1972), op.cit., p.1166.
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"The firm currently presented in text books 
could be abolished and replaced by a computer.
It has nothing to decide, there is only 
information of a specific kind to be gathered 
and the rest is automatically settled. Is this 
even remotely a picture of what goes on in 
business?"78
"Oligopoly theory provides one of the clearest 
examples of the malaise in microeconomics. It 
is here that the contrast between institution 
free and detail rich approaches is most striking.
Furthermore the problems of dynamics appear in 
their starkest form. There is no oligopoly 
theory. There are bits and pieces of models, 
some reasonably well analyzed, some scarcely 
investigated. Our so-called theories are based 
on a mixture of common sense, uncommon sense, 
a few observations, a great amount of casual 
empiricism and a certain amount of mathematics 
and logic."79
But while much of what these critics have to say seems to be an
echo of what Andrews was saying earlier, he would not agree with them
in all respects. For example, he would, I think, find Shubik’s
comments on the power of the firm unsatisfactory.
"The understanding of oligopolistic markets is 
tantamount to the understanding of the economic 
power of the firm and the sources of that power."80
Perfect competition theory assumes that this power does not exist,
monopoly theory assumes it is pervasive and should be legislated
against. To Andrews the economic power of the manufacturing firm,
even in an industry consisting of only a few firms, is limited by
the industrial environment, by the firm’s perception of potential
competition and by its expectations about the reactions of consumers
and competitors to its activities. He claimed that there was no
7ftibid., p.1184.
7ftShubik (1970), op.cit., p.416.
80ibid., (footnote).
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theory of competitive oligopoly except his own. All other theories 
of oligopoly assumed either overt collusion, as when the theory of 
monopoly was used, or tacit collusion as when price leadership models 
were used. Other theories purporting to relate to oligopoly ignored 
the problem of interdependence, which is the essence of oligopoly. 
They were in reality theories of the large firm in isolation from its 
environment.^
Andrews and Machlup
It is not surprising that many of the comments of people like
Shubik and Morgenstern are similar to those of Andrews, since they
take much the same view of the nature and scope of economics. What
is surprising, however, is that many of Andrews’ ideas are similar to
those of Machlup, an avowed marginalist who puts highest value on
theories which involve a "single exit". Many aspects of the latter’s
writing seem to be quite contrary to his stated position. Referring,
for example, to marginal revenue and cost he says
”It should be hardly necessary to mention that 
all the relevant magnitudes involved, cost, 
revenue, profit, are subjective, that is 
perceived or found by those men whose decisions 
and actions are to be explained, rather than 
objective, that is calculated by disinterested 
men who are observing those actions from the 
outside and are explaining them.’’82
Marginal analysis of the firm should not be understood to imply
83 _anything but subjective estimates, guesses and hunches. Of course,
p-t # . . .P.W.S. Andrews and Elizabeth Brunner (1975), Studies m  Pricing, 
Lond., Macmillan, p.35.
poMachlup (1946), op.cit., p.521.
83ibid., p.522.
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taking this view it is easy to make marginal analysis consistent with 
Andrews but it prevents the specification of a determinate long run 
equilibrium. Machlup is against the inclusion of anything other than 
monetary costs and benefits on the grounds that that would make the 
theory tautological and empty, that is untestable, yet he suggests 
that evidence about the real world motivation of firms is not really 
important for many issues and that tests can be dispensed with.
Subjective estimates and expectations are incompatible with 
Cartesian methodology but Machlup tries to make it appear that they
are compatible. "Demand as seen by the seller is what revenue
84 . .expectations stem from" and "the role of average cost m  firms
pricing process is to aid in gauging the elasticity of long run
. 85 .demand for its product" - a very Andrewsian concept.
Machlup's concept of the long run also is quite different from 
the usual interpretation. The long run as usually defined is simply 
a period where there are no fixed factors of production. Long run 
costs are a summary of the costs involved in using different 
combinations of two broad categories of factors, capital and labour, 
when both are variable. The concept of the long run has nothing to 
do with the firm moving from one scale of plant to another. It 
simply summarizes at any particular time the costs of producing with 
different combinations of the factors, with given factor prices.
The changes in the amount of the factor "capital" are referred to as 
changes in "scale of plant". If the long run cost curve is U-shaped 
then there is an optimal scale of plant, and an unambiguous least
84 ., . , ibid.
85ibid. , p.544.
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cost output. Once the firm is producing this output it responds to a 
short run change by varying factors other than capital. That is, it 
moves along its short run marginal cost curve. A long run change in 
demand is not met by firms moving to larger scale of plant, but by the 
entry of new firms. Theoretically a firm will change its scale of 
plant in response to a shift in demand which brings about a change in 
relative factor prices; this is not however a movement from one point 
on its long run average cost curve to another, but a shift to a 
different curve. It was the consideration of the effect of long run 
demand changes on factor prices that led to the Marshallian dilemma 
in the case of decreasing cost industries. Here there is not only no 
long run equilibrium scale of plant but no determinate least cost 
output either. This dilemma Machlup completely ignores just as he 
ignores the standard definition of the long run which is the basis 
of the theory of competitive price and the 1930’s theory of the firm. 
In his definition
"Long run is thought of not so much as the 
time necessary to build new plant, but as 
whether or not changes are expected to be 
permanent, the length of time for which a 
changed volume of production is expected 
to prevail."®6
It may be reasonable to define the long run this way, but it is not 
the way it is defined in the theory of the firm.
It is very similar to Andrews’ view of the long run in 
Manufacturing Business, but the difference is that Andrews is using 
it to construct a non equilibrium theory, while Machlup is trying to 
provide arguments for the acceptance of marginalist equilibrium 
theory; he makes it into something different but seems to think that
86ibid., p.523.
m .
it is the same.
Similarly, Machlup seems to be arguing that the firm does not
base its pricing policy or short run equality of marginal revenue and
marginal cost. This is contrary to the usually accepted interpretation
of marginalist theories, especially as set out in standard text books.
’’The average revenues and average costs that 
must be calculated .,. are not in the least 
inconsistent with marginal revenue and marginal 
cost principles. That the firm figures with 
these averages over time does not mean that 
its decisions concerning price policies are on 
the basis of the average cost rule rather than 
the maximum profit rule."87
You would have to take a very everyday view of maximizing profit to 
make any sense of this statement, e.g. businessmen try and make as 
much profit as they can given the likely repercussions of making too 
much. It is not this kind of maximizing which is the basis of 
equilibrium theories. For these, maximization only occurs at that 
output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. The idea that 
long run profit maximization can lead to a determinate price and 
output is untenable, even if we exclude, as Machlup suggests, all the 
non pecuniary elements. The estimation of long run costs and revenue 
is not only subjective but for it to be otherwise would require an 
objectively determined time discount rate, something that is quite 
impossible. Andrews’ businessman can be compatible with a subjective 
long run profit maximizer, but this idea, while appropriate for 
Andrews* expectations model is not appropriate for models embodying 
the Cartesian epistemology. One cannot help feeling that Machlup is 
using sleight of hand in his defence of marginalist theory. He 
redefines the concepts, making them quite different from what they
87ibid., p.539.
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are in standard expositions of the theories. Then he uses the new 
definitions to defend the Theories, sliding over the fact that by 
doing so he has completely changed the character of those theories. 
His versions are quite incompatible with the Cartesian framework, 
yet he wants to retain the Cartesian conclusions. His concepts as 
defined are very similar to those of Andrews working in a different 
methodological framework, one for which the definitions are 
appropriate. No wonder we seem to be in the Looking Glass world 
where the meaning of words are changed quite arbitrarily to suit the 
purposes of the user.
CHAPTER V
THE REVOLUTION AND THE COUNTER REVOLUTION - 
ANDREWS’ CHALLENGE TO NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
Andrews regarded his own work as revolutionary, but to some
extent it was backward looking, back to Marshall. It reflected a
desire for the wider scope of economic theories of the past,
particularly Marshall’s, before the desire for certainty became
dominant. It was the view that scientific progress involves greater
refinement of analysis that prevented his work being seen as
scientific. For example, in a review of On Competition in Economic
Theory, Corley comments favourably on Andrews’ criticism of marginal
analysis. But he goes on to say
’’Where he fails is to advance a satisfactory 
alternative theory of the firm ... The verbal 
generalizations in [Part IIH (and in 
Manufacturing Business) are no substitute for 
rigorous analysis."1
Andrews’ goals were ordered differently from those of the current 
reference group. To him the need to explain the world took priority 
over the refinement of analysis and development of tools. To the 
reference group, however, the priorities were the other way round, so 
that Andrews’ theory could not count as a better theory since it did 
not make progress towards their primary goal.
Was Andrews* analysis an alternative hypothesis within the 
scope of a single scientific theory, as Chamberlin seemed to
■i #T.A.B. Corley (1965), "Review of ’On Competition in Economic Theory”’, 
Economica 32, p.471.
126.
127.
think, or was it quite different, a conceptual novelty, a hypothesis
framed in terms of a different theory? It was thought by many to be 
3 .the former but I would argue that it was really the latter. Andrews
was challenging the fundamental concepts, the dominant methodology of
economics. If, as Toulmin argues, major concept change involves the
redefinition of old concepts in the light of new facts, this is
surely what Andrews was doing.
"In scientific theory and elsewhere conceptual 
issues involve us in attending neither to 
the facts alone nor to the definitions of 
terms alone. They require us, instead to 
redefine our terms in the light of the 
relevant facts. Without appeal to empirical 
discoveries, there would never be any basis 
for such conceptual redefinitions; but 
without such redefinitions, nothing could 
ever be done to improve our explanatory 
powers."1*
Andrews, for example, redefines the long run average cost curve 
in the light of observations about business practice and the role of 
expectation in decision making.
There is a distinction between arguments about auxiliary 
hypotheses or sub-theories, and arguments about research programmes. 
Those who thought that the issue was profit maximization were 
arguing about the first. If this had been all there was to it, then 
Andrews could have succeeded as, for example, Baumol and Marris did 
when they presented alternative behavioural hypotheses within the 23
2 . . .When he commented that Andrews’ normal cost pricing was simply one
of several alternative goals that could be used in his own theory. 
Chamberlin (1952), op.cit., p.319.
3 •For example, by E.A.G. Robinson, who concludes that it was not very
different from existing theories. (1950), op.cit., p.779.
^Toulmin (1972), op.cit., p.189.
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neoclassical framework. But Andrews was really arguing about the
second, he was rejecting static equilibrium which was the hard core of
the whole neoclassical programme.
In Andrews’ model a "'steady state1 of uniform prices is
determined by competition within an industry and each firm’s market
5share depends on dynamic considerations of growth". This means that
he has rejected the concept of static equilibrium price and quantity
for the firm and for the industry. "The rejection of equilibrium
did not worry Andrews but, ... as he acknowledged, it worried other 
0
people." That it did not worry him is a reflection of the fact that
his aim was not the refinement of Cartesian analysis and the
attainment of intellectual perfection.
In Studies in Pricing, Elizabeth Brunner attempts to express
7 .Andrews’ theory in traditional terminology, a project to which, she
says, he was not entirely sympathetic.
"Andrews was not altogether sympathetic to 
the attempt to put new wine in old bottles, 
and he said, reasonably, that if his theory 
could have been expressed at chapter length 
he would not have written a book."8
Perhaps he feared that, with the best intentions, the essential
elements would be eliminated or made to appear something they are
not, as happened with Keynes’ theory when interpreted by the
9 . .Keynesians. If, as Kuhn argues, alternative paradigms are to a
5Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.880.
6ibid.
7 #Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., Ch.II.
8.. .. .ibid., p.ix.
^Although Andrews thought Keynes himself partly responsible for this 
- see Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit., p.ll.
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certain degree incommensurable, attempts to make them commensurable
10 , . .must create distortions. Brunner’s interpretation and those of
11 #
other followers of Andrews are attempts to remove misunderstanding 
among those trained in static marginalist equilibrium economics. This 
misundei'standing could have been caused partly by his obscurity of
style, an obscurity which, as Loasby points out, should not be taken
. 12 to reflect confusion in his thought.
One difference between Andrews and imperfect competition theorists 
is that his model, although starting with a standardized product can 
be generalized for differentiated products. In this it is more 
general than the theory of perfect competition where products must be 
homogeneous and the imperfect competition theories of the firm which 
can only deal with differentiated products. In these models the 
difference between perfect and imperfectly competitive industries is 
mainly in the nature of the product and how it is viewed by the 
consumer. To Andrews the difference between industries for which 
the perfectly competitive model he thought appropriate i.e. mining 
and agriculture, and manufacturing industries, is not in the product, 
but in the marketing arrangements. On the one hand there are 
impersonal centralized markets, on the other decentralized personal 
markets. Focussing on this difference rather than the difference 
between products is one of the things that makes the nature of 
Andrews’ theory quite different, and to a large degree incommensurable 10*
10 . . . .The incommensurability of alternative paradigms is discussed by
Kuhn (1970b), op.cit., p.266, ff.
**For example, M. Farrell (1952), op.cit.; H.R. Edwards (1952a),
”’Goodwill1 and the Normal Cost Theory of Price”, Economic 
Record 28.
12Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.880.
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with neoclassical theories. Translation of one into the terms of the 
other always destroys some of the essential flavour as it does in 
languages. The further apart two languages are the more difficult the 
translation. Common roots help, but not solve the problems, so too 
with theories, the common roots in Marshall help a little in trying to 
make the theories, based on essentially incompatible epistemologies, 
commensurable, but one cannot be expressed entirely in the terms of 
the other without changing its nature.
The Failure of the Challenge
"Economic theories ... are usually less rigid 
and compelling than their natural science 
equivalents, hence they rarely represent an 
obvious challenge to the established scientific 
tradition. Instead of outright hostility they 
more often encounter neglect, scepticism or even 
anti-intellectual scorn."13
All of these things followed Andrews’ attempted revolution. 
Standard text books, especially American ones, make no reference to 
Andrews’ work except for an occasional footnote. He gets a mention
in one or two surveys of price theory but these usually misinterpret
14 .him. His influence seems mainly to have been on those with whom
15 . . . .he had personal contact. He was not a good publicist for his ideas *145
^A.W. Coats (1969a), op.cit., p.293.
14 . . .Silberston and Archibald mention his work but misinterpret it.
G. Archibald (1971), The Theory of the Firm, Selected Readings, 
Penguin; A . Silberston (1970), "Surveys of Applied Economics:
Price Behaviour of Firms", Economic Journal 80. Spengler's review 
makes no mention of him at all, (1974), op.cit.
15For example, Elizabeth Brunner, Michael Farrell, Harold Edwards and
D.M. Lamberton. Sylos Labini documents Andrews’ influence on him 
in Oligopoly and Technical Progress (1969), Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press, revised ed., p.viii. The only text book 
I know that incorporates Andrews’ ideas is A. Koutsoyiannis (1975), 
Modern Microeconomics, Lond., Macmillan, and that is a product of 
the University of Lancaster.
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and reacted to the often hostile and misdirected criticism of his work
by a refusal to argue. Any defence of his ideas was carried out by
others, and even in his lectures on microeconomics at Lancaster he
deliberately did not emphasise his own work. In this he could be
said to be following Marshall’s precepts.
"Our etiquette does not allow anyone to 
praise his own work or even to claim 
originality on penalty of being judged 
an offender against our rather artificial 
canons of reticence."16
But perhaps this was not wise in the 1950's however appropriate it
. . 17may have been m  Marshall's time.
The field Andrews was most interested in, industrial economics, 
has developed in the last 20-30 years but in a way quite different 
from the way Andrews thought desirable. Writings in industrial 
economics either involve a market structure approach which emphasises 
the number and size distribution of firms as the most significant 
variables, an approach that Andrews specifically rejected, or are 
really theories of the large firm divorced from their industrial 
environment. Even those who consider what Andrews thought the major 
restraining influence on the monopoly power of industrial 
enterprises, potential competition, usually have a much narrower, and
1t)In a comment to the American economist Richard T. Ely: quoted by 
A .W . Coats (1967), "Sociological Aspects of British Economic 
Thought (CA 1880 - 1930)", Journal of Political Economy 75, p.710.
Though Stigler argues that to achieve recognition it is always 
necessary to blow one's own trumpet, he suggests, for example, 
that J.S. Mill's originality was underrated because of his failure 
to do this. G. Stigler (1965), op.cit., pp.1-15.
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in Andrews’ view, quite inadequate definition of this.
It is no wonder that Loasby referred to Andrews as Ma widely
. 19underrated, because misunderstood economist”.
Keynesian theory came to dominate macroeconomics while Andrews' 
theory made almost no impact on microeconomics. Yet on the face of it 
micro theory stood as much in need of overhaul as macro theory. The 
theories had many similarities. Andrews was not only interested in 
putting microeconomics back on what he saw as the correct Marshallian 
track, but also in building a microeconomic disaggregated theory that 
would be compatible with Keynesian aggregate theory. In writing about 
business cycles he stressed the inherently unstable nature of the 
industrial system. Andrews refers frequently to "normal times" but 
while this was meant to exclude events such as wars, it did not 
exclude the business cycle.
Andrews' ideas had many virtues in that he was able to solve 
some of the anomalies and paradoxes that existing theories could not. 
But he did it in a way that could not be fitted within the 
neoclassical framework. That Keynes' theory could, by interpretation, 
be fitted in was to a large degree responsible for the success, if 
that is what it is. At least, it was responsible for the dominance 
of Keynesian economics if not the economics of Keynes.
Both Keynes and Andrews got rid of a definitive equilibrium by 
the introduction of uncertainty, decision making, the businessman's 
expectations, but interpreters re-introduced this equilibrium into *1
18 • •For example, J.S. Bain (1956), Barriers to New Competition,
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, restricts the idea of 
potential entry to new, small firms outside the industry.
1 8Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.88 (footnote).
133.
Keynes’ analysis.
Why Was Andrews Not Successful?
It is simply begging the question to say that he did not present
a better alternative to the imperfectly competitive theories of the
firm. For it is necessary to ask "better", or "worse", in what sense.
I have argued that Andrews' theory was not "better" because it failed
to meet the "scientific" primary goals of the economists' major
reference group, that is, the goals of elegance, simplicity,
determinateness. These take clear precedence, if we are to judge by
the type of theories that are regarded most highly, over the goal of
a realistic explanation of the changing world.
"Analytical elegance, economy of theoretical 
means and generality obtained by ever more 
'heroic' assumptions have always meant more 
to economists than relevance and 
predictability."20
I have argued that Andrews' theory was not successful because it 
was based on a different methodology, a different philosophical 
background and so a different view of what was scientific from that 
of the mainstream. But as well as this major reason, there have been 
many supplementary factors which contributed to his failure and 
neglect. Some of these are aspects of the main reason, namely "that 
he was misunderstood", "obscure in presentation", not able to be 
expressed mathematically", or "addressing the ordinary man rather 
than his fellow economists".
Other reasons which are not so clearly connected, but which have 
had some bearing on the matter are "that he was ideologically biased",
on .Mark Blaug (1976), "Kuhn versus Lakatos or Paradigms versus 
research programmes in the history of economics", in Latsis (1976), 
op.cit., p.159.
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’’that he was writing about mainly English conditions in a period when 
hegemony in economics was passing to the Americans”, and ’’that he 
advocated policies based cn the idea of minimum government 
interference in an era when governments were playing an increasing 
role". These points will now be considered in detail.
Andrews was misunderstood. He was certainly misinterpreted, 
many writers were unable to see any difference between his "normal
cost" theory and the "full cost" principle described in the Hall and
. . 21 . .Hitch studies. His work thus was interpreted as a description of
a ritual and not as analysis. It has been suggested that his
somewhat obscure presentation had something to do with this
. . 22 .misunderstanding. It is true that his presentation of material is
often hard to follow, but this is hardly decisive. We have only to
look at Keynes whose General Theory in places abounds with
obscurity. In Winch’s view,
"The book itself was difficult to 
understand, abounding in novel and abstruse 
terminology, incidental excursions and 
obscurities. Apart from a number of 
brilliant passages it was not even 
particularly well-written.23
Obscurity may slow down, but to judge by Keynes’ case, does not 
prevent acceptance. Indeed, Harry Johnson suggests it may even 
contribute to it. He argues that some element of obscurity may be
For example, Archibald (1971), op.cit. See appendix for a 
discussion of the differences.
At least in written form, I am told that he was much better m  
verbal exposition, perhaps this is why his supporters were all 
people with whom he discussed his theory personally.
2^Winch (1969), op.cit., p.182.
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positively helpful in having a revolutionary theory accepted and that
to facilitate the process it helps to give old concepts new names.
Mln the General Theory the marginal productivity 
of capital became the marginal efficiency of 
capital; the desired ratio of money to income, 
the *k' of the Cambridge tradition, became a 
minor constituent of the new theory of ’liquidity 
preference’ and the = x post identity of savings 
and investment, which previous theorists, including 
Keynes himself, had rightly recognised as unhelpful 
to dynamic analysis became the sine qua non of 
right reasoning.”21*
Andrews did just the opposite in this regard, used old names and
to a very limited extent a visual presentation. His long run
- /
average cost curve, for example, really bears no resemblance to that
of conventional theory. His demand concept is also quite different,
yet he is using the same terminology, and his diagrams, for example
his horizontal price line, have been interpreted as illustrating a
perfectly elastic demand curve.
Not only did Andrews not publicise his own work, which could
have contributed to his being misunderstood, but the order in which
he published his two major works did not help. Loasby suggests that
one reason for his failure to be understood was that the two parts of
his argument, the alternative theory and the full scale critique of
the theories of the firm, were published fifteen years apart and in
25 . . .the wrong order for maximum effect. There is certainly something 
in this. Many reviewers of On Competition in Economic Theory, 
especially American ones, while generally reacting favourably to the 
criticism in that book, appear to be unaware that he had presented an 94
94 x .H. Johnson (1971), op.cit., p.4.
25Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.879.
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alternative theory fifteen years before.
But in my view the main reason for the lack of understanding of 
what Andrews was doing relates to the question of methodology and the 
blinkering effect working within a particular framework of thinking 
has. The blinkers are useful when working within the framework, 
engaging in ’’normal science”, but they do prevent people who are 
strongly committed to that framework from seeing the virtues of a 
theory belonging to an alternative one. The very success of the tools 
of analysis, of the particular framework of thought, make it difficult, 
if not impossible, for economists working within the framework to 
assess with any degree of accuracy a theory which cannot easily be 
fitted into that framework and for which many of the tools of analysis 
they are accustomed to using are inappropriate.
So that those who adhered to the Cartesian methodology could not 
see Andrews' alternative clearly, they could only see it as 
unscientific. It was labelled "descriptive” since it could not be 
analytical. Analysis, by definition, was only that process of logic 
which resulted in a determinate timeless equilibrium. Andrews either
did not analyse and was therefore unscientific, or he only presented
. . . ^ . 27a version of perfect competition which was scientific but inferior.
If the advantages could not be seen, his work was certainly 
perceived to be a major threat, E.A.G. Robinson, for example, said 
that
"...his attempts to construct alternative 267
26See, for example, J.D. Heath (1965), "Review of 'On Competition in 
Economic Theory'", Kyklos 18. E.J. Grether (1966), "Review of 
'On Competition in Economic Theory’", American Economic Review 56.
27This point is discussed more fully below, pp.154-155.
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theories are, to my mind, so powerfully 
destructive not only of the newer 
accretions of imperfect competition 
theory but to the whole body of economic 
reasoning that it is of first importance 
that they should be subjected to rigid 
criticism.
But even here there is some misunderstanding, for what he saw as being
threatened was profit maximization. Whether Andrews’ work was or was
not compatible with this principle was the subject of much debate
between Andrews' critics and his defenders. This, I would argue,
29was somewhat of a red herring, his threat was not just to the
auxiliary hypothesis of profit maximization but to the whole
neoclassical research programme. It amounted to a denial of the
validity of the notion of long period static equilibrium, "The
standard accusation that he is rejecting profit-maximization rather
. . . „ 30than equilibrium simply indicates the confusion of his critics".
The threat to profit maximization was defended with vigour, the 
threat to equilibrium was not clearly seen and was ignored, assumed 
away. "All respectable economists, by definition, adhere to the 
neo-classical core."^
The non-mathematical nature of Andrews' work. It is argued 
that the inability to express Andrews' theories in mathematical 
terms was a reason for their unacceptability, but this is not a 
separate reason, it is part of the fact that he was presenting an 
alternative to static equilibrium theory. For that type of theory *29
2ftE.A.G. Robinson (19b0), op.cit., p.771.
29 .A point I argue more fully in Chapter VIII below.
Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.880.
31Evan Jones (1977), op.cit., p.361.
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is essentially mathematical and depends on mathematics to reach its
determinate solution. Economic theory of this type has a "hunger for
32techniques". Its ability to be manipulated by the use of
mathematics and statistics is a major source of its attraction to
those who search for certainty.
Once again a comparison with the successful Keynesian
revolution is instructive. Johnson argues that, while Keynes’
approach was not so explicitly mathematical as the general equilibrium
approach of Hicks and Allen, it did demand a substantial step forward
in mathematical competence.
"The General Theory offered an important 
empirical relationship for the emerging 
tribe of econometricians to measure - the 
consumption function, a far more challenging 
relationship than the demand for sugar, a 
relationship for which the development of 
national income statistics provided the raw 
material needed for estimation."32 3 34
Andrews’ theory provided no such scope for the use of new techniques
and therefore was not only not scientific but not even very
interesting.
The wrong audience. It was a strongly held principle of Andrews
that economics should be able to be understood by businessmen, and
that it should be written in ordinary everyday language.
"Concerned as it is with men’s activities ’in 
the ordinary business of life’, economics has 
much to lose if it needlessly debars those who 
are responsible for such activities from 
participation in its councils . ”3**
In this he saw himself, quite correctly, as following the Marshallian
32Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.65.
33H. Johnson (1971), op.cit., p.5.
34Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit., p.2.
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tradition, Marshall too had addressed himself to businessmen. But 
since Marshall's time a profession had developed which claimed 
authority over the study of economics, Marshall himself being one of 
those mainly responsible for this development.
When a body of knowledge is associated with a profession then 
you must address yourself to that profession. That is, to those 
people who have learnt the current paradigm, its methodology, its 
definitions and terminology in the course of their specialized 
training. That the terminology is largely unintelligible to laymen 
is an indication that a professional discipline has been established. 
One of the distinguishing marks of a professional science is that, 
increasingly, new work becomes incomprehensible to those who have 
not had professional training.
The reference group of the profession not only defines the scope
of the discipline but decides whether innovations are acceptable or
not. To write for laymen in a discipline, such as economics in the
post Marshallian era, that has developed its own language and guards
jealously its reputation as a science, is to be seen as a popularizer,
unrigorous and unscientific. This mistake, made by Andrews, was not
made by Keynes who addressed himself to "my fellow economists". The
importance of this is stressed by Winch,
"The first half of the twentieth century 
coincides roughly with the period in which 
economics emerged as a professionally 
organized pursuit. The existence of a 
professional academic community with inter­
national ramifications has important 
consequences for the way in which a discipline 
conducts its intellectual affairs. Even 
informal professional standards can diminish 
the range of disagreement and provide commonly 
accepted ways of resolving dispute."35
35Winch (1969), op.cit., p.21.
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In these circumstances it is no use writing for laymen if you want
to have a new theory accepted.
The charge of ideological bias. One reason why Andrews was
labelled unscientific, apart from his methodology, was that he was
seen as letting his ideological bias colour his theories. Grether,
for instance, commented that the conclusions about resale price
maintenance appear to reflect a social judgement as to the public
benefits derived from encouraging a large number of small and medium
sized producers and of specialized retailers than might occur if
36resale price maintenance were abolished. Maclaurin, on the other 
hand, sees Andrews as concerned with pre-monopoly attitudes.
Andrews "does not attempt to conceal a bias for the existing
37structure of business with its emphasis on large scale enterprise".
Andrews certainly saw himself as defending the business system against
those who thought it should be replaced by planning. These attacks
on the system he thought to be largely political in origin but were
argued as if it was simply a matter of economics. He was concerned
to show that the economic reasoning was faulty: that competition was
a more important force than the theories suggested and that the
38capitalist system is basically socially desirable. He had faith 
that the capitalist system worked quite well: that it only needed a 
little government intervention to deal with the anomalies and all 
would be well. A view very similar to that of Keynes - yet Keynes 
was not accused of bias as Andrews was. A similar issue arose in the
^Grether (1966), op.cit. , p.1264.
O n W.R. Maclaurin (1950), "Review of ’Manufacturing Business’", 
American Economic Review 40, p.969.
ooAndrews (1949a), op.cit., pp.27-29.
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controversy over Resale Trice Maintenance. Andrews argued that 
the case put forward by Yamey was faulty in that it was based on 
false premises and inadequate reasoning. He thought the case against 
R.P.M. was "not proven" but he was seen not as arguing this but as 
arguing in favour of this practice.
While a certain measure of objectivity is clearly necessary for 
any kind of scientific analysis, it is not possible to write anything 
in areas relating to social experience without a point of view. I 
would argue, for example, that whether one sees the world as being 
best explain in terms of harmony or conflict is a point of view 
which affects one’s assessment of theories and choice of research 
programmes. The view that the capitalist system works moderately
well on the whole and should therefore be preserved is no more and
no less of a bias than the opposite view. Andrews was attempting to
set out what he saw as the basic principles underlying the
organization of production in manufacturing industry, basing his 
analysis on observations of the way firms operate in that sector.
That he himself clearly had a particular social philosophy which 
prompted him to develop his theory did not make it any less scientific, 
any more biased than the theories he was challenging. The kind of 
myopia that sees other people’s ideology while being unaware of one’s 
own and which therefore regards the other's work as unscientific is 
very common in economics. The reason for this is "that the particular 
social philosophy used in one’s own analysis seems so straight- 39
39
39 .B.S. Yamey (1960), Resale Price Maintenance and Shoppers Choice,
Lond. , Institute of Economic Affairs. P.W.S. Andrews and Frank A.
Friday (1960), Fair Trade: Resale Price Maintenance Re-examined,
Lond., Macmillaru P.W.S. Andrews and Frank A. Friday (1962), "The
Recent Controversy over Resale Price Maintenance: A rejoinder",
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 125.
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forward, that it is not regarded as social philosophy at all, but
, . Ltl 40rather as self-evident truth".
To see the world of 1940’s and 1950’s as a world of potential
competition was no more (and no less) ideological than to see it as a
world of monopolies for clearly it was both. This point was conceded
by Joan Robinson in her reassessment of Imperfect Competition.
"My generation brought up on the view that 
everything in the garden was lovely, 
concentrated attention on the weeds. A 
generation to whom our weed manuals were 
the orthodox text books naturally react by 
pointing out that there are after all many 
splendid blooms to be seen."1*1
The latter idea was unfashionable among academics when Andrews 
was writing, at least in Britain, where his ideas were primarily 
discussed. Andrews' mistake was not that he was biased, that he had 
a particular social philosophy that motivated his enquiries. It was 
that he had the wrong social philosophy and also that he made no 
attempt to hide it.
The distinction that Weisskopf makes between critical and
. 42confirming reason may be useful here. He says that when a stable
society with well established institutions supported by generally
accepted value systems begins to disintegrate, conscious "rational"
thought emerges and is applied to the institutional order and its
ideas. This can take two forms; confirming reason, which tries to
explain and justify institutions by showing that they basically
1+0David Seckler (1975), Thorstein Veblen and the Institutionalists, 
Colorado Associated University Press, p.135.
^Joan Robinson (1953), op.cit., p.590 (footnote). This quotation 
refers to Elizabeth Brunner (1952) op.cit.
Walter A. Weisskopf (1973), "The Image of Man m  Economics", 
Social Research 40, p.549.
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achieve the desired goals, and critical reason which tries to change 
and undermine the existing order. The imperfect competition theories 
of 1930’s, at least in Britain, could be said to be exercises in 
critical reason, which came about because of the disintegration of 
the traditional value system. This disintegration stemmed from the 
growth of big business, monopolies and market power, the disruption 
of the Western economies by World War I and the great depression of 
the 1930’s which undermined the belief in the self regenerating 
powers and beneficence of the free market. Andrews could be seen as 
exercising confirming reason, showing that these institutions actually 
worked quite well, if not perfectly, and that there was no need to 
overthrow the market system. It works better than any others we can 
think of, even if it doesn’t give us the best of all possible worlds. 
In traditional economic thought as presented in the text books this 
idea was never really abandoned but it was not a popular view in 
academic circles in post war Britain.
Andrews and the businessman. During the course of his work at 
Oxford, Andrews met, both professionally and socially, many business­
men. As a result of these contacts he came to regard them highly, 
both as agreeable companions and, more importantly for his theories, 
as competent and intelligent decision makers. This favourable 
attitude permeates most of his writing and allowed him to be accused 
of having been brainwashed by the business community. While not going 
as far as Schumpeter in equating the entrepreneur with the knights of 
the middle ages, he clearly had a high opinion of their capacity and 
their integrity. Once again in this he was following in Marshall’s 
footsteps. Marshall
’’...had what many would regard as an
exaggerated regard for the ’captain of
industry’ as a character type Che saw
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the businessman asH a refined product of 
a competitive and evolutionary process 
which gave scope and reward for such vital 
qualities as leadership, initiative, 
prudence, rationality and forethought."1+3
These qualities, which Marshall thought worth preserving, could not be
found in a bureaucratically organized public sector. He was sceptical
of the likelihood of success of state ownership or management of
productive enterprises.
"Managers of co-operative enterprises seldom 
have the alertness, the inventiveness and 
the ready versatility of the ablest men who 
have been selected by the struggle for 
survival and who have been trained by the 
free and unfettered responsibility of 
private business.
This somewhat romantic view of the businessman was, even before
Marshall’s time, being eroded, and had a distinctly old-fashioned
air in 1940’s and 50’s, when Andrews held similar ideas. For by
then the turning of the entrepreneurial function into a management
routine had brought disillusionment with the knightly vision of the
entrepreneur. By this time it was Keynes’ rather than Marshall’s
view of the businessman that was the prevailing one, a much less
favourable view than that of Andrews.
"A usually unstated but conscious assumption 
in Keynes' own view of the system was that 
the macromanagers, the overseers of the system, 
were likely to be cleverer than the micromanagers, 
the overseers of the individual businesses.,,t+® 43*6
43Winch (1969), op.cit., p.32.
44Marshall (1920b), op.cit., p.255.
^J.A. Schumpeter (1943), op.cit. , pp.131 ff.
46Hirsch (1977), The Social Limits to Growth, Lond., Routledge 5 Kegan 
Paul, pp.127-8.
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He assumed that the managers of the system would be motivated by
higher goals than the maximization of their private interests, and
that standards of public behaviour would progress in a way that
gradually put less rather than more emphasis on maximizing monetary
gains. Hirsch goes on to add in a footnote
"Businessmen and bankers were not among the 
elite who earned Keynes’ respect even for 
their non-intellectual qualities. When 
asked how, if businessmen were as stupid as 
he believed, they succeeded in making money,
Keynes is said to have explained - by 
competing with other businessmen."1*7
One other contrast between Keynes and Andrews that helps explain
the different reception of their ideas is in their background. Keynes
was an establishment figure, he grew up in Cambridge, and was the son
of an eminent economist while Andrews was somewhat of an outsider and
his family background was not that of the intellectual establishment.
When Keynes wrote that his work "would revolutionize the way in
which the world thinks about economic problems", his use of the term
was largely polemical. Keynes’ personal standing played a part in
this exercise in persuasion. He was already an established leader.
"If the General Theory had been his first 
work it would have been dismissed as the 
work of a clever but pretentious crank.
Recognition would certainly have been much 
slower. Advance credentials are essential 
in securing the rapid attention of a 
professional audience: Keynes' credentials 
were impeccable."1*®
In contrast, Andrews’ were not, he was associated with the highly 
criticized "full cost" studies and his conservatism and his bias in 
in favour of businessmen made him suspect. Keynes' work was
ibid., p.128, footnote,
uft
47
Winch (1969), op.cit., p.177.
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calculated to appeal to the disaffected younger members of the
profession, and gave them a weapon with which to attack their 
49elders, Andrews’ work did not have such an appeal, for he wanted to
go back to those elders, mainly Marshall.
Andrews and the Americans. It could be argued that Andrews'
theories were too much based on British examples, were not sufficiently
general to be accepted in the U.S. where the balance of academic 
. 50power had shifted. Marshall wrote mainly about England, but he was
writing in a period when it was English economics that was dominant
in the English-speaking world.
By the 1930’s leadership of economics had gone from being
predominantly British to being both British and American, and American
recognition was an important factor in the success of the Keynesian
revolution. When Andrews was writing, American recognition had
become even more important. Andrews' theories were virtually unknown 
. 51in the U.S. American industrial economics is, as mentioned above,
quite different from the one he proposed. Although the American
tradition was eclectic, before World War I its main roots were
British, while in the interwar years a rough parity between British
and American contributions to a joint tradition had come about.
"From this time until the present day the 
exchange of ideas and men across the Atlantic 
has become a regular feature of the life of 
the Anglo-American economist. The overwhelming 
might of resources qualitative and quantitative 
may now be said to reside in the U.S."52
49
50
51
See H. Johnson (1971), op.cit., p.5.
For example, Maclaurin in his review of Manufacturing Business sees 
it as being primarily written for British readers. (1950), op.cit., 
p.968.
Most discussion of Andrews' work appeared in the English economic 
journals.
52Winch (1969), op.cit., p.14.
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Although Andrews visited the U.S. several times he seems to have made 
little impact there, and his failure to do so can be perhaps regarded 
as a contributing factor to his lack of success or, alternatively, it 
could be an indication of that lack of success.
The role of government. Finally, Andrews, while recognising that 
government intervention was necessary to bring about a "reformed
capitalism, which would avoid the worse evils of the trade cycle and
. 53might be even more competitive than it has been so far" the role he
saw for the government was fairly limited. This is evident, for
example, in his discussion of the role the government could play in
filling the gap in the capital market which prevented medium to small 
. . 54businesses from growing. Advocacy of a relatively small role for
government goes against one of the leading themes of twentieth 
century history, namely the ever increasing role of governments in 
industrial economies.
"Broadly speaking, at the beginning of the 
century it was considered unnecessary, unwise 
and perhaps even impossible for governments 
to exercise detailed control over the 
direction of the economic machine. Now it is 
widely accepted that the economic performance 
of society both in the large and in the small 
is one of the primary responsibilities of the 
. state."55
Andrews’ policy prescriptions, based as they were on a view of 
the relative efficiency of government and business managements 
opposite to that of Keynes, were not favourably received in the 
political climate of the expansion of the government sector. And 534
53Andrews (19U9a), op.cit., p.27.
54ibid., pp.245-246.
55Winch (1469), op.cit., p.16.
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being against the tide in this respect did not help in having his 
theory accepted.
Andrews and the Critics: Reactions to Manufacturing Business and 
On Competition in Economic Theory.
Manufacturing Business was an attempt to do what Andrews thought 
the appropriate task of economic theory, to set out the underlying 
general principles behind economic practices. In this case he was 
concerned with the practices of the manufacturing sector of an 
economy, in particular, the British economy, a world of branded 
products, multi product interdependent firms, which operated in 
conditions of uncertainty and had competitive constraints on their 
behaviour in "normal" times. By this term he was excluding 
extraordinary circumstances like World War II, which was just over, 
and the early post war shortages and constraints that could be 
expected to be temporary. He did not however by "normal times" mean 
a time when the business cycle was absent, a sort of timeless 
average full employment period which was the time period of much of 
neoclassical micro theory even in the post-Keynesian era. The partial 
equilibrium theories of the firm and the general equilibrium theory 
were all concerned with full employment equilibrium, abstracting from 
the effects of external disturbances such as the business cycle - 
these implicitly were regarded as aberrations rather than an 
integral part of the system. In Andrews' work, change, cyclical or 
otherwise, is part of "normal times", and the significance of the use 
of the word "normal" is that businessmen develop "normal" patterns of 
behaviour to deal with these uncertainties.
What Andrews was generalizing about were these normal patterns 
of behaviour, rational enough in the light of uncertainty, though
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irrational in the Cartesian sense where rational behaviour is 
maximizing behaviour under conditions of certainty.
His book was not only a criticism of the imperfect competition 
theories of the 1930's, the conclusions of which Andrews thought were 
being wrongly applied to the manufacturing sector of industry, it was 
also alternative theory. In this case his was clearly an attempted 
revolution in Kuhnian terms for criticisms of existing theories are 
not enough to define a revolution, even an unsuccessful one, there 
must also be an alternative theory suggested. Whether the attempted 
revolution is successful depends on whether the alternative is seen 
to be "better" than the old. Although the criticism was not 
completely spelled out - this came later with the publication of On
Competition in Economic Theory - it was clearly seen to be a 
criticism and much of the reaction to Manufacturing Business took the
form of a defence of the imperfect competition theories. There was
5 6somewhat of a furore, in particular a controversy in the pages of 
the Economic Journal. In this controversy Andrews' supporters scored
most of the points, but in the long run lost the battle because
. . . . . 57 . . . .ultimately the criticisms were ignored. And despite the criticisms
which, by the time On Competition in Economic Theory was published,
. . 58had come to be repeated so many times in so many different ways 
as to have become almost commonplace, the theories of imperfect 
competition remain part of the neoclassical paradigm as it appears in *57
^At least in Britain, Manufacturing Business did not make much impact 
in U.S.
57See Jones (1977), op.cit., for the lack of impact on micro theory 
of empirical studies such as "full cost" discoveries, which was a 
building block of Andrews' theory.
^Even by Joan Robinson herself (1953), op.cit., and (1971), op.cit.
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the standard text books. No text book purporting to cover micro­
economic theory leaves these out, and none includes Andrews in
59anything more than a footnote.
One criticism does seem to have been at least tacitly accepted,
that concerning short run profit maximization. Many writers stress
that it is long run profits that business is interested in, though
without much discussion of whether the necessary variables, long run
marginal cost and long run marginal revenue, can be measured in any
precise way. Some models have been developed showing that growth
maximization and long run profit maximization come to the same 
, . 6 0  .thing. These, however, involve the search for a determinate answer, 
usually by assuming a particular discount rate, thus keeping within 
the neoclassical paradigm. This type of model passes very quickly 
over the subjective nature of the whole estimation of future costs 
and revenues if they mention it at all. By sleight of hand uncertainty 
is made to disappear, a process necessary if static equilibrium models 
are to continue to be used, but this is no real answer to critics 
like Andrews who want theory to reflect reality by incorporating 
uncertainty and expectations in a meaningful and functional way. 
Andrews' views on the question of discounting the future and the 
problems involved are set out quite clearly in his criticism of 
Keynesian investment theory.
Keynesian doctrine, he says, differs only formally from classical 
and neoclassical theory of investment. These were 5960
59 • • / \ •With the exception mentioned before of Koutsoyiannis (1975), op.cit.
60For example, E. Penrose (1959), The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm, Oxford, Blackwell; R. Marris (1967), The'Economic Theory of 
Managerial Capitalism, Lond., Macmillan.
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"...essentially and avowedly static. By this is 
meant that they describe investment decisions as 
if they take place in response to influences of 
precisely known strength and in constant and 
known conditions otherwise. Keynes offered a 
formulation which, while still fundamentally static 
as he used it yet paid homage to the fact that 
uncertainties exist in the actual world. ...Keynes 
is most certainly correct in calling attention to 
the future uncertainty of the earnings from a 
business’ capital equipment whose life must extend 
beyond any horizon of certainty which is visible 
to the businessman. ...Here, there is at least a 
formal gain in Keynes' analysis of the situation.
Unfortunately Keynes theory refers to the 
prospective yield from new equipment as if this 
itself could be precisely measured. CWhile he is 
correct in recognizing] the uncertainty which 
means that future income must be the subject of 
estimates, Che] seems to be in error in assuming 
he has taken care of it. He assumes, without 
enquiry or proof that a businessman will meet 
the problem by constructing a precise estimate 
of the total expected net yield of capital 
equipment. That being assumed, Keynes can bring 
such a quantity into his analysis as though it 
had real validity ...The consequence is that 
Keynes' theories retain the chief characteristic 
of the older static theories - that the rate of 
investment will depend upon the rate of interest 
as far as external influences are concerned.
Despite all the splendid passages in the General 
Theory where Keynes discusses the effects on 
economic affairs of uncertainty which surrounds 
business operations, he yet, when it comes to the 
point resolves that uncertainty into the formal 
equivalent of certainty."61
What Andrews is implying here is that static theories, that require 
certainty whether they are concerned with short run (current) yields 
or long run (prospective) yields, are not appropriate to deal with 
real world industries and should not be used as the basis of policy. 
The same of course applies to those who, while agreeing that short 
run profit maximization is not an appropriate concept to apply to 
modern industry, want to replace it with long run profit 
maximization defined to exclude uncertainty, "the demand curve that
61Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit., pp.9-11.
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is applied to the short period situation as including, suitably
discounted, all the various repercussions of the future upon the
* ,,62 present."
The main published reaction to Manufacturing Business took the 
form of a series of articles and replies in the Economic Journal in 
1950, to which the main contributors were E.A.G. Robinson,
M.J. Farrell and A. Silberston. A later article by Wiles was replied
to by H.E. Edwards, and there were a couple of reviews in Economica.% ■! ■ «■" ■'«»'— >■" '
Kahn wrote a review of Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism in the
American Economic Review in 1952 in which he discussed Andrews’ ideas,
and Edward Chamberlin and Joan Robinson both made a contribution to
the debate in the Economic Journal in 1952. Farrell wrote again in
Oxford Economic Papers in 1952, while H.R. Edwards published two more
articles in 1954 and 1955. Finally D.H. Robertson included a
discussion of Andrews' theory in an article on ’’Developments in price 
6 3theory” in 1956. And that was about the end of it until On 
Competition in Economic Theory was published in 1962, when there were
ft oE.A.G. Robinson (1951), op.cit., p.430. One would hope his crystal 
ball is in good working order.
ft ̂ E.A.G. Robinson (1950), op.cit., (1951), op.cit.
M.J. Farrell (1951), "The Case Against Imperfect Competition”, 
Economic Journal 61.
A. Silberston (1951), "The Pricing of Manufactured Products", 
Economic Journal 61.
R.F. Kahn (1952), "Review of ’Oxford Studies in the Price 
Mechanism’", Economic Journal 62.
W.R. Maclaurin (1950), op.cit.
Arnold Plant (1951), "Review of ’Manufacturing Business’",
Economica 18.
D.H. Robertson (1956), op.cit. ^
P. Wiles (1950), "Empirical Research and the Marginal Analysis", 
Economic Journal 60.
H.R. Edwards (1952b), "Mr. Wiles and the Normal Cost Theory of the 
Firm", Economic Journal 62.
H.R. Edwards (1952a), op.cit.
H.R. Edwards (1955), "Price Formation in Manufacturing Industry and 
Excess Capacity", Oxford Economic Papers 7.
Elizabeth Brunner (1952), op.cit.
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a few, mostly favourable, reviews including one by Silberston again.
Finally Sylos-Labini paid a belated tribute to Andrews’ 
influence on him in the Introduction to the 1969 edition of Oligopoly 
and Technical Progress.^
The reactions were complex to say the least, the main point taken 
by the critics was the rejection of short run profit maximization and 
much of the discussion revolved around that point. Some writers were
concerned to show that Andrews' normal-cost pricing model was not
. . . . . 61inconsistent with profit maximization at least m  a long run version.
R.S. Edwards took the view that Andrews was describing well known and
long practiced procedures and that these formal rules were not
incompatible with profit maximization.
"For those that argue that automatic basing 
of prices on conventional cost statistics 
is the rule rather than the exception have 
not taken adequate account of the formal and 
unregarded stages in the price fixing 
processes.”67
In other words, what businessmen are trying to do is maximize profits 
even if this is not immediately apparent in the formal rules and it is 
surprising that "the existence of these procedures has led to the
6UT. Corley (1965), op.cit.
A. Silberston (1967), op.cit.
J.B. Heath (1965), op.cit.
E.J. Grether (1966), op.cit.
D. Robinson (1965), "Review of ’On Competition in Economic Theory”’, 
Journal of Management Studies 2.
^Sylos-Labini (1969), op.cit.
66For example, Wiles (1950), op.cit.: Robertson (1956), op.cit.; 
E. Brunner (1952), "Competition and the Theory of the Firm", 
Economica Internazionale 5.
67R.S. Edwards (1952), "The Pricing of Manufactured Products", 
Economica 19, p.298.
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• 68 serious questioning of the validity of marginal analysis.”
E.A.G. Robinson was wanting to show that, whatever Andrews
thought he was doing, his costing model was not really the antithesis
of profit maximization bui consistent with it, so that his rejection
of imperfect competition on these grounds was unjustified. When,
. . 69after his exchange with Farrell, Robinson retreated from his first 
position, that short run profit maximization was a reasonable 
assumption for pricing in manufacturing industry, to his idea of 
long run profit maximization, he concluded that really Andrews was 
just presenting another version of perfect competition. He saw 
Andrews’ horizontal price line as implying an infinitely elastic 
long run demand curve for the firm which in his view makes it the
68ibid.
Farrell argued that the long run could not be regarded as a series 
of short runs as Robinson had suggested. Robinson started by 
arguing that the policy of profit maximization in imperfect 
competition clearly refers to short run profit maximization, a policy 
which is necessary if firms are to survive, and "long term 
equilibrium grew naturally and automatically out of shorter term 
pursuit of profit”. But as Farrell was quick to point out where 
market demand in the future was not independent of present price 
"maximizing profits in each of any sequence of short periods is not 
in general consistent with maximizing profits over the longer 
period composed of these shorter periods. If the long run demand 
curve is much more elastic than the short run curve as Andrews 
argues - then higher prices now mean a much smaller demand in the 
future”. ((1951), op.cit., p.424.) This short run maximization of 
profits (equating short run marginal cost and marginal revenue) is 
only rational (in the every day sense) behaviour where the 
businessman goes in for a quick quid and gets out after he has made 
his killing. It is not appropriate behaviour for a manufacturer 
who wants to stay in business for a long time, where capital 
investment is heavy and relatively immobile. It is not appropriate 
that is for a firm that is in Hacks' terms a "sticker" and not a 
"snatcher". Robinson retreated from his initial position and 
stated in his rejoinder that the short run situation is not in 
terms of a short period demand curve, it is the longer and medium 
term elasticities that are relevant to the making of decision and 
the appropriate demand curve is a long run one that allows for 
uncertainty. "Farrell is really on my side!" E.A.G. Robinson
(1951), op.cit., p.430.
155.
same as perfect competition. He says therefore that to accept
Andrews’ criticism and to replace imperfect competition theories with
his model would force all economic thinking back into one universal
straight-jacket of an assumed perfect competition. He then falls
back on the instrumentalist position that the theories of imperfect
competition are not a set of conclusions but an alternative box of
. 70tools for the analytical economist.
’’Conclusions, right or wrong, about the 
conduct of the businessman can only emerge 
from the material to which the tools are 
applied, from the assumptions made by the 
users of the tools, the wrong conclusions 
are not the fault of the tools.”70 1 72
He concludes that progress cannot be made by intellectual machine
smashing, tools don't have to be used if people don’t like them. The
root of the trouble is not the tools but the material they were being
, 72used on.
Much of the reaction to Andrews took the form of interpreting
. . . 73 .Manufacturing Business as a description of a ritual, and it was
usually seen as an expansion of the full cost principle discussed in
7M- . .the Hall and Hitch studies. Andrews had been involved with the 
Oxford group, and despite his disclaimers, despite his concern to
70One of Andrews’ major objections was to the conclusions that were 
drawn from this.
^E.A.G. Robinson (1951), op.cit. , p.430.
72ibid., p.433, see a discussion of this position, Chapter III.
72E.A.G. Robinson (1950), op.cit., p.774.
7UR.C. Hall 5 C.S. Hitch (1951), "Price Theory and Business Behaviour", 
Wilson and Andrews, eds. (1951), Oxford Studies in the Price 
Mechanism, Oxford University Press.
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point out the differences between his theory and this principle, many
people interpreted his normal cost theory as a version of the full
cost principle. I have already mentioned R.S. Edwards. Maclaurin is
another who sees it as descriptive, he regards most of the material
as being at an "elementary level for the individual who is steeped in
. . 75the facts of modern business life". "Andrews has simply given a
rj 0
description of certain facts not themselves presented." He has
"provided many of the ingredients of a realistic theory but has not 
. 77provided a new theory of his own". The persistence of this view of
Andrews, where he is mentioned at all, is evident in Archibald’s
78brief dismissal of Andrews under the heading of full-cost.
Wiles' elaborate and detailed analysis of how the full-cost
. . 79principle can be reconciled with marginal analysis was based on an
interpretation of Andrews that did not draw a distinction between his
normal cost theory and the full cost principle, as H.R. Edwards 
80pointed out. Wiles' interpretation was shared also by Kahn and
Robertson. The former sees Andrews' costing analysis as a mere
81extension of the full cost principle. He interprets Andrews as *7980
^Maclaurin (1950), op,cit. , p.969.
* J  CL Silberston (1951), op.cit., p.426. In a 1970 survey of price 
behaviour he recognises that there are differences between Andrews 
and Hall and Hitch but still includes Andrews under the heading of 
"Full Cost Attacks on Imperfect Competition", (1970), op.cit. , p.517.
77Silberston (1951), op.cit., p.429.
7ftArchibald (1971), op.cit., pp.18-19, 249-50.
79P. Wiles (1950), op.cit♦
80H.R. Edwards (1952b), op.cit.
81Kahn (1952), op.cit.
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postulating the individual producer as basing his price on the full 
costs of the representative firm, thereby making that principle 
amorphous.^
Robertson discusses what he calls "the counter-revolution" which
"...may be said to have set in in earnest in 
1939 when a group of Oxford economists 
satisfied themselves that businessmen in 
manufacturing industry do not commonly 
conceive of themselves as maximizing their 
profits by weighing up increments of receipts 
and costs at the margin of production; rather 
they arrive at a price after reckoning up 
average direct cost per unit of output and 
adding thereto an appropriate percentage for 
indirect cost and profits and then sell all 
they can at the price so set."83
He refers to Manufacturing Business as a "later formulation" of this
principle. He goes on to state that it appears that there was really
no great gap between the revolution and the counter-revolution after
all. That is, that imperfect competition and normal-cost theories are
compatible after all because the goals they attribute to the firms
are the same. In this he glossed over, or perhaps did not realise,
all the other differences in the theories.
Kahn takes the opposite view, being firmly convinced that
"...it would be wrong to infer that Andrews’ 
conclusion boils down to the familiar case of 
imperfect competition with free entry, nothing 
could be more different."* 8^
He, too, sees Andrews’ model as simply an extension of the full cost 
principle, which he thinks was really a description of collusive 
behaviour, tacit collusion but collusion nonetheless. He therefore
oo
8 3D. Robertson (1956), op.cit., p.35. 
RU
ibid., p.124.
Kahn (1952), op.cit., p.125.
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considers the observed stability of price to be the result of
collusive and not competitive behaviour. Kahn refers to the'esprit
de corps’ which places standing in the group above individual interests
as second degree collusion and associates this with Andrews ’’right 
. 85 . .price”. This is contrary to Andrews’ own view that he was 
developing a theory of competitive oligopoly.
Silberston, also, equates Andrews’ "costing model” with a version 
of tacit collusion.
"Andrews lays much stress on the costing 
margin that one has to add and hence on a 
defensive type of price policy which, it 
could be argued, is a policy more 
appropriate to a price follower than a 
price leader.”86
It is the conventional maximizing theory which Silberston suggests
is more appropriate for a price leader, that is "a firm in a mature
oligopolistic industry with potential competition limiting the scope
87for short run profit taking". Apparently he thinks that the firm 
using a costing margin does not have the same freedom to choose its 
policies as the firm of the theory of imperfect competition. It is, 
however, rather hard to see how the rigid, situationally determined, 
firms in the models of the neoclassical paradigm can have any freedom 
of choice among policies, once the decision about which variable is to 
be maximized is made.
The interpretations which said that Andrews was presenting an 
inferior version of perfect competition, or imperfect competition, or
Q C
ibid., p.123.ft fiSilberston (1970), op.cit.
87.K.,ibid.
p.517.
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a model of collusion, or not a theory at all but a mere description,
were put forward in order to weaken Andrews’ challenge to the imperfect
competition theories. H.P. Edwards paper can be seen as an attempt
to refute all these alternative and conflicting interpretations by
making an explicit comparison between Andrews’ theory and the
theories of perfect competition and imperfect competition,
emphasizing the major differences especially with regard to the nature
of demand but this does not seem to have made much impression. Later
interpretations were, as we have seen, along the same old lines.
Some critics make mention of Andrews’ failure to give empirical
evidence for his theories, but this seems to have been a peripheral 
89issue, paying lip service to the idea that economic theories should
be empirically based. This was rather dangerous ground since the
neoclassical theories that Andrews was criticising were not themselves
empirically based. As Farrell says imperfect competition theories
typify the method of drawing conclusions from quite arbitrary
specific assumptions, made with scant regard for plausibility -
90conclusions which will accord with the facts only by chance.
Finally what were the reactions of the major revolutionaries,
Joan Robinson and E.H. Chamberlin, to Andrews’ criticism and his 
proposed alternative? Robinson’s comment is very brief and she seems 
to be implicitly conceding Andrews’ criticism.
opH.R. Edwards (1952b), op.cit.
ft 9E.A.G. Robinson (1950), op.cit., p.771.
Kahn (1952), op.cit., p.123.
Maclaurin (1950), op.cit., p.969.
M. Farrell (1952), op.cit., p.48; also Wiles, "I am aware of no 
evidence whatsoever for marginal analysis’’, (1950), op.cit., p.517 
(footnote).
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"I assumed that entrepreneurs maximize their 
profits because that seemed at the time to 
be the best and simplest assumption to make.
This is the real issue in the controversy.
When the consequences of these assumptions 
are displayed it is seen to be too simple to 
fit all the facts and we now need to discover 
what in reality are the motives governing 
entrepreneurs’ decisions, to set up a more 
subtle and comprehensive set of hypotheses 
on which to base analysis and to consider how 
much (if anything) remains of the ’body of 
economic reasoning’ traditionally used to 
justify the laisser-faire system when the 
simple assumption of profit maximization is 
removed. *
In other words, she seems to be saying that imperfect competition 
theory was a good try but too simple, so now it is time to discard it, 
at least in its geometric version, and try and find something better, 
a view she reiterates in ’’Imperfect Competition Revisited”. She 
cheerfully admits that she did not consider oligopoly, not because she 
did not consider it important, but because she could not solve the 
problem.
"I tried to fence it off by means of what 
was unfortunately a fudge in the definition 
of the individual demand curve.”^2
She comments here on the necessity of defining industries in terms of
processes rather than products as she did in Economics of Imperfect
■ . . 93Competition.
She sees Andrews normal cost theory as set out in Manufacturing 
Business as coming to pretty much the same thing as her imperfect 9123
91Joan Robinson (1952), "Full Cost and Monopolistic Competition - A 
Comment”, Economic Journal 52, p.325. gee also p.243 below.
92Joan Robinson (1953), op.cit., p.584.
93 . . .ibid., pp.579-580. The inadequacy of a product definition was
stressed by Andrews because it ruled out of consideration a large 
number of potential competitors who could be included in a process 
definition.
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competition theory. The difference, she says, is more in tone and
. . . 3 *4emphasis than in analysis.
This point of view was also held by Chamberlin, although for 
. 95 .different reasons. Chamberlin is another who does not distinguish
between "full cost" and "normal cost" and, although he regards
Andrews’ views as compatible with his own, he does not equate them
with profit maximizing. He saw "full cost" and profit maximization
as two different pricing policies that could be accommodated under the
umbrella of his theory of monopolistic competition. The use of an
alternative assumption about pricing did not, he thought, destroy his
own theory, whatever it may have done to Joan Robinson's version.
"Far from being at odds with the theory of 
monopolistic competition, [the principle] 
has been from the first an integral part of 
it. ...It is clearly, (if briefly), described 
and contrasted with the principle of 
maximizing profits on p.105 of Monopolistic 
Competition."94 *6 *
The conflict with imperfect competition theories exists only if they
have been narrowly identified with the profit maximization principle
97 . .so that no other could be part of them. This, he says, is not true 
of his own version, though it is of Joan Robinson’s where the crucial
94ibid., p.590.
QCChamberlin would not have agreed that Andrews' was the same as Joan 
Robinson’s theory. His constant theme was that his own theory of 
monopolistic competition was not the same as hers, though she could 
never see it. He reiterates this point in (1952), op.cit.
96ibid., p.319.
^ i b i d . , p. 320.
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role of marginal revenue concept excludes any other entrepreneurial
objective which could not be depicted in terms of equality of marginal
98cost and revenue.
"The idea of monopoly does not carry with 
it any necessary assumption about how the 
monopolist behaves, although it is usual 
in the main to assume that he maximizes 
his profit. If he does something else he 
none the less controls the supply of his 
product and sells it in competition with 
others; he is probably also in some measure 
an oligopolist in his relations with others.
Thus the fundamental structure of economic 
society is one of monopolistic competition 
no matter what kind of policy the monopolist 
follows and there is no trouble whatever in 
fitting full cost, or other principles in 
addition to profit maximization into the 
system.
So you can take your pick. Andrews’ normal cost theory as set 
out in Manufacturing Business was a theory; was not a theory but a 
description; was the same as/different from the full cost principle; 
destroyed imperfect competition; was the same as it; was the same as 
perfect competition; was not the same as it; was a theory of 
competitive/collusive oligopoly.
But for all the diverse and conflicting reactions, no where have 
I been able to find any explicit reference to the major point, the 
heart of the crisis, the concept of equilibrium. It was the 
destruction of this, and not the denial of profit maximization, that 
made his ideas powerfully "destructive not only of the newer
accretion of imperfect competition but also of the whole body of
. . „ 100 economic reasoning". 98
98.ibid.
ibid., p.321.99
^■^E.A.G. Robinson (1950), op.cit., p.771.
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The reactions to On Competition in Economic Theory are less
numerous and less various, the main impression, except for Silberston
who was familiar with Manufacturing Business, was that Andrews had not
presented an alternative theory of the firm - most were apparently. . 101unaware of the existence of Manufacturing Business. But the
general impression seems to have been that his criticism of
imperfect competition theories was "shrewd and penetrating”. There is
some mention of key concepts - equilibrium of the industry but not 
. . . 102of the firm, new entry competition the meaninglessness of the long
103run orthodox demand curve the demand curve of the individual
enterprise derived not from consumer demand but from the supply price 
. 104of competitors, but the matter stopped there, and the spurt of 
interest brought about by the publication of On Competition in 
Economic Theory soon died. Neoclassical microeconomics continued on 
its merry way. *1
He fails to advance a satisfactory alternative theory of the 
firm (Corley (1965), op.cit.); he does not directly state his 
own theoretical position (D. Robinson (1965), op.cit.); there is 
no means of judging whether the new theory he is pointing at 
would have better predictive value than that which he is 
criticising (Heath (1965), op.cit.); it would have been helpful 
if Andrews had been more explicit as to the characteristics of 
his own industrial structure approach (Grether (1966), op.cit.).
1 0 9 Corley (1965), op.cit., p.471.
^^Heath (1965), op.cit., p.709.
’''^Grether (1966), op.cit., p.1263.
CHAPTER VI
ANDREWS AND THE MARSHALLIAN TRADITION
Although Andrews did not write specifically on methodology his
views on the subject come out clearly when comments scattered
throughout his other writing are collected together. As one would
expect the flavour of these comments is decidedly Marshallian. They
reflect particularly one of the strands in Marshallian thought, the
dynamic strand influenced by the 19th century theories of evolution
and change. Andrews occasionally expresses ideas that reflect the
1 . . .Cartesian strand in Marshall’s thought, but this is not typical. The 
dominant emphasis is on the effects of decision making under 
conditions of uncertainty which stems from the evolutionary Marshall. 
Marshall did write specifically on methodology and his attempts to 
integrate the two different strands in his thought are evident in 
these writings.
The progress of economics is often regarded as resulting from 
the successful purging of its non-Cartesian elements, of its becoming 
scientific, powerful, simple and general. In this view economic
1 . . .For example, in one place he even takes quite a Friedman-like
position. "A theory should be judged by its results and not by its 
assumptions, it is a mistaken view of scientific procedure to 
imagine that this demands assumptions to be ’realistic’. Where 
realism is required is in the conclusions and at that level a better 
name for the quality concerned is validity. The validity of a 
theory is entirely a matter of the extent to which it is a better 
predictive instrument than any alternative theory.” Andrews (1952c), 
op.cit., p.73. But this is not typical of Andrews’ writing, 
almost everywhere else he is concerned with making assumptions more 
realistic, arguing that theories should be based on observations of 
what businessmen do.
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science has been successful in withstanding wrongheaded attempts to 
make it soft, in rejecting attempts to make it reflect reality and 
to turn it from its righteous path. An opposite way to see these 
developments is as resulting in the progressive removal of the content 
of economics leaving only mathematical form and logic. Economic 
theory, in this second view, has become less and less able to do 
anything except satisfy the economists’ desire for intellectual 
beauty.
In the first view attempts by writers such as Mill, Marshall and
Keynes to add realistic, dynamic and institutional elements to
economic theories are wrong headed aberrations of otherwise great
intellects. If they had succeeded economics would have become
unscientific. I would argue however, that these attempts, while
certainly not wrongheaded, were doomed to failure. For the two
elements are not just incompatible but mutually repellent. Unlike
Marshall, Andrews did not try to reconcile the two elements in any
sustained way but rather concentrated on the non-Cartesian elements,
seen in his rejection of determinate equilibrium.
The justification for this emphasis can be found in Marshall’s
2own statement of what he was trying to do. He comments that the
frequent use of the term "equilibrium” in his Principles of
Economics suggests a static analogy, and its central idea seems to
be "statical" rather than "dynamical”.
"But in fact it is concerned throughout with 
the forces that cause movement: and its key­
note is that of dynamics, rather than statics 
... Fragmentary statical hypotheses are used 
as temporary auxiliaries to dynamical - or 
rather biological - conceptions: but the 
central idea of economics, even when its
^Alfred Marshall (1920b), op.cit., p.xii.
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Foundations alone are under discussion, 
must be that of living force and movement."^
If Marshall is read carefully then it is evident that this theme does
indeed underlie the whole of his Principles. This is so even in
Book V, the most Cartesian part of Marshall’s work. This Book
contains the core of his technical apparatus and is the part of his
work that can be best subjected to rational analysis.
It was because of his emphasis on change that Marshall regarded
the element of time as "the centre of the chief difficulty of almost
every economic problem". He was very conscious of the conflict
between the two main streams of scientific thinking in the 19th
century "the mathematico-physical Ei.e. CartesianJ group of sciences
5which were in the ascendant at the beginning of the last century"
and the biological group of sciences which were slowly making way and
which were concerned with the nature of organic growth.
"EPeopleH were learning that if the subject- 
matter of a science passes through different 
stages of development, the laws which apply 
to one stage seldom apply without modification 
to others; the laws of science must have a 
development corresponding to that of the things 
of which they treat."6
He saw the influence of this new notion gradually spreading to the 
sciences which relate to man, showing itself in the works of Goethe, 
Hegel, Comte and others. The development of the science of economics 
in 19th century for Marshall involved attempts to add these 
developmental elements based on biological analogies to the deductive
^ibid., p.xiii
^ibid., p .vi i .
Jibid., p.631 .
6ibid.
167.
methods based on those of the physical sciences.
Marshall was referring explicitly to J.S. Mill, and implicitly to
his own work, when he said that:
"Economics ... is getting to pay every year 
a greater attention to the pliability of 
human nature, and to the way in which the 
character of man affe 2ts and is affected by 
the prevalent methods of production, 
distribution and consumption of wealth.
The first important indication of the new 
movement was seen in John Stuart Mill’s 
admirable Principles of Political Economy."7
It is interesting to compare this view of Marshall with that of Veblen,
whom we tend to think of as an iconoclast, an exponent of all that is
different from the Marshallian mainstream analysis. Veblen thought
that economists would come closer to the real economic world if their
economic analysis was based on a preconception of process. Such a
preconception would cause them to view the economic system as an
evolving process in which change, development and conflict were
0
permanent not transitory features of economic activity. Compare this 
with
"In the world in which we live ... every economic 
force is constantly changing its action, under 
the influence of other forces acting around it."9
We should note, too, Marshall’s very favourable, if brief, discussion
. . 10of the contribution to economics of the German Historical School.
7ibid.
8 . •Allen Gruchy (1972), Contemporary Economic Thought, Lond., Macmillan,
p . 29.
qMarshall (1920b), op.cit., p.306.
10ibid., pp.633-5.
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Marshall thought that the most vital fault of Ricardo and his
followers was that they did not see how liable to change are the habits
11 .and institutions of industry. Even Mill, he thought, at least in
his methodological precepts, claimed too much for the deductive 
12 .method. Marshall attributed the developments he saw in economics 
in part to the "fact that changes in human nature during the past
fifty years have been so rapid as to force themselves on the
. ,, 13attention".
He believed that while deductive chains of reasoning had their
place in economic science these should be short rather than long.
"The function of analysis and deduction 
in economics is not to forge long chains of 
reasoning but to forge rightly many short 
chains and single connecting links. "ll+,
a belief reflected in his partial method of analyses. This partial
equilibrium approach was
"...set within a clear appreciation of the 
two complex problems of general equilibrium 
and historical change, and hence both 
unsatisfactory at the simple level of partial- 
equilibrium analysis taken by itself, and 
extremely difficult to apply skilfully in a 
broader analytical and social context".15
11 .A quite different "fault" or "vice" is of course attributed to
Ricardo by Schumpeter namely the habit of applying results that
are trivial and almost tautological to the solution of practical
problems. Schumpeter (1954), op.cit., p.473.
"His practice, like that of many other writers on economic method 
of all shades of opinion, was less extreme than his profession", 
Marshall (1920b), op.cit., p.637 (footnote); a comment which applies 
to many writers up to the present day, including Robbins.
13 . .ibid., p.631. An incredibly rapid evolution!
12
14.
15
ibid., p.638.
Johnson (1971), op.cit., p.5.
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Despite Marshall's reading of the tendency in economic theory as
being towards change and complexity, the development of that theory
after his time was in another direction, the emphasis was increasingly
placed on general static analysis - the pure theory of rational action
which followed the widespread acceptance of Robbins' 1932 definition.
One of the reasons for this was Marshall's own failure to make
compatible the incompatible.
"The Principles is a relentless effort to 
bring into one fabric of argument the two 
incompatibles, the analysis of conduct by 
virtue of its being reasonable, and the 
denial to reason of the means of its full 
exercise,the denial to it of knowledge of 
that part of the succession of circumstances 
which is still to come into being ...
^Marshall] sought with limitless patience, 
high practical wisdom, resolute realism and 
subtle innovation to spin together into a 
serviceable thread of thought the mutually 
repellent strands of rationality and novelty."16
But the problem was that Marshall was trying to solve the insoluble,
he was facing methodological difficulties which could not be solved,
they could only be lived with.
"Marshall's self-imposed endeavour was an 
intensely difficult one. He sought to describe 
a mechanism of evolution of the firm and 
industry; to derive the principles of this 
mechanism from the detailed and wide observation 
of a segment of British economic and industrial 
history; ...and to make his account of this 
observable productive evolution the vehicle of 
laws which should be in some degree general and 
permanent."* 17
The best method available to him for his purpose was that of 
differential calculus, but this involved the use of static 
equilibrium analysis, hardly the most appropriate type of analysis
^Shackle (1972), op.cit. , pp.286-7.
17Shackle (1967), op.cit., p.44.
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for evolutionary economics.
Despite his use of the simplifying assumptions that lead to a
static equilibrium, despite the Cartesian elements in his analysis,
Marshall remained unconvinced of the value of simplicity and apparent
lucidity in trying to explain the complexities of a changing world.
"In this world therefore every plain and 
simple doctrine as to the relations between 
cost of production, demand and value, is 
necessarily false: and the greater the 
appearance of lucidity which is given to it 
by skilful exposition, the more mischievous 
it is. A man is likely to be a better 
economist if he trusts to his common sense 
and practical instincts than if he professes 
to study the theory of value and is resolved 
to find it easy."1®
. . 19Andrews, m  his own work, adhered to these ideas, and in this
sense his heritage from Marshall is different from that of the 
developers of imperfect competition theories, who also claimed
descent from Marshall. They concentrated on the elements of static 
equilibrium and, by revealing the inherent contradictions between
Marshall’s model and the real world which he had so skilfully
. . . . .  20 .concealed, helped to precipitate a crisis m  value theory. This *1920
1 8Marshall (1920b), op.cit., p.306.
19 . .Explaining perhaps his reluctance to have his own ideas
"simplified" and made more "lucid".
20 . .See Loasby (1971), op.cit., p.871. "The use of a strictly timeless
theory by one who was so conscious of the importance of time 
represents a heroic - and highly successful - use of abstraction; 
but only by the use of all Marshall’s care and subtlety could it be 
made convincing. It may indeed be judged too successful and too 
convincing; for whereas Marshall was keenly aware that his 
mathematical abstractions would lose sufficiency if pressed much 
further, some of his successors being young and bold were less 
inhibited. By revealing the inherent contradictions between the 
model and the real world which Marshall had so skilfully constructed 
they helped to precipitate a crisis in value theory."
171.
crisis they resolved by eliminating the real world. Andrews pointed 
out that Marshall’s industry analysis was dropped not because it was 
less reliable as a basis for predicting behaviour than the new 
(imperfect competition) analysis, nor because it was a worse
description of reality, but because it was inconsistent with a theory
. . .  . . .  . 21of equilibrium of the individual business. It should have been, he
says, equally acceptable to keep the industry analysis and drop the 
theory of individual firm equilibrium. But Andrews was wrong, for to 
do this would have been "unscientific", it would have required 
rejecting a logical Cartesian structure in favour of historically 
oriented description.
One of the clearest and most explicit statements of the view
that an approach through static equilibrium analysis is the only
’’scientific" way for economics to proceed is by Kaldor.
"A more rigorous formulation of the 
conditions under which it is possible 
to make generalizations about the factors 
determining economic equilibrium may be 
regarded as one of the main achievements 
of theoretical developments of the last 
fifty years."22
The nature of this equilibrium is determined from a few self evident 
postulates. The formulation of the conditions of equilibrium 
involved the progressive separation of those forces whose laws of 
operation are known from those in whose behaviour no uniform 
principles had yet been detected. The latter then became part of 
the ceteris paribus clause. Whenever new forces which appear to
^Andrews (1952c), op.cit. , p.74.
N. Kaldor (1960), "The Determinateness of Static Equilibrium", in 
Essays on Value and Distribution, Lond., Duckworth, p .13.
99
172.
make the equilibrium indeterminate are detected then these are
"...incorporated in tlie main body of the 
assumptions, the ’indeterminateness’ 
disappears (it has been buried in the 
assumptions) and the abstractness of pure 
theory has been advanced one stage further.
All this is clearly in accord with the 
main canons of scientific [i.e. Cartesian] 
analysis: it is the only possible procedure 
to adopt23 if we aim at a clarification of 
the intricate inter-relationship of events 
by the investigation of the causal sequence 
of phenomena.1,2,4
That Andrews in no way subscribed to this quite un-Marshallian
view is shown not only in his own theory but also in what he had to 
say about the appropriate method, scope and purpose of economics.
Andrews stresses very strongly the need for realistic 
assumptions for any theory of the firm.
"If we wish to theorise fruitfully about 
individual businesses we must find out what 
are the facts of their behaviour and then 
construct a general theory to take account 
of these facts. The main task of industrial 
economics is the scientific one of giving 
valid generalized descriptions of industrial 
phenomena."* 245
"Since the normal cost principle is so 
generally adhered to in manufacture it should 
obviously be an accepted principle in pricing 
theory ...Scientific method would suggest that 
the right thing to do at the existing state of 
knowledge would be to accept the principle as 
the basis for further theorizing in the field 
of price policy."26
"My emphasis.
24N. Kaldor (1960), op.cit. , p.14.
25Andrews (1952c), op.cit., p.73.
26P.W.S. Andrews (1949b), ”A Reconsideration of the Theory of 
Individual Business", Oxford Economic Papers 2, p.82. The reference 
is clearly to those who want to show that his theory is really 
marginal analysis in disguise.
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Instead, he suggests, even those economists who thought about the 
normal cost principle were concerned with trying to explain it on the 
basis of existing theory. Where he uses unrealistic (i.e. abstract) 
assumptions in his own theoretical work, Andrews is most careful to 
point out that these are used to simplify the exposition of the model
and that the model works equally well with more realistic
. 27assumptions.
Andrews saw himself as continuing the Marshallian tradition and
saw the essence of Marshall not in his mathematical skeleton, but in
the fleshed body based on the changing real world. Compare for
example Marshall’s comments against the use of long chains of logic,
and the laws of science needing to have a development corresponding
28to that of the things they treat with Andrews' statement about the
need to abandon static equilibrium.
"We need some different patterns of analysis.
But these will have to be built up out of 
empirical studies just as Marshallian concepts 
were largely informed by their founder's studies 
of historical processes. No amount of spinning 
out logical chains of analysis based upon static 
concepts will help us in this task. The need is 
for more empirical studies, and the co-operation 
of businessmen and academics in their making."25
It seems odd in the light of this that he accepted the model of
perfect competition as valid for some purposes, for this was based on
the same static equilibrium he felt to be unsatisfactory. Andrews
felt that this model was still very useful when applied to commodity
For example with multi-product as well as single product firms, 
with differentiated as well as homogeneous products.
2 8 ^Above, p.168.
29P.W.S. Andrews (1951a), "Industrial Analysis in Economics", in
Wilson and Andrews (1951), op.cit., p.172.
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markets and extractive industries, and indeed he regarded it in a
sense as the crown of the classical micro tradition. This tradition
he saw as culminating in Marshall and degenerating with the
development of imperfect competition theories. We can see this view
in his thumbnail sketch of the development of economic thought.
"Originally economics was a macro-level 
subject, only in our own time has it developed 
so that the individual business becomes 
anything more than one term in an argument 
relating to industry or to society as a whole.
...The origins of real general theory were with 
Smith and the Physiocrats. The classical 
vision of economic machinery reached its peak 
so far with the perfecting of the theory of 
perfect competition - the work of distinguished 
European economists in the second half of the 
19th century. This was a powerful vision 
especially on the side of costs. The cost prices 
of materials and other factors of production were 
shown to reflect the values of consumers of the 
other good things that could have been 
produced but which were foregone in the 
production of any one industry’s commodities.
The process of competition ensured that what any 
industry produced would tend to be worth at the 
margin what society gave up elsewhere. Price 
theory failed to come to grips with mass 
unemployment and so we had the development of 
Keynesian theory."30
Perfect competition, however, remained useful.
"The general validity of the theory of value in 
perfect competition was shown in the success by 
which economists came to be able to forecast the 
effects of the major influences at work in 
commodity markets."31,
although it could not be reasonably applied to manufacturing business. 
The fact that doctrines had to be modified in application by doses of
.Andrews (1963), op.cit., pp.11-12. 
^Andrews (1952c), op.cit. , p.73.
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practical wisdom is not in itself a criticism, it was the theory's
general validity which made it possible for economists to get their
. . 32practical wisdom.
"Since the competitive theory of price 
’worked" insofar as it supplied broad 
generalizations enabling economists to 
make fairly reliable predictions of the 
ways in which prices could change when 
there was a permanent change in costs 
or in demands, it did not matter for its 
own purposes whether all the underlying 
propositions concerning the situation and 
behaviour of individual business were 
realistically correct."32 3
The important characteristic of a theory to Andrews was that it
should be "workable". Realistic assumptions were better than
unrealistic ones since they were more likely to result in "workable"
34-theories, but in some cases unrealism was not important. Similarly
in talking about how economists, when studying business behaviour,
neglect the special factors of personality which may lie behind the
response of business to economic change he suggests that the
35justification for this methodology is that it works, a pragmatic 
viewpoint, consistent with his underlying relativism, and quite the 
opposite of those who seek "absolute" truth.
His views of the nature of economics and its methodology and the 
basis for his criticism of the theory of the firm on methodological
32 . .ibid., that is, its correct conclusion despite erroneous and unreal
assumptions. See Andrews (1949a), op.cit., Ch.l.
33 .Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit., p.6.
34- . .This is not really a Friedman position, for that involves arguing
that the more unrealistic the assumptions, the better the theory.
See Milton Friedman (1953), op.cit.
35Andrews and Brunner (1952), op.cit., p.17.
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grounds are clearly and succinctly put in the following quotation:
"The economist, as such, tries to find 
generalizations which will summarize the 
ways in which economic forces affect ... 
particular economic situations. ...The 
generalizations of economics are usually 
built up from basic ’laws’ which the 
economist has constructed to describe the 
ways in which he would expect important 
economic quantities to behave in simple 
hypothetical situations ...Economists are 
well aware that such situations can rarely 
be studied in the actual world and that 
their direct practical implications may 
therefore be slight. Nevertheless by 
gradually building up more complex 
generalizations and testing them, or their 
judgement based upon them, against the 
actual course of events, they have gradually 
built up a system of economics which has not 
been without its usefulness. The test of a 
theory is 'is it workable?' Sooner or later 
the more complex reasoning which has been 
erected come up against the test of reality, 
and if it proves unsatisfactory then the 
economist has to abandon it and, going behind 
it to its basic assumptions, try to correct 
these until once more he reaches a satisfactory 
generalization. Something like this has 
happened in the field of price theory, which 
...gave very valid general conclusions about 
broad price-movements in response to large 
changes in demand or in costs, but which has 
begun to prove unsatisfactory in more detailed 
work in the study of business as such, and in 
the analysis of particular industrial 
situations.”36
It was the theory of perfectly competitive markets that Andrews
was referring to, and not the theory of the perfectly competitive firm
which dominates the modern text book version. Like Mishan on consumer 
37theories, Andrews thought the theory of the firm an unnecessary
elaboration of the industry analysis. Indeed not only unnecessary but *37
^ibid., pp.15-16.
37 . .E.J. Mishan (1961), "Theories of Consumers' Behaviour: A Cynical
View", Economica 18.
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also misleading because it had come to be thought that the industry
analysis depended on the analysis of the firm.
"The full development of the equilibrium 
theory of the individual firm was not 
strictly necessary to produce value theory.
... In academic teaching it came to appear 
as if value theory was based on a 
particular theory of the firm, whereas the 
latter was really simply a reworking of 
certain elements of value theory."3"
Andrews as well as Marshall had much in common with the 
institutionalist writers on economics. For example, Mitchell thought 
that the theoretical part and the applied part of economics should be 
united by something more intimate than the binding, and that a reason 
for the failure of economic theory in application was to be found 
in the emphasis in economic theory on what men ought to do, not what 
they do.
"Instead of starting with a set of motives 
and showing how human beings thus 
constituted may be expected to act, he (the . 
economist) can enquire statistically how 
actual men conduct themselves."* 39,
clearly a point of view Andrews would have found congenial.
This similarity of viewpoint, at least in some aspects of his
work, is evident also in the stress he places in all his writing on
the need to consider the firms in their environment, which will be
different for different firms. This factor militates against a
general theory of the firm, or even a theory of the oligopolistic
firm based on structural elements. We can see this in his statement
on the subject matter of economic theory.
qoAndrews (1952c), op.cit., p.74.
39W.C. Mitchell (1937), "Economics 1904-1929", in Dorfman (ed.),
The Backward Art of Spending Money and Other Essays, N.Y., McGraw 
Hill, p .408.
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MAt the macro level economics is virtually 
studying the social environment of business 
decisions in order to disentangle the 
factors which cause changes in that 
environment, it is also interested in those 
basic environmental factors themselves and 
in the interaction between them. At the 
micro level economics deals with decisions 
and activities of individual businesses and 
industrial groupings of businessmen, and 
generalizes about the way they will react 
to changes in their environment, ...the 
changes affecting the demand for product 
and the costs of supplying them."^
Economics is also concerned with the links between micro and macro.
Macro quantities are
"...proximately determined by what individual 
businesses and industries do. The decisions 
and conduct of other businesses therefore 
make important elements in the economic 
environment of any one business or industry, 
and any changes in the economic and social 
environment will achieve their ultimate effect 
very largely through the reactions in business 
decisions.,,l+1
The perception by a firm of the effect of its policies on the
environment and of the environment on its policies is very important.
Decision theories of the firm are part of micro theory, but
decision making is never in a vacuum, environment must always be
considered. It was the failure to consider the firm in its
environment that is the basis of his criticism of Penrose’s Theory
i+2of the Growth of the Firm. He considered that this theory was 
incomplete because of its disappointing shortcomings on the *41
^Andrews (19C3), op.cit., p.10. See also a similar classification 
in Economic Theory and Management Studies, Den Haag, Holland.
41 .ibid., p.ll.
n o  .P.W.S. Andrews (1961), "The Theory of the Growth of the Firm - A
Review”, Oxford Magazine.
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theoretical side which lessen the value of its empirical 
generalizations.
"The search for an objective origin for 
growth from within the firm leads to too 
great a stress on the proposition that 
growth is in response to spare capacities 
in management, while often true, growth 
often comes from the decision to switch 
existing capacity to new fields .. a theory 
of the growth of firms should consider the 
firms in their environment, the equilibrium 
structure of industries which she does not 
consider ... concerned mainly with large 
firms, since this is so it is reasonable 
to recognise that actual growth must impinge 
on industries, be allowed or encouraged by 
external as well as internal environment."1*3
It is no wonder that Andrews felt that the monopolistic
competition theories and also classical oligopoly theories were useless.
They allow no competition from outside at all, for the firms act as if
in a vacuum. The theories are not only wrong in assumptions, and in
conclusions, but are anti-Marshallian as well. The interwar rejection
of Marshall he says, resulted in the acceptance of theories that were
positively wrong m  their approach.
Since oligopoly permeates manufacturing and commerce, the results
the firm gets from its own policies will depend on reactions of
competing businesses. Much of orthodox theory therefore is 
. . 45inapplicable at the individual business level. No wonder, too, that 
Andrews felt that static equilibrium analysis of the firm and industry 
should bo abandoned, since theories involving this placed the firm in 
a vacuum not only of place but also of time and had no application to
^ibid. , p.115.
4l+Andrews (1951a), op.cit. , p.172. 
45Andrews (1965), op.cit., p.10.
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a firm in a changing, real time, environment.
The dilemma faced by Marshall in trying to retain the logical 
analysis that followed from the use of static assumptions and at the 
same time trying to analyse firms in this real world environment was 
solved by Andrews in a way consistent with his views on the nature of 
economic theory, the scope of economics, and the appropriate 
methodology to use. He solved it throwing out the Cartesian elements 
which eliminated decision-making and made rational behaviour a function 
of the structurally defined situation.
The Elements of Andrews’ Model - The Contrast with Imperfect 
Competition
Andrews saw his own theory as a development along essentially 
Marshallian lines. Although the theories of the firm also claimed to 
follow on from Marshall, Andrews thought that they had branched off 
in the wrong direction. Because Marshall thought economics to be more 
than mathematics and logic, he placed his mathematical analysis in 
appendices - whence it was "rescued” and developed by the imperfect 
competition theorists. Andrews thought this was a mistake. Despite 
a genuine admiration for the work of Chamberlin he felt that basically 
he was on the wrong track, that the important insights of Marshall led 
not to a theory of firms, but to a theory of industries. The imperfect 
competition theories could not, because of the nature of their 
assumptions, deal with the concept of industry and industry 
equilibrium. Although he did not completely reject the Marshallian 
analysis of perfectly competitive markets for some purposes, he 
thought it inappropriate for understanding manufacturing industries,
 ̂bee R. Triffin (1947), Monopolistic Competition and General 
Equilibrium Theory, Cambridge Mass., Harvard University Press, 
PP.81-35.
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and he regarded the perfectly competitive theory of the firm as 
positively misleading.
He did not deny a theory of the firm was necessary and useful; 
he thought that studies of the internal workings of the firm should 
be part of micro economics. Both the study of individual business in 
its own immediate environment, including the "industry" as well as 
product and factor markets, and the economics of the organization of 
activity within the firm, especially investment, production and 
marketing decisions, are parts of micro theory proper. In practice, 
however, the economics of decision making within the firm had been 
kept too much apart from the economics of the firm in its environment.
A theory of the firm should complement a theory of the industry and not 
be a substitute for it.
In the theories of the perfectly competitive and imperfectly 
competitive firm, internal considerations were abstracted from, and, 
because all the complexities of the real world firms were conflated 
into a single apparently unambiguous goal of profit maximization, all 
internal conflicts were ignored. For some purposes this approach 
could have been justified, for a certain amount of abstraction is 
always necessary. The trouble was that ignoring internal 
considerations led to totally wrong conclusions about competitiveness, 
price determination and the nature of equilibrium. The conclusions 
were inappropriate for a dynamic world where firms were never in 
equilibrium and where industries had only a limited equilibrium of 
relatively stable prices. The concept of an equilibrium output for 
the firm or the industry was not applicable to real world industries.
47Andrews (1965), op.cit., p.8.
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This was especially so of the equilibrium output reached in theories 
of the firm, where the slightest deviation from that output in either 
direction resulted in lower profits being made.
Andrews considered that the right way to develop Marshall was
not along these lines, but to concentrate on the nature of industrial
competition. He wanted a theory which would incorporate a view of
competition appropriate to that of the real world rather than a theory
that recognised in manufacturing and retailing only a world of
monopolies, a world where competitive behaviour was absent, because 
. . 48’’competitive" structure was absent. It was the conflation of the 
customers of the firm into final consumers and of the output of 
industries into final products that had resulted in a wrong view of 
the nature and existence of competition. Similarly the conflation 
of the firm into a single monolithic entity had obscured the true 
nature of the firm and the competition within it.
The fact that the use of product differentiation in the 
imperfectly competitive models destroys the concept of the industry 
is the basis of another of Andrews’ objections. He thought that 
differentiated products were quite compatible with the concept of an 
industry as long as this was defined not in terms of consumers 
perceptions but in terms of technique. An industry, in Andrews’ 
theory, includes all those firms which could, if the price were 
sufficiently high, make a substitute for the products of existing 
producers. These are the firms that have the same technology 
available. In Andrews’ theory potential competitors, as well as actual 48
48 . . .Competitive structure involves large numbers of small firms
producing homogeneous products in a situation where entry and exit 
are free, knowledge perfect, and adjustments instantaneous.
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competitors, are to be found within the industry, although they are 
not currently producing for the same market. They are therefore 
unlike the potential competitors of Bain’s theory of limit pricing 
where potential competitors can only be new, small firms outside the 
industry.
Goodwill, which differentiates the products in imperfect 
competition theories, and which allows firms to charge a price higher 
than that of substitute products, has a different function in Andrews’ 
normal-cost theory. In his theory its function is to determine 
market shares, to ensure for each firm a core of customers who will 
deal with that firm rather than others as long as prices are 
competitive. The customers of firms in manufacturing industry are 
other firms. The buyers for these firms act rationally, being 
unwilling to pay more than necessary to buy a particular specified 
product. If they did this it would mean higher than necessary 
costs and lower than possible profits. They would, of course, pay 
more for a higher quality product, but this is a different matter not 
related to goodwill.
Goodwill exists because the market for manufactured products is 
essentially a personal, face to face one, unlike the impersonal 
relationships that exist in commodity markets for which Andrews 
thought the perfectly competitive model appropriate. It is also a 
different market from that in which the final consumer buys. Although 
that consumer has a personal, face to face, relationship with the 
retailer, and although this can influence the choice of store, this 
relationship does not affect the choice between products of 
different manufacturers. Goodwill in retail markets is between 
retailer and customer, not between customer and manufacturer.
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Andrews needed to develop a theory of firms’ pricing, if he was
to be able to postulate reasons for a ’’normal” industry price that
didn’t reflect the equality of short run marginal cost and revenue.
Although his theory of firms’ pricing policy was based on his
observation of the actual pricing practices of firms, it was not a
mere description of those practices as was sometimes claimed by those
who could see no difference between his theory and the empirical
findings of Hall and Hitch. Tn a sense it was the policy followed by
a firm something like Marshall’s ’’representative” firm, though
Andrews was dissatisfied with this particular concept of Marshall's.
Prices were determined by first estimating the direct cost of
producing a particular output. The planning output had to be
decided on before any selling activity took place, and was usually
based on expectations engendered by past experience and by attitudes 
49to the future. To this direct cost was added a conventional mark-up 
for overheads and "normal” profit. Firms carry out this procedure 
when trying to decide on prices, but may not actually charge the price 
they arrive at by the method. If it turns out to be higher than that 
generally prevailing in the industry, for example because other firms 
have lower direct costs, the firm will charge a lower price and accept 
a lower than "normal" costing margin. It would not charge its own 
price and so sell a lower output as a firm in the imperfect competition 
theories would.
If the demand which was thought to be most likely, and on which 
cost estimates were based, turned out to be in fact different from 
the actual quantity sold, price would not be adjusted but rather the 
costing margin accepted would be more or less than planned. The only
49There is a clear similarity here with business expectations in 
Keynes’ analysis.
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firm which would make the exact margin that it estimated would be the 
one which was in an "ex post" sense "representative". Since "normal" 
times involve short run fluctuations of demand and costs, these 
fluctuations would be taken up, not by the constantly changing prices 
predicted by marginalist theories, but by fluctuations in the costing 
margin.
In the perfectly competitive model there is a clearly defined 
relationship between price and quantity: when price changes quantity 
must too. This relationship is less definite in the imperfectly 
competitive model, where no supply curve as such can be said to exist. 
There a given price may be associated with more than one output and 
vice versa. Nevertheless, for any particular demand curve, the price/ 
quantity level is determinate, and the firm will be willing to produce 
only one rate of output, that which maximizes its profit. In Andrews’ 
model, however, at a given price the firm is willing to sell as much 
as it can, for it wants as big a share of the market as goodwill will 
allow.
The firm in Andrews’ model does not really have a demand curve 
at all; the concept is not relevant. Although the firm will sell as 
much as it can at a given price, the demand for its product at that 
price is not infinite. In other words the horizontal pr-fceline of an 
Andrewsian firm is not a perfectly elastic demand curve, though it has 
sometimes, wrongly, been interpreted that way. However, a downward 
sloping demand curve for the firm indicating that it can charge a 
price above that of its rivals without losing its customers is not 
appropriate either. This type of demand curve, which is appropriate 
for the industry as a whole, may apply to the firm in the very short 
run. This would be the case if for example, customers, committed to 
a firm by contract, cannot switch immediately to another supplier who
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starts offering a substitute at a lower price. This demand curve, 
however, is transitory, and if a firm continues to charge a higher 
price the customers will leave. Goodwill does not allow higher prices 
to be charged; instead it Influences market share.
In using a horizontal direct cost line Andrews was not denying the 
possibility of short run diminishing returns. Returns of this type are 
short run, and firms in Andrews’ model are more concerned with the long 
run costs, the costs that "normally” prevail, than short run 
fluctuations. These fluctuations are generally absorbed by the costing 
margin.
Similarly the idea of excess capacity is different from that 
involved in the tangency situation of imperfect competition theories. 
For any scale of plant there is a large range of output for which costs 
are for all practical purposes constant. Initial economies of scale, 
which may be great, are achieved fairly quickly, after that direct 
costs are constant. There is excess capacity in a sense, because 
firms keep some capacity in reserve to allow for unforeseen 
fluctuations, but it is planned capacity and is appropriate to a model 
which includes uncertainty as one of its assumptions.
The need to replace the imperfect competition theories with a 
better theory was important for Andrews not only in order to have 
theories which were "true" in a relative sense, but also, and perhaps 
mainly, for policy reasons. The acceptance of the view that 
manufacturing industry was a world of monopolies, resulting in the 
misallocation of resources, had led to conclusions that the market 
mechanism should be replaced by planning. Andrews thought, however, 
that the market system functioned reasonably well; it just needed a 
small amount of government intervention to improve it. Governments 
do not need to run the machinery of the economy themselves, they only
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need "to creete the conditions m  which it csn run smoothly without 
slowing down.
CHAPTER VII
ANDREWS’ MODEL IN OPERATION
Andrews' model was briefly outlined in Chapter VI. Now the key
elements of that model will be discussed in detail and their
implications considered. The concepts that are of major importance
are: the industry, competition, entry, goodwill, reserve capacity,
demand and costs. Although the names are the same, all these concepts
are quite different from the corresponding ones in the theories of 
. . . 1imperfect competition. As I argued earlier the use of the same names 
for quite different ideas was one of the factors that resulted in 
Andrews model being misinterpreted.
The Industry, Competition and the Role of Entry
In theories of competition and competitive behaviour, the concept
2of the industry served three purposes:
a) to narrow down the problems of general competitiveness to 
an enquiry of more manageable dimensions,
b) to reduce to a standard and fairly simple pattern the 
infinite variety of competitive relations,
c) to provide a first and rough approach to a profit theory.
. . 3 . .In addition, the industry is one of the categories in which an 1
1See above, p.99.
2Triffin (1947), op.cit♦, p.79.
3 . .The other categories in micro theory are the consumer, the firm and
the supplier of factor services.
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equilibrium of price and output can be derived. An equilibrium is the 
balance between two sets of separate and independent forces, in 
microeconomics between that of supply and that of demand. The 
separation of the forces is essential for equilibrium analysis for 
"it takes two curves to make an intersection". When the concept of 
the industry becomes unusable, as it does in imperfect competition 
theories, we have to fall back on the equilibrium of the firm.
Problems arise in trying to arrive at an equilibrium if we are 
interested in the decision making firm (as opposed to the no-decision 
firm whose output and price are determined by the structurally 
defined environment) for with this type of firm cost and demand 
forces are not able to be separated.
In the Marshallian analysis the "industry" consists of those 
firms that are most tightly linked with the enterprise in question 
and which cannot be ignored in a discussion of its activities. Firms 
are linked through their products; an industry consists of all those 
firms producing a commodity perceived by consumers as identical with 
those of other firms in the industry. Because products are identical, 
the level of profit realized by existing firms is a good indication 
of the profits newcomers could expect to receive. If profits in one 
such industry are higher than could be obtained in the rest of the 
economy, that is, above normal, then new firms would have an incentive 
to enter that industry. The ability of outsiders to enter is what 
keeps profit at the normal level in the long run. In the long run 
too, there is incentive to produce efficiently, that is, at lowest 
possible unit cost, for costs higher than this mean less than normal 
profits.
^Romney Robinson (1961), "The Economics of Disequilibrium Price", 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 75, p.228.
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Excluded from the industry are the rest of the firms in the
economy. All producers tc a certain extent compete for the dollars
in the consumers’ budget but the inclusion of all of them in a
discussion of competitiveness makes the analysis quite unwieldy.
Partial analysis is the result of a need for a manageable approach.
When the firm is the industry, as in the monopoly model,
specific competitors and competition are absent; there exists only
the more general competition mentioned in the last paragraph. As
Triffin was concerned to show, the use of differentiated products,
the difficulties involved in seeing where the gaps in the chain of
substitutes occur if products can be regarded as forming a chain at
all, and the use of sharply sloping individual firm demand curves, all
make it impossible to define the industry or the competitors
satisfactorily. He claimed, therefore, that imperfect competition
theories were incompatible with partial analysis.
Andrews, the Marshallian, was convinced of the usefulness of
partial analysis but knew that in order to use this some satisfactory
definition of an industry was necessary. The perfectly competitive
definition of an industry he thought inappropriate for the manufacturing
sector, that sector where many different varieties of products are made
and where firms produce many products. This was so because that
definition was in terms of single product firms producing homogeneous
products. The development of theory of the perfectly competitive firm
after Marshall had resulted in a situation where
’’...the industry became emasculated to a 
rigid and restrictive definition of a large 
number of sellers all selling a homogeneous 
product.
5
Andrews and Brunner ( 1 9 7 5 ), o p . c i t . ,  p . 35.
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Such a definition makes competitiveness a structural 
characteristic and excludes active competition. Competition is 
impersonal not personal; if impersonal competition is absent, all 
competition is absent. The concept of perfect competition was not, in 
Andrews’ opinion, useless but it was appropriate only for commodity
gmarkets and not for manufacturing industry.
If the definition of an industry is to be useful for the
examination of competition in manufacturing industries it
"...must be defined more widely than those 
making identical products and more widely 
even than businesses making products of the 
same class. In our terminology, it embraces 
all firms operating the same processes.
Moreover if one is to include potential, as 
well as actual, competition one needs to 
include firms with the know-how and experience 
to produce the same products, even if they 
have not at present the manufacturing processes; 
and this means that we must include customers 
as potential competitors, by virtue of 
potential vertical extension of their activities 
to replace suppliers or to compete with them”.7
This then is the basis of Andrews' own definition of an industry
"...an individual business must be conceived as 
operating within an ’industry’ which consists 
of all businesses which operate processes of a 
sufficiently similar kind (which implies the 
possession of substantially similar technical 
resources) and possessing sufficiently similar 
backgrounds of experience and knowledge so that 
each of them could produce the particular 
commodity under consideration and would do so 
if it were sufficiently attractive".8
It should be noted that, in application this definition faces a 
similar problem to the product definition, namely, how can we decide
8Andrews (1952c), op.cit., p.73. See below p.194. 
^Andrews and Brunner (1975), op,cit., p.30.
8Andrews (1951a), op.cit. , p.168.
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where the gaps in the chain of techniques occur. For the theory, 
however, this is not so important, for the function of the concept is 
to define competitors, in order to show their effect on price. For 
them to affect price they have to be perceived by firms as competitors. 
So that the industry is what the firm perceives it to be.
Andrews' definition was in his opinion compatible with, and in
the spirit of, Marshall’s approach which ’’distinguished two types of
industry - competitive industries and monopolies”. The basis of
Marshall’s distinction is ’’whether or not it would be possible for
other businesses to produce a commodity with the same technical
specification as the product of any particular firm and offer it for 
. 9sale to that firm’s customers”. The narrower concept which involves 
homogeneity of products and absence of buyers’ preferences was a 
post-Marshallian development, and it is this narrow and not the 
wider Marshallian definition that excludes consideration of the 
competitive aspects of oligopoly. Marshall did not mean to exclude 
as being uncompetitive those firms that had elements of monopoly but 
only those firms which for technical or legal reasons are able to 
prevent other businesses offering the same type of commodity to their 
customers.
Andrews therefore uses a concept of an industry that is different 
from that defined in terms of products that are substitutes. He uses 
this concept for the three purposes listed by Triffin, that is to 
enable him to use a partial approach; to make manageable the variety 
of real world competitive inter-relationships, which are responses to 
the threat to market shares by actual and potential competitors; and 
to provide a first and rough approach to a profit theory. It is the
^ibid., p.l^l.
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threat of entry by potential competitors not actual entry that keeps
profits down to a normal level. He does not however use the concept
for the purpose of defining an equilibrium.
Andrews, by his definition of industry, has widened the range of
competitors from those actually producing a substitute to those who
could produce a substitute if they wanted to. So there are now three
types of competitors, actual competitors, potential competitors within
the widely defined industry, and possible competitors from outside the
industry. The latter provide the only potential competition
considered in Bain’s limit pricing model. In this model entry, if it
occurs, is entry into the industry and, at the same time, entry into
the product market. This is the same kind of entry implied in the
perfectly competitive theory of the firm. In Andrews’ model the two
types of entry are separate, potential competitors already in the
industry could, if they wished, enter product markets they currently
do not produce for, and as well, new firms may be able to enter the
industry and the product market. From the point of view of price and
profit levels, the potential competitors that firms can see, that is
the other firms already in the industry, are more important than those
potential competitors outside the industry. This is clearly in line
with Marshall's ideas. Marshall, speaking of trusts, and conditional
monopolies - those for whom the competition from substitutes is not
legally barred - states:
"A powerful capitalist often likes to push 
his way even into an industry with which he 
is not personally familiar but in which he 
knows that high profits can be reaped. Such 
a man, in conjunction with associates who 
have the requisite technical and administrative 
faculty ... may be able to put a plant that 
will be as well or better organized than that
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of the trust because it will incorporate 
the most advances ideas from the first."1®
In a discussion of competition H.R. Edwards distinguishes
between impersonal competition between goods in the market and 
. . 11personal competition between sellers. The first, he says, is 
characteristic of markets where central dealing is a feature, where 
there is a central marketing organization for the product. This is 
generally the case with agricultural products. The second type of 
competition is a feature of markets where a central organization is 
absent. This is the case in manufacturing industry where individual 
producers sell directly to traders who supply the product to the final 
consumer.
The first type is structurally defined competition, which, when 
the market is in equilibrium, is passive. It only becomes active in 
a disequilibrium situation, i.e. when above normal profits are being 
made. The only form of active competition is entry, when entry 
ceases, active competition ceases.
It could be argued that active competition always involves 
disequilibrium. Active competition implies disequilibrium because it 
means that someone is not satisfied with things as they are, and is 
taking action to change things. Models that give a prominent place 
to active competition are necessarily disequilibrium models. This 
applies to Andrews’ model and also to that of Schumpeter in which 
active competition takes the form of innovatory activity. This form
Alfred Marshall (1920a), Industry and Trade, Lond., Macmillan, 
p.525.
10
1:lH.R. Edwards (1952a), op.cit., p.59.
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. . . . 12of competition is important m  Andrews' model too, his firms engage
in continuous innovational product changes. This, combined with
relatively rigid prices, means that not all firms at any one time will
be making profits. It means also that firms' positions in individual
product markets will be continually changing, market shares at any one
time being the result of a historical process rather than determined
by the relationship between optimum firm output and total market
demand. Andrews' businessman has much in common with Schumpeter's
entrepreneur. He is a bringer of change, a decision maker, basing
decisions on his assessment of an uncertain situation, and his
expectations normally are optimistic. Keynes regarded this optimism
as usually unwarranted; it results from high animal spirits but these
spirits are what keep the engine of the business system in motion;
13when the spirits fall, the system slows down.
Another difference in terms of competition between Andrews' 
disequilibrium model and the equilibrium models is that absence of 
entry does not imply that competition is passive or absent, for entry 
is not the only form of active competition available. Entry to a 
market or industry in Andrews' model is free: that is, there is no 
collusion either in the form of price agreements or of price leader-
14ship. It is, however, not easy. There are several reasons for 
this: because of the personal nature of the marketing arrangements it *1
^^Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.H3.
13As we noted before, Keynes did not have as high an opinion of 
businessmen as Andrews or Schumpeter, although like them he was a 
"free enterprise" man.
1 This does not mean that he thought these things never exist, or never 
influence prices when they do. Andrews' model however was a model of 
competitive oligopoly, collusive oligopoly was, he thought, another 
matter.
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is necessary to establish goodwill, and that takes time; the capital
investment required is likely to be high; specialised technical
knowhow is likely to be important and it may take some time for profits
to reach the normal levels so that entrants need to be able to wait
for a satisfactory payoff. But although not easy, entry will be
easier for some firms than for others. Entry into a market from
within an industry is easier than entry into the industry from 
. 15 . .outside. Entry is barred if the price is "right", barred, that is, 
in the sense that there is no incentive to enter. But the "right" 
price is in no sense a "limit" price, that is one that is above the
competitive level by an amount determined by objective barriers to
16 . . .  . .entry. Price uniformity in manufacturing industry, therefore,
need not be collusive or monopolistic but can result from pervasive
. . 17competitiveness.
Andrews considers that the gross profit margin is the focussing 
point of competitive action. This action results in stable gross 
profit margins in those sections of industry which fundamentally 
involve the same sort of organization. These margins are so stable, 
he says, that it is possible to make accurate estimates of them even 
though net profit margins cannot be so estimated."^ The concern of 
a firm to take only a reasonable gross profit margin stems from 15*7
15 •A similar idea is expressed in Penrose’s discussion of the
importance of a technological base for the direction of
diversification. Penrose (1959), op.cit., p.118 ff.
1 RThe model of limit pricing is an equilibrium model. It is an 
attempt to bring in some of the implications of long run profit 
maximization, while still retaining a determinate solution.
17See P.W.S. Andrews (1958), Competition in the Modern Economy, 
Lond., Institute of Petroleum, p.15 ff.
1 ftAndrews (19*+9b), op.cit., p.85.
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desire to reduce uncertainty about the security of investment, but 
whether the firm is concerned to do this or not, it is rarely possible 
to maintain an excessive gross profit margin when entry can occur even 
if it does not occur the iroment profit margins exceed the "normal” 
level.
The doctrine of entry is basic to Andrews’ theory of price.
Entry is difficult when conditions are settled, that is when the 
industry is stable. It is not a function of excess profit but of a 
too high price, a price higher than potential competitors could charge 
and still make a profit. Price may be high because excess profit is 
being taken or because costs are too high. This is why it is the 
gross profit margin rather than the profit margin less overheads that 
is significant. If the price is too high not only will new 
competition arise, but entry is likely to be successful, especially
as the new entrant is often an established business in an adjacent
19 .line of production. We can see why Andrews stresses that his
. . 20"normal" profit is like Marshall’s entry preventing profit. The 
motive for entry is a profitable opportunity - firms see an 
opportunity of making a profit higher than the one they are already 19
19 «Edwards (1955), op.cit., p.97. The idea stems from Marshall who
in Industry and Trade (p.524) discusses the inability of firms in a
conditional monopoly to set prices without attention to the cost of
production. He argues that a trust can regulate prices without
much attention to cost of production only in short periods. It
is concerned, not with the ephemeral relations between the output
under its control and that of the independents but with the
potentialities of independent output in the future. "It adjusts
its price rather closely to the cost of production including profits
on which a newcomer in an ordinary competitive market would base his
calculation. But it adds to this something for the insurance
against extra risk which the newcomer would expect to face." This
cost of production is different in degree, not in kind, from that
which a producer in a competitive market needs to watch.
20Andrews (1949a), op.cit., p.174.
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making, one higher than normal. This is compatible with the 
Marshallian idea that entry erodes profits in perfect competition, 
but it is different from the post-Marshallian theory of the firm in 
that the opportunities to enter are not the same for all firms.
Even if existing firms are making only normal profits, some other 
firms may see the opportunity of making the same product at lower 
cost and so enter, forcing existing firms to take lower than normal 
gross profits or to look for cost reducing innovations.
Goodwill and the Market Share
21Edwards, m  his study of the British Soap Industry distinguishes
between two aspects of goodwill.
"The positive role of goodwill in 
manufacturing and commercial business is 
to channel the total demand of the 
market as between competing manufacturers 
in the proportions established as the 
outcome of dynamic processes in the past, 
and thus to provide the assured output 
for the production of each firm which it 
. needs for continuing and efficient operation."22
The negative aspect is that goodwill can create a product 
differentiation barrier to entry which, in imperfect competition 
theories, confers some monopoly power and allows producers to charge 
a market price higher than cost of production in the long run.
The positive aspect of goodwill, which is the one that Andrews 
emphasises in his model, influences the market share of the 
individual producer and, in combination with the ever present aware­
ness of the possibility of entry, keeps market price closely related
H.R. Edwards (1962), Competition and Monopoly in the British Soap 
Industry, Oxford, Clarendon Press. This is a major empirical study 
using Andrews* normal cost pricing model as a starting point.
21
22ibid., p.20.
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to cost of production. If differentiation is considered first and 
foremost as an attempt to strengthen a goodwill position, then a 
higher price cannot be charged as a result of it. Exploitation of 
goodwill position destroys the goodwill. As well as goodwill, luck, 
inertia and technical progress enter into the determination of the 
market pattern. This pattern is not immutable, it changes over time.
A share of the market in terms of goodwill can only be built slowly 
and businessmen will not risk jeopardizing this for short run 
advantages.
"The goodwill bonds tying customers to a 
particular supplier are easily broken.
But they are strong enough to hold, if 
no undue strain is placed upon them.
Conservative behaviour is the result; 
no firm will take such action as might 
sever a large number of customer bonds.
But it will fight bitterly against any 
rival firm which threatens to encroach 
upon its market position."23
The customers' preferences for dealing with a particular seller, 
expecially when the sellers are manufacturers of intermediate 
products, are not irrational in the sense that preferences by 
consumers for branded products are said to be in imperfect competition 
theories. The initial choice of supplier may have an element of 
chance in it, though it seems too strong to suggest that the customer 
would have no good reasons for the choice, but continued attachment is 
quite rational for buyers, as long as the service is satisfactory. At 
any particular price, there are advantages in personal contacts in a 
market situation that is not impersonal. There are also savings in 
terms of information costs, which are not worth incurring unless there 
is a strong reason to believe that an alternative supplier can offer
23Romney Robinson (1961), op.cit., pp.210-11.
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the same service at a lower1 price.
Goodwill, and the need to preserve it in the face of potential 
competition, keeps prices down and profits at a normal level in a 
mature and stable oligopoly. In this situation a primary goal of the 
firm is, at the very least, to preserve its market share and from this 
comes the respect accorded to the possibility of entry. Successful 
entry endangers the market share that has been built up over time by 
securing the goodwill of customers.
The ability to charge a higher price than that of a rival is 
related not only to the speed with which entry can occur, but also to 
the length of time necessary before customers transfer in response to 
a price differential. In the timeless models transfers that occur do
so instantaneously. In Andrews' model, which does not abstract from
. 24time, there will be a lag in response but it is likely to be short.
Even in Andrews' model the element of goodwill allows a temporary
divergence of price but producers whose aim is to preserve their
market share are unlikely to take advantage of this for the goodwill
lost will not easily be regained.
Excess Capacity and Optimal Scale of Plant
In the imperfect competition theories of the firm misallocation 
of resources occurs because, although entry ensures that only normal 
profits are made in the long run, excess capacity is characteristic 
of the long run equilibrium. This is the so-called tangency solution 
of the model. The demand curve is tangent to the long run average 
cost curve, as in perfect competition, so that average revenue equals 
average cost, but, because the demand curve is downward sloping, the
9UH.R. Edwards (1955), op.cit., pp.108-109.
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point of tangency is not at the minimum point of the long run average 
cost curve. The meaning of excess capacity is that firms do not,
indeed cannot, because of the situation set up by the assumptions of
25 .the model, produce the least cost output for a particular scale of
plant, or use the least cost scale of plant. „
This conclusion was used as evidence that the market system 
functioned badly in the sense that resources are misallocated even 
when large firms with massive monopoly power are absent. Misallocation
of resources occurs even if firms are small and if only normal profits
, 26 are made.
It was this kind of welfare conclusion, as well as the analysis 
it was based on, that Andrews found so unacceptable. Chamberlin, 
incidentally, didn't accept it either. He agreed that excess capacity 
was a result of product differentiation, but thought that it was in 
practice small and more than offset by the advantages of 
differentiation in the form of variety and increased choice for 
consumers.
In Andrews' model too, only normal profits are made in the long 
run. Here however it is because of potential entry rather than actual 
entry. The other long run conclusion, that of excess capacity, has 
no place, indeed no meaning, in Andrews' model. The concept of 
excess capacity relates to a situation where there is a clear and 
definite optimum scale of plant, that is, a particular combination of 
capital and other factors that yields an unambiguous minimum cost *2
Downward sloping demand curve and freedom of entry.
2 6An argument something like Marx's demonstration that while monopoly 
elements worsen exploitation, exploitation occurs even in a 
competitive situation, i.e. where relative prices reflect values.
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output. "Excess" capacity simply means producing an output less than
this optimum output, so that costs of production are "too high".
Unless long run cost curves are U-shaped the concept of an optimum
scale of plant is inappropriate and the concept of excess capacity is
meaningless. Output can only be less than optimum if we can define
the optimum, and in Andrews model where costs are constant over large
ranges of output, this cannot be done.
But "reserve" capacity does exist and is important in Andrews’
. 27 . .model. It is, as Edwards says, similar to short run excess
capacity in established terminology but it is very different from the
long run excess capacity of imperfect competition. In manufacturing
industry existing capital equipment can produce a larger output
than it normally does and it will do so if demand increases in the
short run. Reserve capacity can be regarded as a cost imposed by
uncertainty. It gives the firm a necessary flexibility to deal with
changes in demand that cannot be foreseen. As such it is, of course,
absent from equilibrium models which abstract from time and therefore
from uncertainty. It often consists of equipment that has been
written off and held in reserve. Reserve capacity in management also
can exist. This stems from the fact that while increasingly large
scale production needs different organizational structures, the
required change is not continuous. That is, the same structure will
be appropriate for large ranges of output, the organization structures
will be discrete and overlapping - so that at any particular time the
management organization is likely to have the capacity to deal with a
28larger output than it is associated with at present. This is a very
^H.R. Edwards (1955), op.cit. , p.116.
28See Andrews (1949a), op.cit., Chapter IV.
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similar idea to that of Penrose in the Theory of the Growth of the
Firm, where unused managerial capacity is an important, if not the
most important, internal source of growth. Andrews, while agreeing
that reserve capacity in management can exist, criticizes Penrose's
emphasis on it as the main source of growth. The emphasis on internal
factors affecting growth is unsatisfactory, he argues, because it
ignores the effect of the external environment on the firm's ability 
29to grow.
If businessmen plan for reserve capacity the long run cost 
curve will necessarily cut the falling short run curve, that is the 
long run cost curve is not an envelope curve. Reserve capacity is 
excess only in terms of the minimization of the current costs of 
production and does not involve waste in the fluctuating conditions 
of the real world. Further, it does not necessarily result from 
monopoly power as does the excess capacity of imperfect competition 
theory. Reserve capacity would not be necessary if the world were 
changeless or even if changes were predictable, but since it is not 
then reserve capacity has a necessary function, i.e. to deal with 
unexpected fluctuations in demand.
Excess capacity is inevitable in imperfect competition: it does 
not result from a decision by management, it is determined by the 
situation. Reserve capacity on the other hand is a result of a 
management decision made in response to uncertainty.
Where long run average costs are constant, the notion of an 
optimum scale of plant is not appropriate. This optimum therefore 
cannot be used as a yardstick to measure performance. The yardstick
29Andrews (1961b), op.cit.
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for efficiency becomes simply "normal" profits. In manufacturing 
industry, because of the threat of potential competition and the 
desire to maintain market share, firms' profits in the long run are 
normal. In terms of welfare, therefore, Andrews concludes that 
manufacturing business, at least where collusion is absent, performs 
satisfactorily.
Demand Curves and Cost Curves
"The whole structure of static price 
analysis in its developed form is 
predicated upon the existence of an 
equilibrium position which can be struck 
as a balance between two sets of 
independent forces. ... as to both the 
firm and the industry, the demand curve 
concept has been considered essential 
for it sums up one of the two relevant 
sets of forces."30
Only when there is a successful reconciliation of the individual
demand curve and the industry demand curve can this form of analysis
reach a successful conclusion. In monopoly there is no problem for
the two are by definition the same. In perfect competition the
reconciliation of the firm's horizontal demand curve with the downward
sloping industry demand curve is made possible by the assumption that
equilibrium has been reached at the industry level.
"If industry equilibrium has not been 
reached, the firm does not have a horizontal 
demand curve. If this equilibrium is 
disturbed, the demand curve vanishes ...
[[and the sellerj does not know how much he 
can sell at the prevailing price. He knows 
that a reduction in price will increase hisq 1sales, but he does not know how much."01 
Here we see the irony of a situation where, as Andrews pointed out, *31
OQR. Robinson (1961), op.cit., pp.213-14.
31ibid., pp.216-217.
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price theory has come to be taught as if the equilibrium of the
industry depended on the equilibrium of the firm, whereas strictly
speaking within the model it is the other way round.
The problem of having to reconcile the individual and industry
demand in the case of monopolistic competition was carried out by
abandoning the concept of the industry and carrying out the analysis
in terms of the firm. This analysis does not depict an industry but
"an aggregation of little monopolies". It follows
"...as to firms which plan their output 
and choose their position in terms of a 
demand curve, there are only two 
categories, monopoly and pure competition.
...This particular taxonomy is not made 
more attractive by the fact that neither 
situation is considered as having many 
concrete examples".32
In order to study the real world (if that is your goal), and use 
concrete examples, it is necessary, as Andrews recognised, to abandon 
both the determinate firm's demand curve, and with it the concept of 
equilibrium of the individual firm, and, in conditions of uncertainty, 
to recognise that demand estimates made by firms depend to a large 
extent on production costs.
. 33Andrews eliminated the determinate demand curve for the firm 
and his supply function for the firm is horizontal. The latter is so 
because for large ranges of output firms are prepared to supply more 
at the current price than is currently wanted by consumers. There is
32ibid., p.215.
Not only in the empirical sense of questioning whether the firm can 
know its position as many writers have done (including Joan Robinson 
in "Imperfect Competition Revisited" and Wiles in "Price Cost and 
Output") but also in the theoretical sense of denying its 
existence as a concept appropriate for firms in an uncertain 
environment. See Andrews (1949a), op.cit., Chapter V.
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no one to one relationship between price and quantity, so that there 
is no equilibrium output for the firm or the industry even in a 
situation where prices have stabilized. With regard to output demanded, 
at any time,
’’The goodwill of all necessarily limits the 
sales of each, and this may indeed be 
represented by a downward sloping demand 
curve - but it is not the operative sales 
curve for the firm in the sense of Chamberlin’s 
particular market (d-d’) curve. That is a 
stable function showing the volume of demand 
the seller could continue to command if rivals 
did not cut prices and there were no entry.
In Andrews’ model no such curve exists because
it is a basic assumption that buyers are
rational in the sense that they will not
continue to pay more for the same quality '
of a product, and over time demand would
shrink, ultimately to zero."31*
Instead of trying to conceptualize a long run demand curve 
appropriate to a world containing time, Andrews rejects the concept of 
a demand curve altogether. This total absence of a demand curve 
accounts for much of the environment of uncertainty to which business­
men allude, that is that part of uncertainty that relates to customers.
It does not account for the uncertainty relating to behaviour
35 . . .or reaction of rival firms. The firm has a horizontal price line
indicating, as we said, a willingness to supply more at the current
price, and the demand function is expressed in cost terms, the
36costs of an actual or potential competitor. The following 
quotation could be used to sum up Andrews' view of the relationship *36
^H.R. Edwards (1955), op.cit., p.108.
36R. Robinson (1961), op.cit., p.212.
^This was a source of some confusion, a horizontal price line on a 
two dimensional diagram looks like the demand curve of a perfectly 
competitive firm - it was this that caused some critics, for 
example Kahn and E.A.G. Robinson, to say that he was just 
presenting another version of perfect competition.
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between demand and costs of production. Yet it was written not by-
Andrews but by Machlup in a supposed defence of marginal equilibrium
analysis. Was he unaware, or did he perhaps think other people were
unaware, that the kind of interdependence he postulates destroys the
concept of equilibrium? Tnis concept is, as we saw, only appropriate
where there are two independent forces which can balance each other.
"Average cost may be the most important 
datum for the estimate of demand elasticity.
The elasticity of demand for any particular 
product is determined by the availability 
of substitutes. In order to estimate how 
much a business firm may lose if it raises 
its prices, it will consider whether 
existing or potential competition can supply 
products at that particular price. The 
elasticity of supply from competing sources 
determines the elasticity of demand for the 
firm's product. The supply from competing 
sources will depend on their actual or 
potential cost of production. And usually 
the best clue that a firm has to the 
production cost of competitors is its own
production cost corrected for any known _
differences of conditions. ...The role of
average cost in the firm's pricing process
is to aid the gauging of the elasticity of
the long run demand for its product."^'
The price of a firm's product in Andrews' theory is not based on
consumer preferences for the product of one firm over another (an
38idea that Andrews criticized), but on businessmen's expectations 
about what they think consumers will demand. Pricing policy is based 
on demand to the extent that businessmen must make an estimate of the 
amount they think they are likely to sell. This estimate is usually 
based on past experience and is used in order to calculate average 
direct costs of production. To these costs is added a costing margin,
37Machlup (1946), op.cit., p.543.
3 3 A n d r e w s  (1964b), op.cit., pp.73-4, and (1949a), op.cit., pp.145-57.
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which then gives the firm the price to be charged. ' The costing
margin is also influenced by expectations and estimates, on the kind
of costs likely to be facing rivals, actual and potential, and on the
level of profit they would regard as reasonable or normal. Any price
that would allow potential competitors, given their costs, to make a
profit higher than this, would be seen by them to be a profitable
opportunity and would cause them to enter the market. That is, they
become actual competitors charging a slightly lower price, and so
take from the firm some of its hard won customers. For, as we saw,
goodwill and buyers’ preferences for dealing with a particular firm
will not protect it from losing customers in the long run if it
charges a price higher than that of other firms.
"In the long run demand is very sensitive 
to differences in prices, and even a well- 
established market will be no protection 
against the competition of those who are 
able to quote a lower price for the same 
quality product with the same level of 
associated services."140
Although the market will consist of a fairly definite group of people,
"Convenience of acquisition, and of accounting, 
as well as of use, may make a buyer prefer, 
other things being equal, to deal with one 
regular source rather than many."141
Demand at any one period contains a "floating" element. As Edwards
puts it, it is not *40
R. Robinson refers to this as a "code-established price" which has 
some of the characteristics of, but is not the same as, an 
administered price. It is a disequilibrium price even though it 
results in price rigidity which sometimes gives it a superficial 
resemblance to an equilibrium price. (1961), op.cit., pp.201.
40Andrews (1949a), op.cit., p.154.
41Andrews (1964b), op.cit., p.77.
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"...that some buyers in the market are 
wholly attached, others partially attached 
and some completely unattached. It is, 
rather, that all buyers are incompletely 
attached; the greater part of their 
regular custom is directed to the favoured 
seller, but at any point of time each is 
looking to and is susceptible to the 
approach of other sellers to some extent".1+2
It is through the floating element that information about differences
between prices and quality are channelled, in a world where
information is not perfect, instantaneously known, or cost free. "The
character of the individual demand function will depend on the
. . 4.3potential supply function of other producers", and it is this that
makes it impossible to conceptualize a long run demand curve for the
firm completely separate from supply. Long run demand will be more
elastic than short run because of better information and more
substitutes but we cannot in Andrews’ model speak of the elasticity
of the demand curve. It is neither finite or infinite for a demand
curve as such does not exist.
Since in Andrews’ model the demand and cost elements are
interdependent, businessmen cannot be profit maximizers in the sense
of trying to produce that output where marginal cost equals marginal
revenue in either the short or the long run, however much they may
be maximizers in the loose sense of wanting to make as much profit as
they can in conditions of uncertainty.
When we consider the differences between Andrews’ theory and
those of the neoclassical research programme it is important to
remember that it is not just that the assumptions they start from are *
MOH.R. Ldwards (1952), op.cit. , p.62 (footnote).
^Andrews (1964b), op.cit. , p.80.
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different. The different assumptions reflect a different view of the 
nature and purpose of economic theorizing. The neoclassical analysis 
is based on a priori assumptions that need bear no resemblance to the 
real world. The purpose of these assumptions is to enable a clear 
unambiguous equilibrium price and output to be defined. It uses what 
is essentially a mathematical method even if it is expressed in 
words, and,
"...in mathematics the analytical method 
consists in supposing the problem solved 
and considering what must be the 
characteristics of the solution."4^
The development of value and price theory since Adam Smith could be
said to be the progressive spelling out of the assumptions and
conditions necessary in order to get his "natural" price, and finding
that it can only be reached by eliminating uncertainty, and therefore
. 45 .time. If your absolute presuppositions, your basic world view, is
that the world is characterized by change, and not by equilibria, or 
even tendencies towards them, the equilibrium models won’t have much 
appeal.
Andrews thought that the role of economic theory was to make 
generalizations based on empirical observations, which were not 
likely to be valid for all places and times. In his price theory he 
was concerned to discover the general principles underlying the 
determination of actual prices in manufacturing industry. These 
prices must be set in conditions of uncertainty, and at a particular 45
44Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.103.
45 . . .Perhaps a more concise example would be Samuelson's writing on
factor price equalization in international trade theory. See 
P.A. Samuelson (1948), "International Trade and the Equalization of 
Factor Prices", Economic Journal 58, and (1949), "Factor Price 
Equalization of Factor Prices", Economic Journal 59.
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time and place. That is, in circumstances where the existence of 
time means the inevitability of change.
Nowhere is this more evident than in his treatment of long run
costs compared with that of the neoclassical price theory. Yet
when attempts are made to explain Andrews’ ideas, to make them
commensurable with conventional curves, the crucial distinctions are
lost and Andrews’ long run cost curve is thought of being the same as
that of neoclassical theory except that it is L-shaped rather than
U-shaped. This is something that is very easy to do particularly
for those whose training and teaching experience accustom them to the
use of two dimensional diagrams as a heuristic device, a shorthand
way of expressing complex ideas. Andrews, in Manufacturing Business,
47 . . . .has very few diagrams but it is very easy to visualize what Andrews 
has to say about long run costs as a two dimensional diagram with 
costs on the vertical axis and output on the horizontal. Then we get 
a curve that slopes fairly steeply at first, then flattens out until 
there is a long stretch where it is horizontal, a plateau, perhaps 
rising a bit eventually before another plateau is reached - ”aha” we 
say, a long run average cost curve with a long stretch of constant 
costs before diseconomies set it. It looks like a version of the 
cost curves of neoclassical theory, i.e. the long run curve that 
summarizes least cost ways of producing each quantity of output in a 
situation where everything including costs and demand are known with
Andrews differs from neoclassical theories even in his definition of 
types of costs. He uses the terms ’’direct” and "overhead” rather 
than "variable” and "fixed” partly in order to write in business­
men's terms but also because he includes different things. Many 
costs that are "variable" would be included by Andrews as overhead 
costs - some wages for example. See (1949a), op.cit., Chapter III.
4 7 There are only four altogether and are related to the short run.
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certainty.
These are the costs of producing with different sized plants, if
all of these could exist simultaneously, the firm would then choose the
best one. It is inherently, and even in principle an untestable
concept; we cannot test it by looking at how a firn) has grown over
time; we cannot test it by examining firms of different sizes. It is
not based on any empirical observation about how economies of scale
work for real firms. It does not, for example, refer to the situation
of a firm growing to a certain size and adopting a different and more
productive technique, e.g. mass production. Any basic text book will
tell you that such a change in technique is specifically ruled out,
as are changes in factor prices. The idea behind the long run average
cost curve is put by Viner,
"The theoretical static long run, it 
should be noted, is a sort of ’timeless’ 
long run, throughout which nothing new 
happens except the full mutual adjustment 
to each other of the primary factors 
existing at the beginning of the long run 
period. "t+®
Its sole purpose is to enable us to arrive at a determinate 
equilibrium of size of plant, costs, prices and output. Despite all 
that is said about testability, the high status accorded to 
neoclassical static equilibrium theorizing is evidence that practice 
and precept are not the same. It is determinateness and logical 
structure that make these theories so highly regarded, not testability 
and empirical relevance. Those who want the latter have different 
goals from those of the neoclassical economists.
U8 • •Jacob Viner (1931), "Cost Curves and Supply Curves" reprinted in
D. Kamerschen (1969), Readings in Microeconomics, N.Y., Wiley, 
p .204.
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It is easy to think that because Andrews' cost concept can be 
visualized so that it looks like a long run average cost curve with a 
long range of constant returns, its purpose is the same. This leads 
to the expectation that it can be used to define an equilibrium.
When it is seen that it cannot be used for this, it, together with 
the rest of his apparatus, is rejected. It does not help to achieve 
the goals of economics, it is not "analysis", not "scientific" and 
therefore not acceptable.
But Andrews was not trying to do what neoclassical analysis was 
doing. He was trying to develop the general principles lying behind 
the pricing practices of the real world, where expectations about 
reactions of rivals and customers lead to a stability of prices under 
circumstances when price theory would predict changing prices. The 
implication drawn from observed price stability in changing 
conditions using neoclassical analysis is that monopoly power is being 
exercised. In Andrews' model, the fluctuations in demand and cost 
are absorbed in the firm's gross profit margin. Stability exists 
because firms have some room to manoeuvre, some flexibility, they are 
not forced by the market situation to charge the price that will 
maximize their short run profits. Even if they knew how to do this, 
they have not an equilibrium price and output that changes with 
changes in market conditions, but a zone of stability within which 
they operate. This stability is conferred not by monopoly power 
based on consumer preferences, but arises from fear of potential 
competition, the need to preserve goodwill and above all uncertainty. 
Andrews' long run curve is an expectational curve. It represents the 
cost situation that the firm would face if it grew, as seen by the 
businessman. Unlike the curve of price theory it is irreversible.
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MA declining business will be left with at least some equipment and
49organization which is too large for its short run output.” Andrews' 
businessman is not the abstract entity of neoclassical theory whose 
decision making function has been abrogated by the situation, rational 
but without choice. He is essentially a manufacturer, a man with a 
knowledge not only of his market but also of the technological 
processes appropriate to his business; of the technical resources 
available to the firm and the implications of having these resources
available both in terms of current production and of possible future
, . 50production.
The importance of the technology available to firms, their 
knowledge of its scope, and the flexibility this gives them in 
switching from one product to another, is a very important part of 
Andrews' model, since it is technology which defines the industry 
and therefore the competitors of whom the businessman must take account 
when deciding on prices. Competition comes not solely from current 
producers of substitutes, but from firms who could produce them 
because they have the appropriate technological resources available. 
Technology is important in defining profitable opportunities, 
assuming a firm is looking for these.
The kind of technology found in manufacturing processes 
determines the pattern of long run average costs. While technical 
economies of scale are substantial at first they are used up before 
too long and operating costs become constant or fall slowly over a 
very long range of outputs. Diseconomies of scale that result from *50
^Andrews (1949b), op.cit., p.78.
50 . . • •A similar idea is expressed by Penrose when she uses the concept of 
the firm as a "pool of resources", (1959), op.cit.
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management inefficiency don’t enter into the costs, mainly because, 
whether or not their expectations are justified, businessmen do not 
expect that they will become less efficient because their business 
grows.
”So far as concerns price theory, the 
important thing is the expectation of the 
business man. Insofar as he will not 
expect to become less efficient just because 
his business grows - and he will be 
justified because an expansion does not 
generally come suddenly and violently, so that 
he can meet it with some degree of planning 
- he will be influenced only by the technical 
costs of production, and will expect average 
costs to fall. ...If the price is profitable 
now it will not be less profitable according 
to his expectations when once he has fully 
readjusted himself to produce an increased 
output. He may, therefore, accept any 
short-run rise of costs necessary to hold 
the expansion of his market until he can 
readjust.”51
Although the long run curve is a planning curve based on 
expectations about what costs will be when adjustments can be made 
to accommodate increases in demand, the decision on price is initially 
made in terms of short run costs. The firm seeks to cover average 
direct costs of production plus a gross profit margin which will 
include average overhead costs and a normal level of profit. In order 
to estimate these averages the firm must decide on an output on which 
to base its calculation. This is the output it thinks most likely to 
be demanded by its customers. But because it cannot know with 
certainty what this will be, the firm will expect some variation. It 
chooses an output for purposes of calculating the price, but expects 
that demand will be unlikely to settle exactly on this. It could be 
more or less and indeed is likely to fluctuate around estimated
51Andrews (1949a), op.cit., pp.136-137.
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. . . , 52output over any production planning period.
The firms plan for some reserve capacity to allow not only for 
uncertainty associated with fluctuations in demand, but also to allow 
for the fact that machines may break down. In the neoclassical models 
firms do not have to allow for this, machines never break down but 
wear out at a steady rate and will be replaced at a time that is known 
for certain.
Uncertainty and the need for flexibility which results in 
planned reserve capacity has implications for the relationship 
between short and long run costs in Andrews’ model. It means that the 
long run average cost curve cannot be an envelope curve defining least 
cost ways of producing successive outputs. In Andrews' model the 
long run cost curve lies above the short run curve, the technically
least cost short run rate of output being inappropriate in conditions
. 53 .of uncertainty. The long run curve cuts the downward sloping part
of the short run average cost curve, for Andrews was Marshallian in
accepting the short run law of diminishing returns and a U-shaped
short run average cost curve. He thought, however, that the upward
sloping part was irrelevant to businessmen; since they were planning
reserve capacity they would not plan an output near the start of the
upward part of the curve for this would defeat their purpose in
trying to allow for an increase in demand without costs rising.
"In technical language: short run costs 
will equal long run costs when the business 
is running at its planned capacity; the 
short-run cost-curve will run steeper than 
the long-run cost-curve, lying above it 523
52Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit.
53ibid., p.28.
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for outputs below the scale-output and 
below it for larger outputs. This will 
be true of those curves even on the normal 
theoretical definitions, in so far as 
businessmen must be presumed to plan for 
repairs reserves; it is the more valid on 
our definition, in sc far as we also 
recognize the existence of strategic 
reserves not relevant to the strictly static 
case of orthodox theory."51*
Andrews’ long run cost curves and their relationship with short 
run costs are quite different from those of price theory. They are 
expectational curves, and include planned reserve capacity. They are 
planning curves and relate to the growth of the firm in chronological 
time. They are constructed for quite a different purpose, to help 
explain pricing policy and reaction to changes in demand in 
manufacturing industry. Although abstractions, they are not 
unrealistic, they are based on observation of business behaviour and 
attitudes. And they are not part of the specification of the 
conditions under which a timeless equilibrium price and output can be 
determined, they are part of a disequilibrium model and cannot be 
fitted into equilibrium analysis.
Andrews (1949a), op.cit. , p.272 (footnote). A very similar 
discussion of the inappropriateness of an envelope long run average 
costs in a situation of uncertainty and change is to be found in 
J.M. Clark (1955), "Competition: Static Models and Dynamic 
Aspects", American Economic Review 45, p.458. I have no idea 
whether he was aware of Andrews’ work, he certainly doesn’t mention 
him in the article. Clark also makes a point similar to one 
Farrell made in the Economic Journal controversy about the long run 
not being a series of short runs. Tl951), op.cit.
CHAPTER VIII
RATIONALITY AND MAXIMIZING BEHAVIOUR
Two related issues that are pertinent to Andrews’ challenge to 
neoclassical analysis are rationality and profit maximization. 
Andrews argued that the theory of imperfect competition, because it 
associated a downward sloping demand curve with product 
differentiation, implied that buyers are irrational. This, he said, 
conflicted with the assumption of neoclassical theory that economic 
man is rational. He therefore called into question the internal 
logic of this model and developed his own model on the explicit 
assumption of buyer rationality.
On the other hand, Andrews was criticized on the ground that, 
by rejecting short run profit maximization as the basis of pricing 
policy, he was himself violating the assumption of rational economic 
man. Many of the attempts to show that Andrews' model is compatible 
with maximizing behaviour, at least in the long run, resulted from 
the desire to refute the criticism that Andrews’ model assumed 
irrationality on the part of businessmen. I would argue that this 
concern with profit maximization is somewhat of a red herring. To 
deny profit maximization does not necessarily imply that businessmen 
are irrational even in the neoclassical sense of the word. For as 
long as this goal can be replaced by another that can lead to a 
determinate equilibrium of price and output (e.g. sales revenue 
maximization), then behaviour designed to achieve this goal is 
rational. For in neoclassical analysis rational behaviour is that
218.
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which leads to a determinate equilibrium and profit maximization is 
only one goal whose achievement depends on rational behaviour. What 
took Andrews outside the neoclassical research programme was not his 
rejection of short run profit maximization but his rejection of a 
determinate equilibrium of price and output.
Rationality
. . 1"Economics is the study of rational economic man." Why is this
so, why for example does economics not attempt to study irrational,
i.e. real economic man? The answer, I would suggest, lies in the use 
of Cartesian methodology which defines "scientific" economics. For 
Descartes the world is self consistent and therefore understandable 
by the application of principles of logic. This methodology is 
based on introspection; because sense impressions are misleading the 
individual must examine himself and use what he finds there as the
starting point for studying aspects of the society in which he
. 2 . . . . .lives. The thinker constructs a society where individuals are
subject to the same laws and act in the same way in response to
those laws. It was necessary to devise what Shackle calls
"...the general individual, an abstract 
person equipped with only those tastes and 
capacities common to everyone. ...The 
individual would have needs for the means of 
survival, and the capacity to render some 
useful service. It was necessary to state 
some principle on which he would act and then 
to consider what would be the consequence 
when all individuals acted on this principle."3
1 . .Martin Hollis and Edward J. Nell (1975), Rational Economic Man,
Cambridge University Press, p.53.
2 .“Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments is an excellent example of 
this methodology.
^Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.148.
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The characteristics of this individual had to be such that the analyst 
could apply logic to the understanding of action. And the simplest 
assumption that would allow this was the assumption that conduct was 
based on reason.
"It was natural" says Shackle "that the reasoner, the
theoretician, should elevate above the rest that particular faculty
14that was his own especial tool." It was not only for that reason 
that rationality was assumed to be the basis of conduct. It was a 
highly plausible assumption in the situation of scarcity examined 
by economics. In this situation the individual could surely be 
counted on to think intensively and carefully in order to make the 
most of the possibilities open to him. In an everyday sense this is 
what a rational person does. If, however, a determinate answer to 
the question "how will things settle down?" is required this simple 
everyday definition of rationality is not sufficient. For to think 
intensively and carefully, to apply reason, to decide what is "best to 
do'-' can lead to many different equally "reasonable" conclusions when 
there is uncertainty present.
In this connection Simon makes a distinction between
. . . . 5"substantive rationality" and "procedural rationality". Behaviour,
he says, is "substantively rational when it is appropriate to the 
achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by given
g
conditions and restraints". Procedural rationality, on the other 
hand is, in effect, deliberative behaviour in situations of imperfect 45
4ibid., p.151.
5 . .H.A. Simon, "From Substantive to Procedural Rationality", in 
Latsis (1976), op.cit., pp.130-131.
^ibid., p .130.
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information. That is, in situations where the ability to make 
assessments is the result primarily of the decision maker’s experience,
there is no single decision that can be said to be objectively
7 . . .  . .rational. Substantive rationality dominates economics and is used
because and only because a particular goal is assigned to the
economic actor. The goal is assumed to be maximization of
satisfaction and substantive rationality is used in the process of
defining how this goal is to be achieved.
’’The reasoner’s conclusions, no matter 
how rigorous his logic, are only valid 
in relation to a given set of premisses. '
If those premisses are not the whole of 
our real circumstances, if they are even 
not known to be the whole, his conclusions 
as to the best conduct have no imperious 
and unarguable validity. He cannot 
demonstrate that one course of conduct is 
in fact the best of those available.”7 8
The only way to overcome the indeterminateness of procedural
rationality was to dismiss time, for time and complete knowledge are
totally incompatible.
"Time is what brings new knowledge: how 
then could old knowledge be complete? ...
Time is alien to reason. If economics is 
to be the pure logic of choice, the 
dismissal of time was necessary."9
7 . . • •"The human mind is programmable: it can acquire an enormous variety
of different skills, behaviour patterns, problem-solving repertoires 
and perceptual habits. Which of these it will acquire in any 
particular case is a function of what it has been taught and what it 
has experienced. We can expect substantive rationality only in 
situations that are sufficiently simple as to be transparent to this 
mind. In all other situations, we must expect that the mind will use 
such imperfect information as it has, will simplify and represent the 
situation as it can, and will make such calculations as are within 
its powers. We cannot expect to predict what it will do in such 
situations unless we know what information it has, what forms of 
presentation it prefers and what algorithms are available to it." 
ibid., p.144.
9ibid.
^Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.151.
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So that rational behaviour in economics became not the application of 
reason to decision making in a situation of uncertainty. It became a
synonym for maximizing behaviour in a static world where knowledge is
. 10 perfect. Rationality in this sense is "a sub-species of logicity".
As soon as we want to look at time dominated things - things that are
situated in time and develop historically - then rationality takes on
a different meaning and the exercise of reason no longer leads to
definite predictable conclusions.
This is the core of the dilemma of those like Marshall and 
Andrews who wanted to include time and uncertainty, and who wanted 
to examine "how things happen” rather than "how things settle down". 
For the use of rationality other than "substantive" rationality 
puts the analysis outside the realm of what is regarded as economic 
science. It may be applied economics, it may be labelled 
description, it may even be a form of economic history, but it is not 
and cannot be regarded as "scientific", for scientific economics is 
Cartesian economics, and depends on substantive rationality. Attempts 
by Andrews' various supporters to show that his work was consistent 
with profit maximization were often an attempt to refute the charge 
of "unscientific" that was levelled against him. But it cannot be 
done; Andrews' model is not and cannot be made to be Cartesian 
without eliminating from it its essential characteristic, its 
inclusion of decision making in terms of expectations derived from 
experience in an uncertain world. Rationality in Andrews' model 
is not "substantive" but "procedural". It cannot yield an unequivocal 
definition of "best" or equilibrium conditions.
The conclusions of such a model as Andrews' cannot be used to
10Toulmin (1972), op.cit., p.486.
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refute the ’’scientific" conclusions of static equilibrium theory,
because the goals of the enquiries are different. Hollis and Nell
make this point in speaking of empirical studies on the behaviour of
businessmen. These studies indicate "that businesses, both in
practice and as a matter of policy, often do not go on investing
until the anticipated rate of return has fallen to the current level
11 . . .of the rate of interest". This empirical observation does not 
however refute theories that assume maximizing behaviour - it merely 
shows that under conditions of uncertainty rationality has a different 
meaning.
"Rational economic man is not an actual 
man. He is rather any actual man who 
conforms to the model to be tested. So 
there is no question of testing Hand there­
fore hoping to refute] an economic theory 
against the actual behaviour of the rational 
producer or consumer. Producers and 
consumers are rational precisely insofar 
as they behave as predicted and the test 
only shows how rational they are."12
What a rational agent does is not an empirical question, and
incompatibility between actual behaviour and rational behaviour
does not show that the rationality assumption is wrong, but that the
person is not rational in the sense required by the model.
The assumption of rationality, like the elimination of time
with which it is associated, is not simply another ceteris paribus
condition. It is part of the hard core of the model, part of what
makes the model scientific. To object to it is to question not a
particular theory but to question an agreed view on the nature of
scientific knowledge. What is maximized - profit, sales, utility -
^Hollis and Nell (1975), op.cit., p.53. 
^ibid. , p. 55.
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distinguishes the individuil theories that are part of the research
programme, but for those' theories to be scientific the agents in the
model must be assumed to act rationally, maximizing whatever it is
in a precise and predictable way using complete knowledge. Rational
economic man is and must be a maximizer.
MAs a consumer he maximizes utility by 
omniscient and improbable comparison of, 
for instance, marginal strawberries with 
marginal cement. ... He is always at what 
he takes to be the optimum, believing 
(however falsely) that any marginal change 
would be for the worse. From individual 
indifference to international trade, he 
is forever striking the best subjective 
balances between disincentive and reward.
This is the rational primum mobile of 
neo-classical economics."13
When it was considered that equilibrium values were determined
by objective factors, such as quantity of labour embodied in a
product, then the fact that real people could have goals other than
material ones did not matter. But the introduction of utility as a
major, if not the major, determinant of equilibrium value in the
marginal revolution of 1870’s raised a problem for Cartesian economics.
”If the satisfaction of subjective desires 
is the ultimate goal, much of economic activity 
is endangered by the fact that the exchange 
economy permits only the fulfilment of those 
needs which can be satisfied by the acquisition 
of money and wealth through exchange in the 
market; and only in a way which often conflicts 
with many ’noneconomic’ human propensities.
Also, no social order is conceivable in which
the satisfaction of individual aims is the
supreme goal: such a system must end in anarchy.”11+
Alfred Marshall saved the day by his emphasis on economic rationality,
*3ibid., p.54.
Walter A. Weisskopf (1973), op.cit., p.557. (Marx of course always 
refers to commodity production for exchange as anarchic - the 
concept of a planned market is, he says, contradictory.)
14
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his Prudent Victorian Economic man. In his eyes deliberativeness not
. . 15 .selfishness was the basis of rational behaviour. Deliberateness 
provided an ethically valuable connotation to rationality which 
rationality in pursuit of purely selfish ends did not have.
Rationality had been important for classical models, but its use could 
be taken more or less for granted when values were mainly cost 
determined. Its use had to be justified when new emphasis was placed 
on the subjective bases of value.
Marshall did not introduce the idea of rational man - that was a 
characteristic of all Cartesian economic models. But he emphasised 
and at the same time justified morally this characteristic of economic 
theory.
"Through this emphasis on rationality, 
directed towards the goal of higher 
activities, the danger was avoided that 
non-rational, impulsive, emotional elements 
would enter through the door of 
subjectivity and destroy not only the 
regularity of the economic law, but also 
the discipline required for the working of 
the economic system. Therefore, it had to 
be demonstrated that rationality dominates 
all types of economic activity.
And rationality, as we saw, in scientific economics came to mean not 
simply any sort of deliberative behaviour but calculable maximization 
under conditions of certainty.
One of Andrews’ criticisms of the imperfect competition theories 
was that they implied irrationality on the part of buyers. Product 
differentiation, the perception by buyers that there are differences 
between products that are essentially the same, necessarily implies 
irrational behaviour. If this were not so, if the buyers were
^Marshall (1920b), op.cit. , pp. 17-18. 
*6Weisskopf (1973), op.cit., p.557.
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rational then,
’’...should we not assume that a price 
higher than would be quoted by a would- 
be-competitor must put the firm’s ’own’ 
market increasingly in peril from 
competition and that the peril will be 
enhanced the higher its relative price 
is put”.17
Product differentiation implies a diminution of competition, this 
leads to a misallocation of resources, the taking of more than normal 
profits in the long run, production at an inefficient scale of plant, 
and so on. Andrews did not believe that empirical observations he 
and others had made justified these conclusions and was concerned to 
show that in reality, where products were not different, customers 
did not perceive them as being different. The choice between the 
products of manufacturing industry was not irrational. Customers 
would not normally continue to pay a higher price for a commodity 
that was essentially the same as another product.
The reason, Andrews said, that irrationality was so easily 
assumed was because of the emphasis on final, consumer, goods - the 
customer was assumed to be the consumer. This emphasis stemmed from 
the importance of utility in the determination of value in the 
neoclassical model. In that model value is, so to speak, passed 
down from consumer’s utility to goods, even the value of intermediate 
goods and raw materials being derived from the value of consumer 
goods. This was one of the changes that occurred in the marginal 
revolution. Formerly value had passed from the components, 
especially labour which had intrinsic value, to the consumer good. 
Final goods had value conferred upon them not by the consumer but by 
the factors of production. When the direction of value was reversed,
1 7P.W.S. Andrews (1964b), op.cit., p.75.
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the emphasis was placed or, the consumer good. Andrews pointed out at 
length that the customer of one manufacturing business was likely to 
be another business and not a final consumer. And while the business 
buyer may have preferences for dealing with one firm rather than 
another (goodwill related to the firm and not the commodity) these 
preferences will not persist in the long run in the face of 
significant price differentials. The business buyer may have 
preferences but he is not '’irrational'’ in the sense of continuing to 
pay higher prices for a good he could get at a lower cost elsewhere.
Andrews argues further that in retail trade where buyers are 
consumers, they are not really as irrational as imperfect competition 
theories imply. Consumers, he says, do not normally achieve, or 
want to achieve a nice balance between the marginal utility of any 
individual good and the money they lay out on it. Consumers buy 
groups of commodities and there are advantages in buying a group in 
one place, even if some individual commodities cost more than in 
another place. Some are likely to cost less and it is the cost of 
the group and the utility of the group that will be balanced.
Consumers in this case will be considering such things as information 
costs and the cost of time which underlie habitual purchases. Such 
things enter into purchasing decisions and make consumers more rational 
than the theory suggests. But we should note that it is procedural 
rationality Andrews is talking about here, not the substantive 
rationality of maximizing models where time is eliminated and infor­
mation costs and the need to save time are absent. Andrews continues 
that even if only 10% of customers were rational in this sense this *19
^Andrews (1949a), op.cit. , Ch.5.
19 • •He suggests that this is not an unrealistic assumption.
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would provide a sufficient leaven in the lump to ensure that
competition not monopoly was dominant and that product differentiation
. . 20did not imply a downward sloping D curve.
Andrews argues therefore that consumers can be regarded as 
acting rationally even if they do not match the marginal utilities of 
every good they purchase in the way neoclassical theory requires. He 
also considers that the assumption of product differentiation, which 
implies irrational behaviour on the part of consumers, is incompatible 
with the general assumption of rational economic man which all 
economic theory makes. The conflicting assumptions, he says, result 
in the model being internally illogical.
With regard to the first point, the fact that consumers act 
differently from the way the model says they do does not count against 
the model, it merely indicates that they are not ’’substantively” 
rational. With regard to the second point I think Andrews was 
wrong: the internal logic and consistency of the model are not 
affected by the assumption of what he calls irrational preferences.
Buyer irrationality in the sense of regarding one product as 
different from another even if to an objective observer they are the 
same, does not make the model illogical or unworkable. It does not 
prevent the reaching of a determinate equilibrium price and quantity 
combination any more than the inclusion of tastes in the more usual 
sense does. And it is only if irrationality prevents determinate 
conclusions that it matters. As long as consumers’ preferences are 
consistent and transitive, a perference for Brand A over Brand B is 
no more important than a taste for apples over oranges. That a 
consumer would pay more for an apple than an orange even though to a
20Andrews (1964b), op.cit., pp.97-109.
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nutritionist the food value of the two is the same, is a matter of 
• , . 21taste, not rationality.
And this type of irr£itionality - the preference for Brand A over 
Brand B - in fact has a positive value in the neoclassical research 
programme for it allows a solution to the Marshallian problem as set 
out by Sraffa. The problem was that with a horizontal demand curve
for the firm and a situation of constant or decreasing long run
costs, a determinate equilibrium of price and output was not possible. 
With the downward sloping demand curve implied by product 
differentiation, however, a determinate equilibrium could be found.
This type of irrationality does, however, destroy the concept of
the industry. Or rather each firm is the industry, in the same
sense that apples and oranges are the products of different industries. 
This is the case where the industry is defined in terms of the product, 
as in the theory of imperfect competition. The analysis of 
equilibrium must then be carried out in terms of the individual firm 
- something which Andrews, who was convinced of the value of 
industrial analysis, deplored. Andrews recognised that products of 
different manufacturers were different, in that they were not perfect 
substitutes for each other. The assumption of homogeneous products 
was therefore not realistic where this sector was concerned. This 
much he certainly conceded to the imperfect competition theorists.
But he thought the answer to the problem of not being able to use the 
homogeneity assumption was not to turn attention to the equilibrium 
of the firm, but to change the definition of the industry. This is
‘Of course, if the preferences are imposed on the consumer by action 
of the producer as it is argued often happens with advertising, 
this does affect the model. It destroys the independence of the 
supply and demand functions without which equilibrium is not 
possible, but this is another issue.
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why he defined it in terms of processes not products. Although
Brand A was different from Brand B, as long as the manufacturer of A
22could make Brand B if he wanted to, they were m  the same industry.
Irrationality of buyers in imperfect competition theories,which 
Andrews claimed conflicts with the assumption that equilibrium 
requires rationality,does not require the supporters to reject those 
theories. For irrationality in the sense of preferences don’t matter, 
what is important is maximization and for this only consistency and 
transitivity are necessary. The inclusion of rationality in his own 
theories is not enough to make them acceptable to the reference group 
that defines economics as consisting of equilibrium analysis. In 
economics, Andrews says, rationality, while it gives rise to 
interpretive problems in other coptexts, has a fairly clear, technical 
meaning -
M...a man is rational if he chooses which 
alternative costs less, taking into 
account all aspects other than costs 
which affect the value in use to him of 
each alternative”.23 24
This may have been a definition of rationality appropriate to
economics as Andrews saw the discipline, but it is certainly not
sufficiently precise for the neoclassical programme. This programme
requires rationality in the sense of maximization under certainty.
Andrews warns against the danger of not recognising rational
24 . . .conduct when it is met but theoretical rationality is never met, 
it is an idea, an absolute, the validity of which cannot be questioned
22 Andrews (1951a), op.cit., p.168.
23Andrews (1964b), op.cit.
24 .ibid.
231.
by showing that real people are not rational in this sense. That they
can be shown to be rational in other senses is irrelevant. For it is
the assumption of substantive rationality which is essential to the
static equilibrium models. Without a demonstrable optimum you cannot
25answer the question "How will things settle down". The formal 
abstract answer to this question was contained in the model of general 
equilibrium which was why it was regarded so highly. The different 
partial equilibrium models were attempting to answer this question 
in terms of different structural assumptions, and they too depended on 
the assumption of rationality. The use of rational economic man as 
a hard core axiom enabled economics to be a deductive science, to 
resort to
"...high abstraction, fewness, generalness, 
and simplicity of principles. The conceptual 
elegance and austerity which resulted became 
strikingly evident when the value-construct 
was given mathematical expression ... as a
system of simultaneous equations".25 6
To those whose criteria of a science are those mentioned above, 
it cuts no ice to want to broaden the definition of rationality, to 
include expectations and uncertainty; they know you can’t do this and 
remain within the realms of "economic science". It cuts no ice either
to suggest, as Andrews did, that economics does not need to know only
one big thing, that it can embrace many things. The definition of 
the nature of economics is a presupposition, the only way to change 
the definition is to change the reference group, to get a reference 
group with different presuppositions to speak for the discipline.
25 . . .To ask this question at all reflects a particular world view, that
the world is characterized by harmony and a tendency to 
equilibrium.
26Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.149.
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To reiterate: it is easier to change, replace, add particular
theories within a research programme than to replace the programme
itself, for those that speak for the discipline guard that privilege
carefully, they won’t give it up without a fight and mostly they 
. 27 . .win. Where status, position and worth in the view of peers is 
vested in the attachment to a particular view of the scope and nature 
of a discipline, these are very hard to change, especially for 
someone like Andrews, who was in many respects an outsider.
The Red Herring of Profit Maximization
Much of the discussion of Andrews' model was in terms of whether
or not his normal cost pricing methods were compatible with pricing
designed to maximize profit. But this issue is to a large extent a
red herring. There is no doubt that he thought the assumption of
28short run profit maximization as the goal of the firm was a bad one
. 29to use, he quite clearly attacked the use of this assumption, and *
Toulmin (1972), op.cit., p.266. "An innovation which the current 
reference-group declares 'totally unsound' is, for the time being, 
as good as dead. There are, of course, two alternative ways of 
escaping from this condemnation, either to abandon the innovation 
or to change the reference-group. So the idea in question may be 
successfully revived under the auspices of a later generation of 
scientists, whose other theories accommodate it more easily. 
Meanwhile, however, an 'authoritative' judgement of unsoundness can 
be the death sentence on a new hypothesis, on a would-be scientific 
institution or even on an individual's scientific career."
That is, the equating of short run marginal cost and short run 
marginal revenue to arrive at the price/output combination that the 
firm would produce, if it were behaving rationally.
In a sense, successfully, for some of his critics were forced to 
recognise that it was an inappropriate description, following 
Farrell's defence of Andrews and said they really meant long run 
profit maximization all along. But of course it still continued 
to be used both in text books for the student and as the 
basis of much research, because it is the simplest of possible 
maximands. He won the battle but lost the war.
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. . . 30his own work cannot be shown to be compatible with it.
Whether or not his ideas were compatible with some notion of 
long run profit maximization is really irrelevant for this notion is 
far too imprecise to serve the function of leading to a determinate
equilibrium of price and output, the function which short run profit
. . .  31maximization serves.
There are two important things we should note about short run 
profit maximization:
a) that although it depends being able to quantify the variables, 
marginal revenue and marginal cost, it is not an assumption that is 
intended to be examined empirically;
b) it is not the hard core of the neoclassical research 
programme but an auxiliary assumption of some of the theories that 
make up that programme.^
33Much of what is called the profit maximization controversy 
involves such questions as: Do businessmen seek to maximize profits? 30*
30Andrews (1949a), op.cit., p.270. Wiles attempted this but H.R. 
Edwards showed that he was misguided. See Wiles (1950), op.cit.; 
H.R. Edwards (1952b), op.cit.
For example, what possible meaning can long run marginal cost have 
even theoretically (let alone empirically) when it is associated 
with the concept of scale of plant based on a discrete and not a 
continuous function?
It is, for example, the assumption that allows a determinate 
equilibrium to be derived in a monopoly model, and in other models 
that have monopoly elements. Whether it is a necessary assumption 
for perfect competition is a moot point - probably the weaker 
assumption of wanting to stay in business is sufficient when 
combined with the other assumptions of the model.
See Gerald L. Nordquist (1965), "The Breakup of the Maximization 
Principle", Quarterly Review of Economics and Business 5, for an 
outline of this controversy.
33
Can they even if they want to? In other words it is taken for an
empirical assumption, for something which is testable. Robertson,
for example, in discussing whether profit maximization in the narrow
short run sense should be abandoned says
"Broadly as we may interpret the concept 
of profit maximization we must surely 
not stretch it so far as to cover all 
possible motives which may animate 
businessmen robbing the concept of its 
empirical content Liny emphasisJ, since 
profit has now become what a businessman 
pursues.1,35
He goes on to imply that Andrews, rather than replacing profit
maximization has brought it closer to reality.
But short run profit maximization is not an empirical assumption.
The fact that it has continued to be used despite all the empirical
evidence to show that businessmen cannot and do not maximize profits
in the short run is a sufficient indication. Jones comments that in
response to the criticism of the Oxford group
"^Machlup] hedges the concept Cof marginal 
product] with qualifications sufficient to 
remove the concept from any possibility of 
an empirical reference. ...Machlup’s 
attitude is an isolated example, but his 
significant position in the methodological 
defence of orthodoxy merits the use of his 
responses as representative of the 
profession’s intent."36
His intent is clearly to ensure that goals such as profit maximization 
are not challenged empirically. *35
31* #That is, do they know their marginal revenue, marginal cost curves?
Wiles (1961), Price Cost and Output, Oxford, Blackwell, argued that
this was impossible.
35D. Robertson (1956), op.cit., p.40.
qc Jones (1977), op.cit., p.360. Machlup goes through this kind of
exercise many times in defence of orthodoxy. See, for example,
Machlup (1946), op.cit♦, and (1974), op.cit.
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Wrong, in a discussion of the various motivations for action
that sociological theories use, makes the point that the maximization
of profit in economic theory is a heuristic rather than an empirical 
37assumption. As such it reflects an abstract and partial view point,
being a necessary part of a theory which consists of a set of
logically constructed formal propositions. Loasby refers to it as a
paradigm and not a hypothesis, by this he means that while a specific
hypothesis using an assumption of profit maximization could be
tested, profit maximization itself was not refutable by empirical
evidence. When Joan Robinson for the first time appeared to bring
decision-making by the competitive firm within the ambit of empirical
research, there was no flood of investigations as might have been
expected "probably largely due to the feeling that research was
unnecessary since facts could apparently be deduced from purely
38geometrical arguments". When empirical research began to be carried 
out, it showed that in fact businessmen did not in their pricing 
decisions find that output where marginal cost and marginal revenue 
are equal.
"Many of the successful revolutionaries, 
quite properly, turned conservative to 
protect the newly-established paradigm; 
and their defence owed little to empirical 
evidence about firms’ pricing behaviour."03
Profit maximization is an untestable assumption and is part of 
the hard core of some neoclassical theories. It is not, however,
Dennis H. Wrong.(1961), op.cit., p.189.
ooLoasby (1971), op.cit., p.879.
37
39ibid. Also Wiles’ comment, "I am aware of no evidence whatsoever 
for marginal analysis". (1950), op.cit., p.517.
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part of the hard core of the whole of the neoclassical research
programme. Some theories that do not use it, can and have been
incorporated into that prcgramme. But, and this is important, they
have only been accepted because they replace profit with some other
maximand, sales revenue fcr Baumol, balanced growth, defined in terms
of value of assets and market value of shares, for Marris.
There alternative maximands can be used to define an equilibrium
position and it is "equilibrium" and not profit maximization that is
41the hard core of the whole neoclassical research programme.
Wiles argues that it was "merely a historical accident" that
analytical economics used the idea of profit maximization as its 
. 42behavioural assumption. While this may be true if we emphasize the
word profit, as opposed to say sales revenue, it is not true if we
emphasize maximization as opposed to say "satisficing". For the
method of maximization is an essential part of neoclassical Cartesian
analysis. H.R. Edwards points out that Andrews’ theory is consistent
with profit maximization broadly interpreted, but not with the
43 .narrow short run marginal analysis. But this is the whole point, 
for without some such narrow interpretation no determinate 
equilibrium is possible. Long run profit maximization is merely a *41
40For example, those of Marris and Baumol.
41 . . .That this determinateness may be to some extent illusory is pointed
out by Joan Robinson, "the neo-neo-classical hypothesis that the 
aim of a firm is to maximize the present value of its shares does 
not seem to say anything very precise, for the main influence on 
the present value of shares is the expectation which the market 
holds about the future growth of their value", (1971), op.cit., 
p.107 (footnote).
noWiles (1950), op.cit., p.529.
u ? .Edwards (1952b), op.cit.
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convenient label for an idea that by its very nature cannot be
44 . . .precise. The long run involves time, expectations, discounting and
so on, and these are incompatible with Cartesian analysis.
Another aspect is that in the long run it is not possible to ,
separate the supply factors from the demand factors - they are too 
entangled, too interdependent to be able to reach an equilibrium when 
this requires their separation. It is curious that Machlup not only 
recognises this interdependence, he spells it out very clearly, but
idoes not concede that it makes long run marginal analysis impossible.
This is a further indication that lack of realism is no argument
against analytical economics, for realism is not one of its goals.
Andrews could have attacked short run profit maximization
without destroying the basis of the neoclassical programme if he had
put some other maximand in its place. In this case his theory might
have been acceptable as for example Baumol’s was. But he did not in
fact do this. Andrews’ model is not a maximizing model in any
determinate sense. It may be true, as Farrell says, that
”...if you choose a definition of profits 
and specify the constraints the firm is 
subject to it is generally easy to infer 
what policies will maximize profits. For 
this reason the deductive part of the theory 
of the firm has usually been a trivial 
exercise in calculus: the live controversies 
have concerned the assumptions of the theory”,4 *6
but assumptions which will not permit that ’’trivial exercise" to be
carried out are not admissable, for they are not "scientific”.
44 • • tIt is useful in the same sense as, for example, the term "industrial
revolution" is useful through not precise.
Machlup (1946), op.cit.
Farrell (1960), "Research on the Theory of the Firm", A.E.A.Papers 
and Proceedings 40, p.560.
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The real issue that prevented Andrews being acceptable was the 
nature of the equilibrium that he proposed as an alternative to the 
neoclassical equilibrium. For however stable prices are in Andrews’ 
model, they are based on expectations and could have been different. 
Actual prices are just where they have happened to settle down within 
a band of possible prices. In other words prices are observed to be 
stable when we look back, but for the future there is a range of 
possibilities. The fact that that range may be limited does not make 
prices determinate ex ante. The observed stability is a result of a 
historical process of adjustment under conditions of uncertainty, not 
the result of the constraints imposed by a structurally defined 
situation depending on the elimination of time. Andrews’ model 
reintroduces time and uncertainty especially in relation to 
business expectations. His model is rooted in real chronological 
time in a way that neoclassical theories are not. This is quite 
evident, for example, in the fact that Andrews’ long run cost curves 
are not reversible, a firm could not go back to the smaller scale it 
had previously and find costs the same. Andrews is clearly concerned 
with real irreversible time and not with the reversible logical time 
embodied in the scale concept of neoclassical theories. In Andrews’ 
model the situation at any one time is static, a still picture if you 
like, but it is just a moment in a complex historical process of 
adaptation and compromise. The neoclassical stasis is not a point in 
time in this sense - it is timeless. Time has not been momentarily 
abstracted from but has been eliminated. That equilibrium is not the 
result of a process is clearly evident to anyone who has tried to 
explain to a first year student the process by which a surplus or 
shortage is eliminated in an elementary supply and demand model. It 
is also evident if you look at Walras’ quite unsatisfactory discussion
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of the process of "tAtonnment" by which general equilibrium is supposed
to be reached. It cannot be reached - it can only exist because it is
. , 47timeless.
Demand curves do not tell us what would happen to quantity 
demanded if prices changed over time; cost curves do not tell us what 
would happen to costs if output changed over time; they describe 
instead different timeless possibilities. This is why they are 
inappropriate for Andrews’ model and why he does not use them. For 
the prices and quantities that he is concerned with are quite clearly 
a result of a process. This has been the source of much misunder­
standing of Andrews. Many people assumed that his cost and demand 
concepts were the same as the static concepts of conventional theory. 
The blinkers imposed by the neoclassical paradigm prevented them from 
realising the differences.
Although Andrews was Marshallian in a sense, it was not the 
Marshall who used comparative statics that his ideas were developed 
from. The method of comparative statics does not conflict with the 
elimination of time, for Marshall is considering a series of 
alternative timeless states. His short run - long run distinction 
has nothing to do with real time, it is cost related, technological 
not chrcnological. Andrews’ model is quite different for it is 
chronological - it reintroduces real time.
The introduction of time is not simply a change in one of the 
auxiliary assumptions, as the replacement of profit with some other 
maximand is, it is a change in the hard core, and involves a switch 
to a different research programme. Its reintroduction means that 
static timeless equilibrium can no longer be defined. It is for
47See Shackle (1972), op.cit., p.150.
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this reason that the profit'maximization controversy in relation to 
Andrews is a red herring for his significant rejection was that of 
equilibrium not of profit maximization. Yet as I mentioned earlier 
this does not seem to have been recognised by his critics, I could 
not find any reference to this point by any of the writers who 
responded in one way or another to the publication of Manufacturing
Business. It was only later that his elimination 
48 -clearly seen.
of equilibrium was
4 8 t_ , , „  „  , . f a n  a \ A  T M Q 7 1For example, by Romney Robinson (1961), op.cit., and Loasby (1971), 
op.cit.
CHAPTER IX
A STEADY STATE OF PRICES
The model that Andrews developed had no place for the kind of 
equilibrium of price and output that characterized the neoclassical 
theory of the firm. This was the primary cause of its rejection. Yet 
the disequilibrium nature of his model was not clearly recognised when 
Manufacturing Business was published, a fact which Andrews himself
found surprising. Referring to an article by Romney Robinson
1 .published in 1961 in which Andrews’ ideas are used as a basis of a
discussion of ’’disequilibrium prices", he comments, "It puzzles me
that my divergence from equilibriumistic theory should have taken so 
. 2long to be discussed".
Is it possible to explain the apparent paradox, that the model 
was rejected because it was not concerned with establishing an 
equilibrium, yet this was not clearly recognised at the time? I 
would argue that because Andrews’ model was misinterpreted, it was 
judged as if it were an equilibrium model and therefore found 
wanting; looked at as an equilibrium model it is clearly unsatisfactory 
I would further argue that those who used Andrews’ model as a basis of 
their own work unwittingly contributed to the misinterpretation by 
using the term "equilibrium" for Andrews’ steady state theory. This 
is another example of how the use of an established term for a new
•i #Romney Robinson (1961), op.cit.
^Andrews (1964b), op.cit., p.92 (footnote).
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concept can result in misinterpretation. Andrews did not himself
like the term "equilibriun" being used to refer to a situation in
which industry prices were stable.
"I refrain from calling this an equilibrium 
state and, if forced to give it a name, I 
should prefer to borrow, I hope fairly, the 
term 'steady state' from the physical sciences."3
The Critique of the Full Equilibrium of the Firm
Andrews' rejection of equilibrium was quite explicit. He thought
that the developments of micro-theory after Marshall were in the wrong
direction. He thought that the mistake occurred when a commitment was
made to a full equilibrium of firms and industries, an equilibrium
that Marshall had deliberately avoided. The idea that equilibrium of
the individual firm in perfect competition was necessary for the
equilibrium of the industry led to an apparent crisis, solved by the
introduction of the theory of imperfect competition. This solution,
in Andrews' eyes, was a further step in the wrong direction.
"In the work of Marshall the description of 
full equilibrium was restricted to forces 
working at the industrial level, avoiding 
assuming that businesses always tended to be 
in the optimum position theoretically available 
to them. ...In academic teaching it came to 
appear as if value theory was based on a 
particular theory of the firm whereas the latter 
was really simply a reworking of certain elements 
of value theory. Seen from this standpoint, the 
theory of value in conditions of competition 
developed by Marshallian economists, appeared to 
lead to serious logical inconsistencies, which 
was why Marshall had not based it on the idea of 
full equilibrium in the individual business. In 
particular Marshall's theory of competitive prices 
was general enough to include both ordinary 
manufacturing industry and primary industry. It 
therefore recognised cases where costs of 
production would fall with sustained increases
^ibid., p .17.
2i+3.
in output - these were very important but 
not compatible with tne full equilibrium 
of the individual business."1*
It was the attempt to solve a logical difficulty that had been created 
by the belief that a full equilibrium was necessary that led to the 
abandonment of the approach to manufacturing industry through 
competition. Instead, monopoly theory was used for any industry where 
long run costs were falling or constant.
The full equilibrium approach ruled out the possibility of 
considering anything other than structurally defined competition and 
ruled out anything that involved decision making. As Romney Robinson 
argued
"...the most unfortunate attribute of 
marginal theory in its present equilibrium 
form is that for all of the insights with 
which it begins, despite its consistency, 
precision and subtlety of analysis, it 
suffers from a rigidity which makes impossible 
its absorption of such ideas as Schumpeter’s 
concept of competition and its application to 
many important and interesting price-involving 
decisions. At some point in its lengthy 
development, a wrong decision was made. I 
suggest that Andrews was right in arguing that 
this was made with the full commitment to the 
equilibrium concept.
Joan Robinson, one of the main imperfect competition theorists,
herself came to much the same conclusion. In the introduction to the
0
first volume of her collected papers she wrote that she had made a
"wrong turning" in her initial choice when she expanded Marshall’s
. 7static rather than his dynamic analysis. *57
^Andrews (1952c), op.cit., p.74.
5Romney Robinson (1961), op.cit., p.233.
kjoan Robinson (1951), Collected Papers, Vol.l, Oxford, Blackwell, p.vii
7 . . .  . .Her later writings certainly reflect this, her preoccupation since
has been with change and growth, with an exploration of deficiencies 
of the static theories, and in an emphasis on a wider view of economics
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"The concept of equilibrium, of course, is 
an indispensable tooj.. of analysis . . . but to 
use the equilibrium concept one has to keep 
it in its place, and its place is strictly in 
the preliminary stages of an analytical 
argument, not in the framing of hypotheses 
to be tested against the facts, for we know 
perfectly well we shall not find facts in a 
state of equilibrium."8
Marshall was not an equilibrium theorist as far as the firm is 
concerned. His device of the "representative" firm indicates his 
refusal to consider this approach. Andrews considered that he did 
not form part of
"...the genealogical chart of modern economics 
...the line of descent would go through Menger 
and Walras who do not appear in the family 
tree []as depicted by Samuelson in his Economics]] 
and Marshall should be shown as standing 
eccentrically but warningly on one side."8
It is certainly evident that Marshall was not as committed to
Cartesian economics as Menger and Walras, and Jevons too, were. As
we saw, he was quite strongly also committed to the 19th century
evolutionary view, and tried to reconcile the two. Perhaps he should
v j T 10be portrayed as Janus.
Chamberlin's reaction to Andrews’ criticism of the theories of 
the firm was to deny that the Cartesian elements were basic and 
dominated the model, at least in his version. He suggested that
gJoan Robinson (1964), op.cit., p.81.
9 .Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.5.
^A discussion of how these two philosophical positions, one stemming 
from Descartes, the other essential Hegelian, affected social 
thinkers especially of late 19th, early 20th century, is found in 
W.A. Robson (1974), Man and the Social Sciences, Beverley Hills,
Sage Publications (especially Postan’s paper on "Time and Change" and 
Leach on "Models of Man"). This book is focussed on the social 
sciences associated with the London School of Economics, but 
nevertheless is applicable more generally.
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Andrews had interpreted him wrongly.
"The theory of monopolistic competition is 
predominantly in terms of profit maximisation 
and that within this part of it the equation 
of marginal revenue and marginal cost is 
merely Emy emphasis] a matter of geometry."11
This is a good illustration of how a mathematical formulation can
influence unexpectedly and adversely an economic explanation.
"There can be no doubt that the picture of 
businessmen computing and adjusting marginal 
revenues has been a major factor in alienating 
many from the theories of imperfect (and 
monopolistic) competition and has even sparked 
a revolt against "marginalism" in general.
[.But my] purpose was to construct a theory 
which would be more closely oriented towards 
economic reality than the old one. I do not 
think that Mr. Andrews is correct when he 
observes that the result (of the theories of 
monopolistic and imperfect competition) has 
been a greater gulf between theoretical analysis 
and practical thought than can have existed 
during any other period since before Mill."1^
Loasby considers the issue from a different angle. He sees
Marshall, a 19th century man, as being concerned to find a mechanism
of evolution. That the developing evolutionary biology had a strong
influence on Marshall's thought is evident not only in his
methodological writing but also in his frequent use of biological
analogies of which the well known "trees of the forest" metaphor for
13firms and industries is only one example: a forest of constant
size is compatible with individual trees of different sizes, being 
born, growing at different rates and eventually dying. Loasby sees 
the problem, the logical inconsistency, arising because Marshall, the *123
"^Chamberlin (1952), op.cit., p.322.
12ibid., p.323.
13 . . .Marshall was not alone in using biological analogies. See
E. Penrose (1952), "Biological Analogies in the Theory of the 
Firm", American Economic Review 42.
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mathemat ician, wanted to turn to mathematics for a formal exposition
of the general laws of economics.
"But there was simply no ’biological 
mathematics' adequate for his purpose, so 
evolution had to be explained in terms of 
static equilibrium. The use of a strictly 
timeless theory by one who was so conscious 
of time represents a heroic and highly 
successful use of abstraction."1*4
He could be said to have been too successful in the sense that his 
followers tried to push his abstraction further than the cautious 
Marshall did and precipitated the crisis.
Andrews’ most general objection to the theory of the firm was 
that the stability of the industry appeared to depend on the 
equilibrium of the individual firm. Another part of his criticism 
was that the particular version of the theory of the firm that 
involved a downward sloping demand curve destroyed the notion of the 
industry. He saw the downward sloping curves as having no analytical 
basis.
"Joan Robinson's demand functions have no 
analytical roots. Her demand curves fall 
simply because she tells them to do so.
By this device she virtually assumed that 
the major theoretical problem had been 
solved without actually solving it."14 5
The "polypoly" analysis of Robinson and Chamberlin's large group case
was an attempt to preserve the particular equilibrium analysis of an
industry while taking account of the fact that the producer sells to
his own market. But this attempt failed and
"...the presuppositions of the imperfect 
competition theory necessarily deliver the 
theorist over to general equilibrium
14Loasby (1071), op.cit., p.871.
^Andrews (1964b), op.cit. , p.22.
247.
approach. ...As a result of Triffin’s 
attack there is a widespread tendency 
today to emphasise, rather than play down 
the unique character of the product of 
the seller."* 1̂
This emphasis prevents the recognition that there can be competitive 
pressure on prices. Andrews’ solution to the problem of rescuing the 
industry concept was to d€:fine industry in terms of processes and 
technology, and not in terms of products. This solution was used also
by Joan Robinson in her leiter re-examination of the question of
. ^ . . 17imperfect competition.
For one whose main interest was in industrial economics, the
elimination of the industry was a very major flaw in the use of
imperfect competition theories for the study of the manufacturing
sector. Andrews' notion of competitive oligopoly depends on being
able to define an industry, to say who the competitors are. Without
this it is not possible to achieve his aim of showing that industry
prices are influenced by competition and are not the result of
monopolistic ability to restrict output.
’’The normal cost theory may be interpreted,
...as an attempt to take account of the 
separableness of the individual producer’s 
market, and at the same time, retain the 
particular equilibrium approach."18
That is, the approach is through the concept of an industry.
Andrews thought that, because oligopoly is a prevalent industrial
situation, it needed to be brought into the main body of economic
analysis. The way to do this, however, was not through consideration
^H.R. Edwards (1952a), op.cit., p.55.
17Joan Robinson (1953), op.cit.
1 ftH.R.Edwards ( 1952a), op.cit., p.55.
19Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.l.
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of the equilibrium of the individual firm. For the conditions 
necessary for this approach bore, he thought, absolutely no relation­
ship to the oligopolies of the real world. The assumptions were not 
just abstract, they were wrong. Not only did they not include the 
major determinants, just leaving out confusing detail, but they also 
left out major characteristics whilst including trivial or even 
imaginary details. His objection was on the grounds that the economic 
environment of the firms is ignored and that "it is surely an evasion
of economic analysis not to be able to handle the response of entities
L . . . „ 20 to their economic environment".
Andrews' emphasis on the need to take account of the environment
of the economic agents can be seen also in his discussion of the
nature of the equilibrium of the individual consumer. Built into
orthodox static demand curves, he says, is an assumption of the full
static equilibrium of the individual consumer.
"Surely, we ought to recognise that human 
life, in the market place as elsewhere, is 
transient and mutable. Consumers are born 
and die; the families which form, grow and 
scatter among them, buy ... markedly
different bundles of goods at different .
stages; no-one is in the market for a car
every day; nor is a family in that for a
coffin more than at odd intervals in a life
time - these high platitudes drop with a
thud on our theoretical constant populations, 20
20 • ibid., p.2. His main emphasis was on what he called the "economic"
environment, that is on demand conditions, the existence of
competition and so on. He did not however ignore the broader
institutional environment. He discusses, for example, the effect
of the structure of the capital market on the ability of firms to
cope with the "economic" environment and such things as the
effect of the geographical immobility of workers on the nature of
the supply of labour. (Chapter VI, Manufacturing Business).
This is another example of his affinity with Marshall who wrote
extensively on this kind of thing not only in Industry and Trade
but also in Principles of Economics.
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with firmly settled preferences, and 
needing only information about relative 
prices in order to exercise their 
preferences."21
"We should regard the demand for any 
particular commodity, broadly defined, 
and still more the demand for any brand 
of it, as often rather chancy if we look 
only at the functional relationship with 
price.”22
"Our demand theory should not run in terms 
of consumers, as though they are in 
equilibrium with respect to all else but 
the price of the good we are especially 
considering, and then as moving decisively 
from equilibrium to equilibrium as the 
price of the good changes. We should allow, 
in our constructions, for the effect of 
market organization and practices."23
If you do not need to have all firms in an industry covering 
their costs in order to get a steady supply from an industrial group 
as a whole
"...then we need not invoke falling marginal 
revenues merely so that decreasing costs 
shall be compatible with the postulated 
equilibrium of the individual firm"21*
and the logical problem for which this was a solution no longer arises.
The Nature of the Steady State
Andrews’ term "steady state" refers to a situation in which there 
is a steady supply from an industry as a whole and a stable industry 
price. This stable industry price can really be a set of prices for
21Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.8.
2 2 .ibid.
ibid., pp.8-9. For an expansion of these ideas on consumer 
equilibrium see Andrews (1964b), op.cit., pp.97-109.
24Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.6.
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individual products reflecting real variety among products that are 
basically similar. These prices will be very close to each other; 
the industry price then being a band of prices rather than a single 
price. When industry prices change in response to changes in market 
conditions they will change in a uniform way. Prices are uniform in 
the sense of responding uniformly to change. Andrews’ own alternative 
analysis was set out in detail in Manufacturing Business but is 
present in one form or another in all his writings.
The nature of the steady state is not as clear in Andrews’ own
work as it is in the writings of those who used and interpreted his
analysis, for example, Elizabeth Brunner, H.R. Edwards and Paolo 
. . 25 . .Sylos-Labini. Brunner’s article is a simplified model of normal 
cost theory. Edwards, in his article, examines the ideas of excess 
capacity and free entry, his examination being based specifically on 
Andrews’ analysis. Edwards’ major work on the soap industry 
represents an explicit use of Andrews’ ideas as a basis for a study of 
a particular industry. The use of Sylos to illuminate Andrews is 
perhaps less obviously justifiable, but when we read his book 
carefully we can see that Andrews’ ideas pervade and underlie the
whole analysis, though of course there are other elements as well. 2526
25Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.clt., Chapter 2. 
H.R. Edwards (1955), op.cit., and (1962), op.cit. 
P. Sylos-Labini (1969), op.cit.
This pervasiveness of the influence of Andrews is apparent in 
Sylos' statement in the 1969 edition "I owe much to Philip Andrews, 
especially as regards the ideas formulated in the first part of 
the book - much more certainly than might appear from occasional 
footnote references. In my view, Manufacturing Business, which 
appeared in 1949 was the first major original contribution to what 
I have called the new theory of the firm”. (1969), op.cit., 
p. (viii).
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He uses throughout, when discussing price formation, both Andrews’
idea of a costing margin apd the idea that this can explain, with
reference to the entire industry to which the firm belongs, many of
the conditions of entry oi new firms and of mutual market invasion by 
. 27 . . . .existing firms. It is the possibility of entry and the effect it
would have on market share, especially of large firms, that determines
the price that will prevail in the industry. The effect would depend
28on whether market demand was growing or static.
We should be aware, however, that Sylos’ view on the level of 
profit that enters into the costing margin is different from that of 
Andrews.
"Under competition firms can enjoy above­
minimum profits but these are transitory or 
due to friction, under oligopoly they are 
structural and permanent ... the profit 
rate of the medium and large firms is well 
above the minimum rate and this high rate 
cannot be eliminated. A new large firm 
attracted by the high profit rate could not 
achieve it and would cause losses to all 
firms. The alternative to a price yielding 
high profits to large firms is not a price 
which equals cost but sheer chaos."29
In other words the profits that would attract new entrants are not
those actually made at any one time but those which would prevail
after entry when greatly increased supply would lower prices.
Andrews’ model is concerned with the stability of prices, not
with an equilibrium in terms of output of individual firms. In
impei'fect competition models firms find their own equilibrium
(i.e. profit maximizing) output and produce that amount. The price
27. .ibid., p. 31.
28 . ibid., p. 61.
29ibid., p. 5 2 .
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at which they can sell. this output is given by the demand curve for 
the commodity. Firms' decisions are made in terms of output, prices 
take care of themselves. In Andrews’ model the opposite is true.
The firms determine price, basing it on their own average direct cost 
and on how much they think competitors would charge for a similar 
product. Once the price is decided then output takes care of itself
in the sense that the firm is willing to supply as much as the market
. . 30 . .will take at that price. The price is stable because the firm could
and would supply more both in the short run and long run at an 
unchanged price if the demand were there. This is so because in the 
short run firms will not risk losing potential customers or 
endangering its present goodwill by charging a higher price because 
short run costs rise. In this short run situation the firm will 
resort to shift work or overtime and if the situation persists will,
in the long run, expand its plant. Since in this model long run
, . . . . . 3 1average costs are constant this will cause no rise m  price.
But while a firm will sell at the same price for long periods
even when demand conditions change, and the prices charged by
different firms will be very close to each other, there will be no
equilibrium output for the firm in the sense that all firms are
producing the same output and their market shares are equal. Neither
will there be an equilibrium in the sense of constant market shares
and a constant number of firms in the industry.
"The actual market shares and the number 
and identity of firms are historically 
determined and depend on the path to 
equilibrium."32
BOH.R. Edwards (1962), op.cit., p.75. 
Edwards (1955), op.cit., p.113. 
^ibid., p.lll (footnote).
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That is, they are not determined by the structural conditions of the 
market.
If the efficiency of all firms remained constant then the market
shares of all firms would remain constant. In these circumstances
even if demand changed in the long run the new demand would be taken
up by the entry of new firms of the same efficient size as the others, 
or by the growth of existing firms at the same level of costs.
But while demand may be sufficient to maintain the number of firms
and while in most cases a stable set of prices is brought about by the
threat of, but not actual,entry, market shares will not remain constant
The relative efficiency of firms varies, the variation often
resulting from innovation which is a major form of competitive
behaviour. Variations in efficiency give rise to ’’the constant
passing to and fro of individual leadership which is the essence of
. . 33dynamic competition in practice". .
The use of innovation and technological change as a major 
competitive strategy results from the fact that, although the firms 
sell as much as the market will take, this does not mean that they 
are satisfied with their market share. Firms try to increase it.
Where the products of an industry are differentiated and firms are 
multiproduct, there will be constant minor innovations in the design, 
quality of the product and in product mix, so that changes in 
relative efficiency are likely to be frequent. These differences in 
relative efficiency mean that firms in an industry will, in practice, 
be making different levels of profit so that relative profit rates 
will change when innovutions occur. It is in this context that the 
idea ot: normal pro! it must be regarded. It does not mean, as in 
imperfect competition theories, that firms are making identical
ibid. But this leadership is not collusive, see p.195 above.
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. . 34profits, because they have identical cost and demand functions.
It is the fact that each firm has its own perception of what its
costing margin should be That allows Andrews to do away with Marshall’s
. . . 35notion of the "representative" firm.
The price of any product
"...must not offer a prospective reward 
great enough to induce cross-entry from 
other existing producers, nor tempt vertical 
integration backwards or forwards, by a 
customer or supplier, let alone encourage 
entirely new enterprises to come in. These 
things may happen, but they are signs of 
disequilibrium”.34 56
They are most likely to occur at the early stages of the establishment
of an industry where the situation is unstable, they will not be
characteristics of established industries. In a dynamic world there
will be constant shifts in firms' positions in individual product
37markets but not constant shifts in price. Stability of price and
lack of entry are the result of competition not of its absence as in
models of collusive oligopoly. Andrews was concerned to establish
that price stability and lack of entry did not necessarily result
from collusion, though he recognised that it could. What he wanted
to show was that the existence of such stability was not prima facie
evidence for the existence of restrictive practices.
"So long as its price is right, an established 
business will have a more or less clearly 
defined market, and will be protected from the 
efforts of competing business to cut into that 
market.”33
34Andrews and Brunner (1975), o p . c i t ., p.30.
35Andrews (1951a), o p .c i t ., p p . 145-7.
36Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.30.
^7ibid., p .45.
38Andrews (1949a), op.cit., p.153.
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This is so because competitors would not be able to charge a lower 
price unless they found ways to become relatively more efficient.
And this is why actual competition in Andrews’ model often takes the
. . 39 , . .form of innovation, a fcrm ruled out m  neoclassical analysis by the
assumption not only of identical firms but the idea that all firms are 
using best practice techniques and that ’’the state of the arts" is 
given.
In Andrews’ model
"...equilibrium of price at new entry 
ceiling is independent of the number of 
actual competitors inasmuch as each of 
the firms is subject to the same threat 
of intervention of new competition.,,l+0
The number of competitors which, in a structural approach, is taken
to measure roughly the extent of competition, is irrelevant here
because the entrepreneurs are restrained in their pricing policies by
the threat of potential competition. This is especially so in
manufacturing industries, where there are many firms whose similar
technology gives them the ability to produce a substitute if it is
worth their while to do so. Entrepreneurs, therefore, are anxious to
find the "right" price. This right price will be different in
different industries but the general outlook and approach will be
common.
In the absence of collusion the tendency is for the price to be 3
3 3JWe are reminded of Schumpeter's view of competition through 
innovation. The competition that counts he says is "the competition 
from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, 
the new type of organization ... competition which commands a 
decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the 
margins of the profits and outputs of the existing firms but at 
their foundations and their very lives". J.A. Schumpeter (19*4-3), 
op. cit. , p. 8*4.
^H.R. Edwards (1952), op. cit. , p.76.
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set in relation to the most efficient lowest cost firm. Price tends 
to equal the average inclusive cost of the most efficient existing 
firms but this must be a price that will give the other firms in the 
industry what they regard as normal profit for themselves. This is
not necessarily the same level for all firms, i.e. different firms
. . 42have different perceptions about what is '’normal’'.
Sylos, unlike Andrews, considers that large firms necessarily
make higher than normal profits. This results from the assumption
that he makes that small firms are necessarily operating on the
downward sloping part of the long run cost curve - or rather on higher
segments of the curve since in his model the different scales are not
continuous as they must be for marginal analysis. They are stepped
curves incorporating major discontinuities and areas of constant
cost. Indeed this is a major reason for Sylos’ rejection of
marginal analysis for oligopoly where complex capital intensive
processes are used, "although it can be said to be formally correct,
because it presupposes continuous variations in quantities under 
. . 43consideration" e.g. technical coefficients and demand.
In modern industry there are large technological discontinuities,
and in their presence demand takes on a finite elasticity and the
notion of a curve becomes somewhat questionable. We would instead get
"...a line proceeding stepwise that does 
not lend itself to derivation - as a 
result the concept of marginal revenue 
is strictly speaking inapplicable.
Furthermore, in conditions of oligopoly *4
41. .ibid., p.73.
Andrews and Brunner (1975), op.cit., p.30.
4 3 . .Sylos-Labini (1969), op.cit., p.93.
42
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each entrepreneur is far more concerned 
about the possible reaction of his rivals 
than about those customers of which 
elasticity of demand is an expression".1+4
Sylos argues that the use of marginal analysis for the explanation of
pricing in oligopoly is based on a too simple and unrealistic
assumption of profit maximization through the use of marginal cost
and revenue curves. However suitable this may be for perfect
competition where firms are assumed to be able to adjust price and
output and in marginal amounts in response to changes in market
conditions it is not suitable for oligopoly. Oligopoly lacks "those
mechanisms of continuous adjustment which are an inherent feature of 
. . 45 .competition"; and m  the absence of some simple and universally
applicable principle for arriving at a new equilibrium price such as
the normal cost principle, chaos would result from changes in
surrounding conditions. There would be serious losses, which would
be intolerable for firms concerned with long run survival and growth.
"The new price must again lead to an 
equilibrium situation, it must be a price 
which is acceptable to all existing firms 
and does not attract new ones. At the new 
price the profit rates must be the same or 
nearly the same as those established by the 
previous equilibrium situation and it is the 
use of the costing margin by firms in the 
industry that allows the new situation to 
be reached without disruption."4^
On the question of how general the model of Andrews can be we 
should note the conclusion to Fart One, the theoretical section, of 
Edwards’ study of the soap industry. Because of the variety of
4 4 .ibid.
45.ibid., p.57.
46., . j ibid
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contributory circumstances that affect the nature of the steady state
. . 47in manufacturing industry in Andrews' analysis and the enormous
number of possible combinations of these conditions
"...every industry in practice is to 
some extent a special case and the scope 
for simple generalization is limited."148
,Wbat is needed, he says, is detailed study of particular industries,
49a point made frequently and strongly by Andrews m  all his writings. 
The model can provide a framework for an empirical examination of 
industries, their policies, efficiency and so on but it is not a 
substitute for such an examination. For Andrews the main value of a 
theory is in its empirical relevance and not in its elegance, 
simplicity and generality. The opposite is true of neoclassical 
economics.
Andrews, like Marshall, argued that a stability of prices in an 
industry did not depend on all the firms within that industry being 
in equilibrium. His notion of the stability of the industry is 
different from that of neoclassical economic theory. Kaldor indicates 
clearly that to get the "determinate" equilibrium it is necessary to 
have all the firms in the industry in equilibrium, so that to find the 
equilibrium of an industry we must start with the equilibrium of the 
firm. This is the basis of his criticism of Marshall's use of the 
"representative" firm, his purpose
47 . .1. The nature and magnitude of barriers to entry.
2. Character and frequency of developments in technique and product 
design.
3. Number and size distribution of competing sellers.
4. Kate of growth or potential elasticity of industry demand.
5. Objectives of individual firm policy.
6. Degree to which sellers operate in other markets.
'. Presence of largo buyers.
^il.K. Fdwards (1982), op.cit., p.122.
49 For example, in Andrews (1951a), op.cit., p.172.
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"...was not the establishment of a concept 
which has analytical significance but a mental 
tool with the aid of which the reaction- 
mechanism can be made plausible. (It) is 
meant to be no more t han a firm which answers 
the requirements expe cted from it by the supply 
curve. ...It is just because it was meant to 
be nothing more than a small scale replica of 
the industry’s supply curve that it is 
unsuitable for the purpose it has been called 
into being. Instead of analysing at first the 
conditions of equilibrium for the individual 
firms and then deriving from them, as far as 
possible the conditions of equilibrium for an 
industry, Marshall first postulated the latter, 
then created a 'Hilfskonstruktion’ which 
answered its requirements. ...Explicitly or 
implicitly the equilibrium of the firm is made 
dependant upon the industry rather than the 
other way round.”50 51
Only when the necessary functions are found which determine the 
behaviour of individual firms and some formal Conclusions have been 
arrived at about the form which these functions can actually take, 
and when the inter-relation of these cost functions have been analysed 
can we derive those industry supply curves of various slopes that 
the simple two dimensional diagrams at once suggest to the mind.
This is quite the opposite view from that of Andrews who 
criticized the post Marshall theories of the firm on the ground that
they imply what Kaldor wanted, that the equilibrium of the industry
. . . . 51 . . .depends on the equilibrium of the firm. His own rejection of
Marshall’s representative firm was not for Kaldor’s reason, but 
because ne thought it unnecessary. In his model of competitive 
oligopoly he was able to explain a situation where prices are stable 
in an .industry without, recourse to either collusion, a representative 
firm, or individual firm equilibrium.
50 .Kaldor (1960), op.cit., pp.36-37.
51 ." Andrews (1952c), op.cit., p.7U.
CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
Economics has much in common with other scientific disciplines.
It is an invisible college - the repository of the current collective 
wisdom. It has its journals, its conferences, its heroes and its 
villains, its accepted versions of history, its text books, its 
selection and initiation procedures, and so on. The goals of the 
discipline are articulated by the time-being reference group. Some 
goals are more important than others; their relative importance is 
indicated by practice rather than precept. The goals determine the 
scope of the discipline, the questions it thinks appropriate to 
answer and the approved methodological principles. All these can 
change over time, the goals perhaps being the slowest to change. 
Economics has research programmes consisting of collections of 
theories at various stages of development, at least partly compatible 
with each other. The research programmes have their hard cores - 
their absolute presuppositions which are not only not testable in 
practice but which are not meant to be questioned at all. These 
programme?; have their positive and negative heuristic principles which 
define their methodology and also their auxiliary assumptions and 
hypotheses. It is these hypotheses and not the programme itself that 
are subject to testing and change.
Each of the theories within a programme has a similar pattern, 
sharing many of the do’s and don't's of the whole programme, each 
also has its own presuppositions, those elements of the particular
260.
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theory which are not in principle testable.
Much of the work of the science of economics consists of working 
within these programmes, on the sets of theories, testing their logic, 
discovering their limits aid their applicability. There is a 
hierarchy of research; applied researchers whose status is low often 
work partly outside the programme; their findings, whilst they may 
affect parts of the programme, do not affect easily the central core 
of the discipline. To change this central core a change of goals 
and a change in reference groups is needed and that is far more 
difficult to achieve than a change within the programme. To challenge 
the hard core is to challenge the status and integrity of the 
discipline itself. This heretical procedure is greeted either by 
attempts to redefine the proposed alternative so that it can be 
incorporated into the accepted programme, or by banishing it to the 
outer darkness. Both these responses occurred when Andrews 
challenged the neoclassical research programme. The incompatibilities, 
however, were too great for successful incorporation so that in the 
end the challenge was rejected.
When anomalies and contradictions arise in the course of 
research, attempts are made to improve, or even replace theories within 
the research programme. In economics, as in other sciences, this will 
not happen unless someone has an alternative which seems likely to be 
able to achieve the goals better than the current theories. If it is 
agreed that, this is so then the new replaces the old, often in the 
process being adapted so that the features that are not compatible
^The process of incorporation of deviant concepts is discussed in 
Berger and Luckmann (1971), op.cit. , pp. 132-134-. An example of 
banishment of a heresy in physics is the Velikovsky affair discusse 
in M. Polanyi (1967), op.cit.
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with the main programme are, if not eliminated, at least played down.
It Is in devising alternatives that economics exhibits
characteristics that are different from the natural sciences. Not
always, but quite often, tie search for the alternative takes the
. . . 2economic theorist back into the history of the discipline. Keynes, 
for instance, picked up Malthus' idea of a general glut from the 
oblivion into which it had fallen. Mill, too, while claiming that 
he was simply bringing Ricardo's labour theory of value up to date, 
returned to the Smithian "adding up" theory. The radical political 
economists have started again with Marx, while the Cambridge 
controversies over capital stem from Sraffa's return to Ricardo.
Andrews' alternative to the neoclassical theories of the firm is 
a further example: he went back to Marshall in order to start again. 
Economics, he thought, had taken a wrong turning when it became 
committed to the concept of full equilibrium of firms and industries.
To get economics back on the track a return to Marshall was 
necessary.
For markets where a central marketing organization for the 
disposal of the product is absent, that is markets for the products of 
manufacturing industry, Andrews developed a theory which explained 
how a situation of stable prices could emerge. The stability of 
prices in his model does not result from collusion but from the 
existence of potential competition. The inclusion of potential as 
well as actual competition widens the circle of competitors the firm
r\ There is one famous example in the physical sciences, the return after 
2,000 years to the Aristarchean principle of heliocentricity, which 
was the feature of the Copernican Revolution, but going backward is 
very rare in the physical sciences.
^Andrews also applied his theory to retail markets, see Andrews 
(1964b), op.cit., Part II, Section B, "Application to Retailer 
Firms".
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has to take into account Vvhen making its decisions.
The steady state of prices is not, however, associated with any 
particular optimum level of output either for the firm or the industry. 
That is, there is no equilibrium of prices or output like that which 
obtains in neoclassical theories of the firm. Firms in Andrews' 
model are willing to suppLy more at the current prices. The stability 
that follows logically from Andrews' assumptions is one of price not 
output. The conclusions o f  Andrews' model differ from those of 
theories of the imperfectly competitive firm in the neoclassical 
research programme. These theories, which were said to be applicable 
to manufacturing industry, concluded that in equilibrium firms would 
either be making above-normal profit or producing a non-optimal level 
of output or both. If the firms are few in number and collude, then 
the monopoly model applies and above normal profits are made. If the 
firms are large in number and act independently then the model of 
monopolistic competition applies and there is excess capacity. In 
either case, the welfare conclusion is the same, resources are being 
misallocated. This welfare conclusion does not follow from Andrews' 
model. The conclusions of his model are that only normal profits are 
made in the long run and that, since there is no optimum level of 
output because long run costs are constant, the concept of excess 
capacity is inappropriate.
Both the neoclassical theories of the firm and Andrews' 
alternative stem from Marshall. That two such different theories can 
come from the same source can be explained by the fact that Marshall 
thought that two quite different and incompatible theories of the 
natural science were appropriate models for economic science. Since 
the subject matter of the social sciences was not constant, he thought 
that an evolutionary model, similar to that of biology, was appropriate
2b4.
to economics, a model incorporating time, uncertainty and change.
Yet he also thought that for some purposes an economy and its parts 
could be regarded as analogous to a machine and that a mechanical
model was therefore appropriate. He cautioned, however, that this
. . . . 5  .type of model had only a limited use m  economics. Neoclassical
theories of the firm developed those parts of Marshallian analysis 
where a mechanical analogy was appropriate. This meant that the 
conclusions of these theories were concerned with equilibrium 
positions, mostly static. It had come to be considered by the 
reference group at the time Andrews was writing that only equilibrium 
theories were properly scientific economics.
Andrews’ theory was developed from the other strand in Marshall. 
It was internally logical and its assumptions were more realistic 
than those of the neoclassical theories. It was clearly not inferior 
on either of those grounds. It gave a satisfactory theoretical 
explanation of a real world phenomena, namely stability of prices 
under conditions of uncertainty and interdependence. It was not a 
general model; it was applicable to industries with particular 
market and technological conditions, but the same applies to the 
theories of the imperfectly competitive firms. It was therefore not 
inferior on this ground either.
Yet Andrews’ alternative did not replace the neoclassical theory 
of the firm. While there are a variety of reasons for this, I have 
argued that the main reason is that it did away with equilibrium.
That is, the conclusion of his model was not the definition of the
^Marshall (1920b), op.cit., p.xiii and p.637.
^ibid.
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kind ol' precis*■ equilibrium of price and output which was regarded as 
the hallmark of scientific economics. To accept his alternative 
would have required a fundamental and drastic change in the research 
programme of economics. . n  the eyes of most economists it would have 
resulted in giving up the attempt to make economics a science, and it 
was on its being a science that much of the authority and prestige of 
the discipline depends.
Andrews himself recognised this and tried to persuade his 
colleagues that to give up equilibrium would not make economics 
unscientific.
"Something may be said by way of consolation 
to those who may think in giving up the 
nicely precise idea of equilibrium as we 
understand it, economics would lose that 
quality which marks it off from the less 
fortunate sister social sciences, which 
lack the theoretical foundations of the 
kind in which economists are trained. The 
physical scientists have had to face just 
such a methodological break during this 
century.. The laws which are applied to 
assemblies of many atoms were discovered 
not to be applicable at the level of the 
atom. Accepting this, physicists have not 
forced their macro theory at the atomic 
level, nor have they given up research at 
that level in despair."6
The economists were not ready to emulate the physicists and 
Andrews’ attempted revolution failed. The appeal of analysis framed 
in equilibrium terms proved too strong for Andrews to overcome. The 
reference group of the profession at the time did not agree with him 
that economics had taken a wrong turning and that that wrong turning 
came when a commitment was made to the full equilibrium concept. 
Neoclassical economics continued on, ignoring the anomalies it could 
ignore, finding ad hoc solutions or alternative theories within the
^Andrews (1964b), op.cit. , pp.92-93.
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research programme for those it could not. The profession was not 
willing to follow Marshall's other route towards disequilibrium, 
towards the discovery of laws appropriate only to particular times 
and places, to the admission of interaction, time and uncertainty, 
to conclusions in terms of alternatives instead of determinates.
APPENDIX
THE FULL-COST IRINCIPLE AND NORMAL COST PRICING
Firms use average cost or normal cost as a basis for calculating 
their cost. They assume a "standard" output for the calculation of 
overheads and the profit margin. If the achieved output is exactly 
that planned, and this of course cannot be assumed to be the case 
since it depends on the customers, then firms will receive their 
"full" costs. The distinction between firms operating under the full 
cost principle and normal-cost pricing arises when the achieved 
output is not the same as the planned output. In the normal cost 
case price will not be changed and the firm will accept a lower than 
"normal" (or higher than "normal") profit margin. In full cost
pricing firms are endeavouring to actually cover their "full" cost 
and will make changes either in price or output. Some writers 
criticized Andrews’ analysis on the grounds that the firms would 
attempt to restrict output if not receiving the planned margin. This 
may be the implication of the full cost model, it is not of the normal 
cost model where firms set the price and sell as much as they can at 
that price. Firms adhering to the full cost principle do not always 
achieve their aim in getting their own calculated costs and net profit 
margin actually covered, but this is their aim. In the normal/ 
average cost methods covering these costs at all times is not the aim 
of the firm. The purpose of using the method is to provide a means 
of arriving at a price that gives stability in an uncertain 
situation, a price which will keep customers’ goodwill and prevent
share being eroded either by existing or potential competition.
2 6 7 .
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In either case whether the calculated margin is covered at all 
times depends on the particular historical conditions. The important 
difference between the two models is in the aims of the firm.
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